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ABSTRACT 
 
DAN V. KOZLOWSKI: The Malleable Viewpoint/Content Distinction and its Consequences 
for Free Expression 
(Under the direction of Ruth Walden) 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has recognized three categories of regulations on 
expression: content neutral, content based, and viewpoint based.  Whether a regulation will 
be upheld depends in large measure on the Court’s determination of the category to which it 
belongs.  The Court has devised tests to review content-neutral and content-based 
regulations, but it has said that viewpoint-based regulations are unconstitutional.  The 
categorical approach thus seems to depend on a clear demarcation between the content and 
viewpoint concepts. 
 This dissertation explores how the Court has distinguished between content and 
viewpoint discrimination and concludes that the distinction, despite its importance, remains 
unclear.  The Court has failed to adequately define the terms and the criteria to be used in 
determining whether content or viewpoint discrimination is present.  In identifying content 
discrimination involving private speech and speech in public forums, the dissertation shows 
that the Court has waffled among three approaches, variably relying on the face of the 
regulation, the purpose of the regulation, and the effect of the regulation.  The Court has 
further clouded its jurisprudence when reviewing restrictions on private speech and speech in 
public forums by conflating the content and viewpoint terms.  In limited public forum, 
nonpublic forum, and subsidy cases, the Court has ruled that content discrimination is 
iv
permissible.  Viewpoint discrimination, however, remains unconstitutional.  In spite of the 
Court’s stated prohibition of viewpoint discrimination, the dissertation shows that the Court 
has applied the concept differently depending on the speech context. 
 In addition, this dissertation examines whether the Court’s lack of definitions and 
inconsistent applications permit ideological manipulation of the concepts.  Using data from 
The Supreme Court Compendium that categorize the ideological voting behavior of justices 
on the Court, the dissertation studies decisions in three socially divisive areas of law in which 
content and viewpoint discrimination have been central issues of significant cases.  With a 
few notable exceptions, the lineups of justices in the cases largely mirror the justices’ 
ideological voting behaviors.  The dissertation concludes by proposing a new method of 
analysis for courts to follow that has clearer guidelines and leaves less room for ideological 
biases to influence case outcome. 
vFor Jane and Anna,  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction and Overview 
The U.S. Supreme Court’s contemporary approach to the Free Speech Clause of the 
First Amendment relies heavily on categorical analysis.1 In its jurisprudence, the Court has 
recognized three categories of regulations on expression: content neutral, content based, and 
viewpoint based.2 Whether a particular regulation will be upheld depends in large measure 
on the Court’s initial determination of the category to which it belongs.3 Sketched very 
loosely (as will be seen, the Court’s own descriptions have varied), content-based laws 
restrict the subject matter of expression while content-neutral laws restrict the opportunity for 
expression.4 A restriction on the time and route of a parade is an example of a content-
neutral regulation.  The regulation may encroach slightly on freedom of expression, but it is 
not aimed at regulating the content of the parade, only the time, place, and manner of 
expression.5 The Court, therefore, considers content-based restrictions to be more 
worrisome.6 As such, those restrictions will receive strict scrutiny, the most rigorous scrutiny 
 
1 See Wilson Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that are Both Content-Based and Content-Neutral: 
The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 803 (2004). 
 
2 See Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable 
Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 69, 70 (1997). 
 
3 CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 12 (1993). 
 
4 Huhn, supra note 1, at 814. 
 
5 KENT MIDDLETON ET AL., THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 35 (6th ed. 2003).   
 
6 As will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the Court’s skepticism of content-based regulations applies to 
regulations of private speech and of speech in public forums (such as the parade restriction mentioned here).  In 
other speech contexts, the Court is more tolerant of content-based regulations. 
2the Court employs.7 A content-neutral restriction receives a more lenient intermediate 
review.8
The distinction between content- and viewpoint-based regulations is critical to First 
Amendment doctrine as well.9 To extend the parade example, a law barring all political 
parades through town would be an example of a content-based restriction; the subject or topic 
of politics would be singled out for regulation.  If the government were to go one step farther, 
however, and proscribe only parades sponsored by Republicans, the law would constitute 
viewpoint discrimination; only one viewpoint, the Republican viewpoint, would be barred, 
thus making the regulation viewpoint based.  Because viewpoint-based restrictions “pose the 
inherent risk that the Government seeks not to advance a legitimate regulatory goal, but to 
suppress unpopular ideas or information or manipulate the public debate through coercion 
rather than persuasion,”10 the Court has long disfavored viewpoint discrimination.  Even 
when the government administers a nonpublic forum, a situation in which the government 
has significant control over speech, regulations on speech still must be reasonable and
viewpoint neutral.11 
7 Under strict scrutiny, a regulation must be justified by a compelling governmental interest, and it must limit 
expression using the least restrictive means possible.  
 
8 Under intermediate scrutiny, a restriction must be content neutral, must be narrowly tailored to serve a 
significant governmental interest, and must leave open ample alternative channels for communication of the 
information. 
 
9 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 
34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 596 (2003). 
 
10 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994).  As one commentator has written, “A fear of 
viewpoint discrimination motivates and informs much of First Amendment jurisprudence.”  Note, The Content 
Distinction in Free Speech Analysis after Renton, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1904, 1914 (1989) [hereinafter Content 
Distinction]. 
 
11 As will be discussed in much more detail in Chapters 3 and 4, in its jurisprudence the Court identifies three 
kinds of forums: traditional, limited, and nonpublic.  Traditional public forums are government-owned 
properties that the government constitutionally must make available for speech.  Examples include streets, 
3The prohibition of viewpoint discrimination lies at the heart of the First Amendment’s 
free speech guarantee.  Viewpoint discrimination, Professor Leslie Gielow Jacobs reasoned, 
“is the primary free speech clause danger.”12 The Court treats content-based regulations with 
suspicion because they remove whole subjects or topics from the marketplace of ideas.  
Viewpoint-based restrictions, however, are even more damaging because the government 
skews “public debate in an explicitly message-sensitive way” by suppressing particular 
views.13 A viewpoint-based regulation thus violates any number of values that animate the 
First Amendment: It arguably impedes a free search for truth14 and stunts individual self-
fulfillment.15 Moreover, because viewpoint restrictions are often the product of antagonism 
toward a minority view,16 they fail to protect dissent17 and encourage tolerance.18 As the 
Court’s jurisprudence has developed, content-based restrictions on speech have been upheld, 
 
parks, or sidewalks.  A limited, sometimes called a dedicated, public forum is property that the government 
intentionally designates for expression.  A state university, for instance, creates this type of forum when it 
permits student groups to meet in campus facilities.  A nonpublic forum is property that is not by tradition or 
designation a forum for public expression.  The Court has said a military base is an example of a nonpublic 
forum.  In this type of forum, the government may permit speech if it chooses, but it need not demonstrate 
compelling or even significant reasons to justify excluding speech.  Instead, any speech restrictions, including 
content-based restrictions, merely must be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.  See MIDDLETON ET AL., supra 
note 5, at 55-57.   
 
12 Jacobs, supra note 9, at 600. 
 
13 Id. at 598. 
 
14 See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“The best test of truth is the 
power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.”) 
 
15 See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Scope of First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 966 
(1978). 
 
16 Jacobs, supra note 9, at 600. 
 
17 See STEVEN SHIFFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DEMOCRACY, AND ROMANCE (1990). 
 
18 See LEE BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY (1986). 
4but what the Court has determined to be viewpoint-based restrictions have never been 
upheld.19 
Determining whether a speech regulation is viewpoint based would thus seem to be 
critical when ruling on its constitutionality.20 Despite the importance of that inquiry – 
despite how significant it is for First Amendment law – the means of making the 
determination remain murky for the Court.21 In theory, the Court’s categorical approach 
might seem clear-cut and obvious, a sensible framework to ensure the utmost protection for 
free speech.  In operation, cases have rarely been as easy as the parade example offered 
above, and the content and viewpoint concepts have proven to be slippery in the Court’s 
hands.  The Court has experienced difficulty in making the distinction between content-
neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-based regulations of speech and in making the 
distinction consistently.22 The confusion, as will be seen, is further fueled by linguistic 
imprecision and inconsistent application.  Although the Court has offered examples of 
impermissible viewpoint regulations in its case law, it has failed to establish a predictable 
border between viewpoint and content or even clearly and consistently define viewpoint 
discrimination.23 To illustrate, viewpoint discrimination has been described by 
 
19 Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems in the 
Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 49, 56 (2000).  See also Kathleen Sullivan, Discrimination, 
Distribution and Free Speech, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 439, 443 (1995) (arguing “viewpoint discrimination is the 
cardinal First Amendment sin”); Anthony Colletta, Comment, Abridgments of Free Speech Which Discriminate 
on the Basis of Viewpoint: Finzer v. Barry, 61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 127, 142 (1986) (arguing “viewpoint-based 
restrictions do more to undermine first amendment values than content-based restrictions”). 
 
20 Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 56. 
21 Jacobs, supra note 9, at 596. 
 
22 Id. at 602. 
 
5commentators and the Court, inter alia, as a subset of content discrimination, as a 
particularly egregious form of content discrimination, and as a concept distinguishable from 
content discrimination.24 To further add to the morass, the Court has frequently appeared to 
use the terms interchangeably.  Commentators have thus criticized the Court for failing to 
articulate a method for deciding when a regulation suppresses a point of view instead of 
permissibly restricting a certain subject.25 The Court has also drawn criticism for applying 
the viewpoint label unpredictably26 and for “adopting an unduly restrictive definition of 
viewpoint discrimination.”27 The resulting doctrine, one commentator has written, has 
produced fractured opinions that often appear outcome-driven.28 
Because of this increasingly confused jurisprudence and the repercussions it has for 
free expression, this dissertation seeks to illuminate the distinction between content and 
viewpoint discrimination and explore the validity of claims that the concepts are susceptible 
to ideological manipulation.  The dissertation concludes with a proposed solution, a new 
method of analysis for courts to follow.  Before reviewing the literature necessary to embark 
on the project, it is useful to describe the quagmire as presented in a significant and relatively 
recent Supreme Court decision, Hill v. Colorado.29 In 1993, the Colorado legislature enacted 
a law aimed to prevent the “willfull obstruction of a person’s access to medical counseling 
 
23 Janna J. Annest, Note & Comment, Only the News That’s Fit to Print: The Effect of Hazelwood on the First 
Amendment Viewpoint-neutrality Requirement in Public School-Sponsored Forums, 77 WASH. L. REV. 1227, 
1230 (2002).  
 
24 Id.; Chemerinsky, supra note 19.  
 
25 Annest, supra note 23, at 1234. 
 
26 Id.  
27 Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 56. 
 
28 Jacobs, supra note 9, at 597. 
 
29 530 U.S. 703 (2000).   
6and treatment.”30 Section 2 of the law made it a crime to “knowingly obstruct, detain, hinder, 
impede, or block another person’s entry to or exit from a health care facility.”31 The third 
section of the statute, however, went beyond the ban on blocking entry and exit and made it a 
crime  
 [to] knowingly approach another person within eight feet of such person, 
 unless such other person consents, for the purpose of passing a leaflet or 
 handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral protest, education, or 
 counseling with such other person in the public way or sidewalk area within a 
 radius of one hundred feet from any entrance door to a health care facility.32 
The statute was a product of the “street theater of anti-abortion politics,”33 its 
nondescript reference to “health care facilit[ies]” notwithstanding.  Although there was a bit 
of testimony in the legislative history regarding animal rights protests at other types of 
medical facilities,34 “the legislative history makes it clear,” Justice John Paul Stevens wrote 
for a majority of the Court when it ruled on the constitutionality of the statute, “that its 
enactment was primarily motivated by activities in the vicinity of abortion clinics.”35 
Shortly after the statute’s enactment, a group of anti-abortion demonstrators sued in 
state court, arguing that Section 3 of the statute was facially invalid.36 The plaintiffs lost at 
trial and on appeal to the state’s highest court.  They then appealed to the U.S. Supreme 
 
30 COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1) (2000). 
 
31 Id. § 18-9-122(2). 
 
32 Id. § 18-9-122(3). 
 
33 Jamin Raskin & Clark LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech About Favored Rights: Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing 
Public Forum and the Need for an Objective Speech Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U.L. REV. 179, 183 (2001). 
 
34 William E. Lee, The Unwilling Listener: Hill v. Colorado’s Chilling Effect on Unorthodox Speech, 35 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 387, 396 (2002). 
 
35 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000).   
 
36 Raskin & LeBlanc, supra note 33, at 192. 
7Court.  In their appeal to the Court, the demonstrators challenged the constitutionality of 
Section 3 on various First Amendment grounds.37 None of those grounds proved successful 
in front of the Court; the focus here, though, is on what legal commentators have called the 
“Court [majority’s] most corrosive holding” that the statute was neither content nor 
viewpoint based.38 The anti-abortion demonstrators argued that Section 3 was content based 
because protest, education, and counseling were categories of speech singled out for 
regulation.39 Furthermore, they contended, the statute was discriminatory because it, in 
effect, gave listeners “unbridled discretion” to permit or deny a speaker permission to 
approach based on their dislike of the content or viewpoint of the speaker’s speech.40 
In a 6-3 decision, the Court rejected those claims,41 holding that the statute was a 
constitutional content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation of speech.42 The Court 
majority began its content-neutrality analysis by repeating its holding in Ward v. Rock 
 
37 Those grounds included content and viewpoint discrimination, insufficiently narrow tailoring, failure to leave 
open ample alternative channels of communication, imposition of a prior restraint, overbreadth, and vagueness.  
See id. at 193. 
 
38 Id. at 183. 
 
39 Id. at 193. 
 
40 Id.  
41 Although outside the scope of the present discussion, the Hill decision is also noteworthy because of the 
“interest analysis” the Court conducted.  530 U.S. at 715.  The Court reasoned that three “competing interests 
[were] at stake”: the petitioners’ interest in free speech, the state’s interest in protecting the health and safety of 
its citizens, and a listener’s interest in avoiding unwanted communication.  Id. at 714-16.  The Court wrote, “It 
is also important when conducting this interest analysis to recognize the significant difference between state 
restrictions on a speaker’s right to address a willing audience and those that protect listeners from unwanted 
communication.  This statute deals only with the latter.”  Id. at 714-16.  The Court denied that it was 
recognizing a new listener’s “right” to avoid unwanted speech in a public forum.  (Justice Scalia, in dissent, 
argued that the majority was.)  Rather, Justice Stevens wrote, “we are merely noting that our cases have 
repeatedly recognized the interests of unwilling listeners in situations where ‘the degree of captivity makes it 
impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure.’”  Id. at 718 (citing Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)).  The Court’s protection of the “unwilling listener” in Hill has been 
roundly attacked by some legal commentators.  See, e.g., Lee, supra note 34.    
 
42 530 U.S. at 719.   
8Against Racism:43 “The principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases 
generally and in time, place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has 
adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”44 The 
Hill Court said the Colorado statute passed that inquiry for “three independent reasons.”45 
First, the Court declared that Section 3 was not a “regulation of speech,” but only a 
“regulation of the places where some speech may occur.”46 Second, the Court concluded that 
Section 3 was not adopted by the Colorado legislature because of disagreement with any 
messages conveyed.47 Such a conclusion was supported, the Court said, by the Colorado 
Supreme Court’s holding that the statute’s “restrictions apply equally to all demonstrators, 
regardless of viewpoint, and the statutory language makes no reference to the content of the 
speech.”48 Finally, the Court held that Colorado’s interests in protecting access and privacy 
“are unrelated to the content of the demonstrators’ speech.  As we have repeatedly explained, 
government regulation of expressive activity is ‘content neutral’ if it is justified without 
reference to the content of the regulated speech.”49 
The Court rejected the argument that the law was content based because it selectively 
applied only to oral protest, education, and counseling.50 It is common in the law, the Court 
 
43 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 
44 Id. at 791. 
 
45 Hill, 530 U.S. at 719. 
 
46 Id.  
 
47 Id.  
48 Id. (citing Hill v. Thomas, 973 P.2d 1246, 1256 (Colo. 1999)). 
 
49 Id. at 720. 
 
9said, to examine the content of communication to determine a speaker’s purpose.51 Whether 
a particular statement constitutes a threat, blackmail, or a copyright violation, for instance, 
the Court held, often depends on courts reviewing the content of the statement in question.52 
“We have never held, or suggested, that it is improper to look at the content of an oral or 
written statement in order to determine whether a rule of law applies to a course of conduct,” 
Justice Stevens wrote.53 Furthermore, the Court held, Section 3 applied to any form of oral 
protest, education, and counseling.  The statute “places no restrictions on – and clearly does 
not prohibit – either a particular viewpoint or any subject matter that may be discussed by a 
speaker.”54 As the Court majority interpreted the statute, it was a “minor place restriction”55 
on a “broad category of communications with unwilling listeners.”56 It did not draw 
distinctions based on the subject that an approaching speaker wished to address; rather, “the 
statute applies equally to used car salesmen, animal rights activists, fundraisers, 
environmentalists, and missionaries.”57 That is, under the statute, as the majority saw it, no 
one was allowed to approach within eight feet of another person, without permission, to 
educate, protest, or counsel on any subject outside of a health clinic. 
 
50 Id.  In making this argument, the petitioners relied on Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980), a case in which 
the Court reviewed a general prohibition of peaceful picketing that contained an exemption for picketing of a 
place of employment involved in a labor dispute.  The Court held that because “it is the content of speech that 
determines whether [the regulation] is within or without the statute’s blunt prohibition,” the statute is content 
based.  Id. at 462. 
 
51 530 U.S. at 721.   
 
52 Id. 
 
53 Id. 
 
54 Id. at 723. 
 
55 Id. 
 
56 Id. 
 
57 Id.  
10
 Two fiery dissents interpreted the statute differently.  Justice Antonin Scalia, joined 
by Justice Clarence Thomas, contended that the law was clearly content based and intended 
to restrict the speech of abortion protesters.  He wrote: 
 Whether a speaker must obtain permission before approaching within 
 eight feet – and whether he will be sent to prison for failing to do so – depends 
 entirely on what he intends to say when he gets there. I have no doubt that this 
 regulation would be deemed content-based in an instant if the case before us 
 involved antiwar protesters, or union members seeking to "educate" the public 
 about the reasons for their strike.58 
Justice Scalia’s latter sentence builds on an argument he first articulated in Madsen v. 
Women’s Health Center,59 decided six years earlier.  In Hill, as he had in Madsen, Justice 
Scalia argued that speech regulations directed against the opponents of abortion enjoy “the 
benefit of the ‘ad hoc nullification machine’ that the Court has set in motion to push aside 
whatever doctrines of constitutional law stand in the way of that highly favored practice.”60 
The majority’s desire to protect the practice of abortions, Justice Scalia argued, allowed it to 
contort its reasoning and find the statute content neutral.  Justice Scalia mocked the 
majority’s holding that Section 3 was intended to apply to anyone wishing to educate, 
protest, or counsel outside of a health clinic.  “This Colorado law is no more targeted at used 
car salesmen, animal rights activists, fund raisers, environmentalists, and missionaries than 
French vagrancy law was targeted at the rich,” he wrote.  “We know what the Colorado 
 
58 Id. at 742 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). 
 
59 512 U.S. 753.  In Madsen, which will be discussed in Chapter 5, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a 
state court injunction that restricted the activities of abortion protesters outside abortion clinics.  The Court held 
that the injunction was partially constitutional and partially unconstitutional.  In dissent, Justice Scalia, joined 
by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, argued that “the entire injunction in this case departs so far from the 
established course of our jurisprudence that in any other context it would have been regarded as a candidate for 
summary reversal.  But the context here is abortion.”  Id. at 786 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
60 530 U.S. at 741 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 785) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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legislators . . . were taking aim at.”61 To find the statute content neutral, Justice Scalia 
concluded, “blinks reality.”62 
In a separate dissent, Justice Anthony Kennedy agreed with Justice Scalia that the 
statute was content based.63 “The law imposes content-based restrictions on speech by 
reason of the terms it uses, the categories it employs, and the conditions for its enforcement.  
It is content based, too, by its predictable and intended operation,” he wrote.64 He argued 
that a statute of broad application, as this statute was, is not content neutral if its terms 
control the substance of a speaker’s message.65 Furthermore, Justice Kennedy argued, not 
only did the majority err in finding the statute content neutral, but also “it compounds the 
mistake by finding the law viewpoint neutral. Viewpoint-based rules are invidious speech 
restrictions, yet the Court approves this one.”66 The statute, Justice Kennedy reasoned, was 
designed to restrict speakers on one side of the debate: those who protest abortions.  “The 
statute applies only to medical facilities, a convenient yet obvious mask for the legislature’s 
true purpose and for the prohibition’s true effect.”67 To buttress that point, he argued, one 
need not read farther than the statute’s preamble, which recognizes “that the exercise of a 
person’s right to protest or counsel against certain medical procedures must be balanced 
 
61 Id. at 744. 
 
62 Id. at 748.  Unlike Justice Kennedy, see infra notes 66-69 and accompanying text, Justice Scalia did not 
charge that the statute was viewpoint based.  Justice Scalia argued that the content-based statute should be 
subjected to strict scrutiny, which, he contended, it would fail.  Id. at 748-49. 
 
63 Id. at 765-66 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the statute “is a textbook example of a law which is 
content based”). 
 
64 Id. at 766. 
 
65 Id. at 767. 
 
66 Id. at 768.  
 
67 Id.  
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against another person’s right to obtain medical counseling and treatment in an unobstructed 
manner.”68 Justice Kennedy, then, focusing closely here on legislative history and purpose, 
concluded the statute was viewpoint discriminatory and should have been declared 
unconstitutional.69 
The debate and disagreement over the content and viewpoint neutrality of the statute 
among justices in Hill is far from an anomaly.  Indeed, Hill is but one important example in a 
number of cases in which the Court appears to disagree over the definition, interpretation, 
and application of its content- and viewpoint-neutrality principles.  The foregoing discussion 
of Hill illustrates the scope and stake of the debate among justices on the Court.  The line 
between content-neutral, content-based, and viewpoint-based regulations has proven to be 
thin, perhaps illusory.  What constitutes viewpoint discrimination, a case such as Hill begs?  
What role does or should legislative history and intent play in determining whether a speech 
regulation is content or viewpoint based?  What is the line – or, even, is there a line – 
separating content from viewpoint?  This dissertation seeks to answer those questions, to 
explore how the Court has distinguished between the closely related but slippery concepts of 
content and viewpoint.   
 As Hill demonstrates, differing interpretations among justices have produced 
fractured opinions, resulting in accusations by scholars and, also, justices70 that the 
distinction between content and viewpoint is susceptible to ideological manipulation, that is, 
charges that the line between content and viewpoint can be – in fact, has been – manipulated 
 
68 Id. (emphasis added) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-9-122(1)). 
 
69 Id. at 769. 
 
70 See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
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to reach outcome-driven decisions.71 Such charges have not been examined systematically.  
A narrow focus of this project will be to investigate their merit, studying whether the Court’s 
speech discrimination principles have been vulnerable to ideological manipulation by justices 
on the Court.  Might the emotionally charged topic of abortion have colored the justices’ 
evaluation of the viewpoint neutrality of the statute in Hill, for instance?  If so, what might 
that tell us about the Court and its role in preserving free expression?  As Professor Jacobs 
has argued, like liberty, free speech “finds no refuge in a jurisprudence of doubt.”72 
Underlying this dissertation is a concern that a central tenet of the Court’s free speech 
doctrine – the prohibition of viewpoint discrimination – is “awash in a sea of confusion.”73 
Literature Review 
As the discussion in Hill indicates, to study the Court’s handling of the distinction 
between viewpoint and content, one must also understand the Court’s differing treatment of 
content-neutral and content-based regulations.  Indeed, because the distinctions between 
content-based/content-neutral and content-based/viewpoint-based regulations have proven to 
be so closely related, this review of literature first summarizes the chief commentary 
analyzing and critiquing the content-based/content-neutral distinction.  The literature 
addressing the distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination is then reviewed.  
The final portion of the literature review discusses scholarship that has studied judicial 
decision making, particularly the role ideological preferences play when judges resolve a 
case. 
 
71 An outcome-driven, or result-oriented, decision is one in which a judge manipulates judicial concepts in order 
to reach a desired outcome or result.   
 
72 Jacobs, supra note 9, at 635 (quoting Planned Parenthood of S.E. Penn. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992)). 
 
73 Id.  
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 The Distinction Between Content-based and Content-neutral Regulations 
 Legal scholars generally agree that one of the first serious scholarly critiques of the 
judicial distinction between content-neutral and content-based regulations appeared nearly 
twenty-five years ago.74 In 1981, Professor Martin Redish argued that those who endorsed 
such a distinction “labor under two misconceptions.”75 The first, he said, was that “the 
interests and values of free expression” are more threatened by regulations aimed at the 
content of speech than those that are not.76 He wrote, “The most puzzling aspect of the 
distinction between content-based and content-neutral restrictions is that either restriction 
reduces the sum total of information or opinion disseminated.”77 The second misconception, 
according to Redish, was that it would always be possible to differentiate between content-
based and content-neutral laws.78 Redish’s concern has proved prescient.  Because of the 
uncertainty, Redish concluded that the distinction was “pragmatically untenable” and that it 
should, therefore, be discarded.79 In its place, Redish proposed that “all government 
regulations of expression be subjected to a unified compelling interest analysis.”80 
Not all of the initial scholarship agreed with Redish’s condemnation of the distinction 
between content-based and content-neutral laws.  Professor Geoffrey Stone, for instance, 
 
74 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, the Supreme Court’s classic statement of the requirement of content 
neutrality did not appear until 1972 in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972). See Susan 
Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615, 623 (1991).  
 
75 Martin Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 114 (1981). 
 
76 Id. at 114. 
 
77 Id. at 128. 
 
78 Id. at 114. 
 
79 Id. at 140. 
 
80 Id. at 150. 
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found merit in the distinction.81 Stone argued that content-based and content-neutral laws 
were distinguishable – and that content-based laws were far more worrisome.  Stone admitted 
that both content-based and content-neutral laws reduce the flow of information, but, he 
explained, content-based laws are more likely to distort public debate, have an improper 
governmental motivation, and restrict speech because of its communicative impact.82 
More recent scholarship has criticized the Court’s application of the distinction but 
found enough utility in the doctrine to propose potential remedies.  Professor Susan Williams 
argued that “content discrimination promises to be one of the central first amendment issues 
for some time to come”; as such, she said, “the concept deserves a fuller explication.”83 
Williams argued that the major problem with the Court’s increasing use of content 
discrimination was that the Court has not understood and applied the principle broadly.  The 
Court, Williams argued, has increasingly interpreted content discrimination narrowly – as 
focusing only on the governmental purpose served by the regulation of speech.84 That is, she 
argued the Court erred in focusing the content-based/content-neutral determination on the 
government’s motivation behind the regulation.85 Williams criticized the Court for not 
 
81 Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46 (1987). 
 
82 Id. at 54-57.  See also, Geoffrey Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of 
Subject-matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978); Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First 
Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189 (1983) [hereinafter Stone, Content Regulation].  For other early 
scholarship in the area, see Daniel Farber, Content Regulation and the First Amendment: A Revisionist View, 68 
GEO. L.J. 727, 749-62 (1980); P. Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 VA. L. REV.
203 (1982) (arguing that government should be able to regulate speech based on its subject matter but not its 
viewpoint); Note, Content Regulation and the Dimensions of Free Expression, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1854, 1856 
(1983) (suggesting an alternative approach to content-based regulation of speech). 
83 Williams, supra note 74, at 728. 
 
84 Id. at 624. 
 
85 But see Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment 
Doctrine, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 415, 446-463 (1996) (arguing that the concern with improper government 
motivation best explains the content-based/content-neutral distinction).  
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recognizing content discrimination unrelated to governmental purpose (and for often only 
glancing superficially in its evaluation of governmental purpose at that).86 For Williams, 
content discrimination is not one concept but many.  Though governmental purpose should 
be important, Williams argued, narrowly focusing on it – and ruling laws with no illicit 
purpose content-neutral – would not uncover all forms of discrimination.  Williams said that 
content discrimination may occur in the impact of the regulation on the marketplace of ideas 
available to listeners, as when a regulation bans a certain format that is systematically 
associated with particular speakers or points of view, thereby reducing the availability of that 
point of view in the marketplace.87 Furthermore, content discrimination may also occur, 
Williams said, in the impact of the regulation on a speaker’s chosen message, as when a 
regulation removes certain symbols or symbolic activities from the range of expression 
available to speakers.88 If these other types of content discrimination were more readily 
recognized, Williams concluded, “then the unfortunate doctrinal trends could be reversed and 
this area of first amendment doctrine could attain a greater degree of responsiveness and 
coherence.”89 
86 Williams, supra note 74, at 624. 
 
87 Id. at 620. 
 
88 Id.  As an example, Williams offered the following hypothetical: Suppose a law bans all bonfires in public 
places.  The harm the government seeks to control is the danger of the fire getting out of control and causing 
damage.  The law is thus content-neutral in terms of the government’s purpose.  Suppose also that bonfires are 
not regularly associated with any particular subject matter or viewpoint.  The impact of the law on the 
marketplace of ideas would then also be content-neutral.  However, suppose a group of students from the 
People’s Republic of China wished to burn their student visas as a symbolic protest against the President’s veto 
of a bill that would have allowed them to stay in the United States.  Williams concluded the group of students 
would be experiencing a type of content discrimination, despite the fact that neither the government’s purpose 
nor the general impact of the law on the speech marketplace is discriminatory.  The discriminatory effect would 
arise because the prohibited activity is inherently communicative.  The bonfire is itself a symbolic message. 
 
89 Id. at 729. 
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 In 1997, Professor Clay Calvert examined the Court’s treatment of the distinction 
between content-based and content-neutral regulations in five then-recent Court cases that he 
said “undermine[d] and erase[d] rational distinctions between the content-neutral and 
content-based categories”:90 Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC (Turner I),91 Turner 
Broadcasting System v. FCC (Turner II),92 Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,93 
Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York,94 and City of Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres, Inc.95 In each case, the Court ruled that the speech regulation under review was 
content neutral.  Calvert argued that the Court erred in all of the cases because the regulations 
“appear content-based, either on their face or by their operation.”96 
Calvert argued that the Court’s “inconsistent and variable” approach in determining 
content neutrality permitted justices to transform seemingly content-based laws into content-
neutral ones.97 In Renton, for instance, the Court found a zoning law aimed at adult movie 
theaters to be content neutral because its purpose was to target the “secondary effects” (such 
as crime) that are associated with the presence of those theaters.98 The law was not aimed at 
the content of the films themselves, the Court concluded.  Calvert, however, argued that the 
 
90 Calvert, supra note 2, at 71.  All five cases will be discussed in later chapters. 
 
91 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 
92 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
 
93 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 
94 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 
95 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 
96 Calvert, supra note 2, at 71. 
 
97 Id. at 72. 
 
98 Renton, 475 U.S. at 48.  
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city’s focus on crime did not diminish the fact that the law singled out adult movie theaters 
for regulation, a fact that should have made the law content based.99 
Calvert posited that, in theory, the distinction between content-based and content-
neutral regulations serves the important purpose of limiting the government’s ability to 
distort the marketplace of ideas.100 However, he reasoned, “profound problems” plague the 
Court’s use of the distinction.101 As a result, Calvert argued, the “seemingly nice and neat 
dialectical categories of content-neutral and content-based regulations . . . are anything but 
tidy”102 because “the standards and criteria used for determining whether a regulation on 
speech is content-neutral or content-based are so malleable and amorphous.”103 For the 
distinction to have any continuing value, Calvert argued that the Court needed to refine the 
tests it uses to tell the difference between content-based and content-neutral regulations.  
“The problems with the doctrine are not intractable,” Calvert concluded.  “The Court, 
however, must take pause to reflect on and articulate clearer standards in the near future.”104 
99 Calvert, supra note 2, at 103.  Calvert is certainly not the only legal commentator to take issue with the 
Court’s holding in Renton. See, e.g., Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 1135, 1148 (2003); Stone, supra note 81, at 115-16 (arguing that the “secondary effects” doctrine of 
Renton “is a disturbing, incoherent, and unsettling precedent” that “threatens to undermine the very foundation 
of the content based/content neutral distinction”); Content Distinction, supra note 10. 
100 Calvert, supra note 2, at 72. 
 
101 Id. at 110. 
 
102 Id. at 72. 
 
103 Id. at 73. 
 
104 Id. at 110.  Other legal scholars have recently put forth modifications and clarifications of the distinction.  
See Steven Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment 
Jurisprudence, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 647, 707 (2002); Stephan Oestreicher, Effectual Interpretation 
and the Content Neutrality Inquiry: On Justice Scalia and Hill v. Colorado, 12 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 
1, 22 (2001). 
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 In a recent analysis, Professor Wilson Huhn disagreed with Calvert, arguing instead 
that the content-based/content-neutral distinction was unsalvageable.105 The problem, Huhn 
said, is that the doctrine relies too heavily on categorical analysis.  “It is not always possible 
to classify a law as purely content-based or purely content-neutral,” Huhn wrote.  “Many 
laws regulating expression – perhaps most such laws – are both content-based and content-
neutral.”106 For example, Huhn said zoning laws that disperse sexually oriented businesses 
(echoing Calvert) and policies and regulations restricting access of religious groups to public 
schools and universities are both content based and content neutral on their face.107 In 
addition, many laws – such as the one at issue in Hill, he argued – might be content neutral 
on their face, but are also content based in fact, he said.108 Huhn called such laws “dual-
effect laws.”109 He argued that although several Supreme Court justices (particularly Justice 
Stevens) have expressed dissatisfaction with the standard model of First Amendment 
analysis, “the Court as a whole has failed to acknowledge that the source of the difficulty is 
the dual nature of laws regulating expression.”110 
Huhn advocated discarding the content-based/content-neutral distinction and instead 
expanded upon a proposed alternative method: the multi-factor “constitutional calculus” 
suggested by Justice Stevens in his concurring opinion in the 1992 hate speech case R.A.V. v. 
 
105 Huhn, supra note 1. 
 
106 Id. at 806. 
 
107 Id. at 807. 
 
108 Id. 
109 Id. at 808. 
 
110 Id.  
20
City of St. Paul.111 Justice Stevens suggested that First Amendment cases involve the 
interaction of five variables: the content, character, context, nature, and scope of the law in 
question.  Huhn suggested that by considering those five factors in each case, the Court 
should be able to estimate the value of the expression that is being suppressed “and may then 
use that estimation of value to calibrate the quantum of proof that the State must offer to 
justify the regulation of expression.”112 Huhn concluded that the proposed balancing 
approach would be more speech-protective than the existing categorical distinction the Court 
has struggled to make.  “Rather than pretending that a law is purely content-based or purely 
content-neutral, it is more efficient and appropriate to consider how each of the underlying 
factors identified by Justice Stevens adjusts the state’s burden of proof to justify the law,” he 
wrote.113 The only categorical distinction that the Court must vigilantly enforce, Huhn 
argued, is the prohibition against viewpoint-based laws, which should remain “per se 
unconstitutional.”114 
111 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  In R.A.V., which will be discussed in detail in Chapter 3, a 17-year-old was charged 
for burning a cross inside the fenced yard of a black couple, in violation of the St. Paul Bias-Motivated Crime 
Ordinance.  The ordinance made it a misdemeanor for anyone to place a symbol, object, or graffiti, including a 
swastika or burning cross, on public or private property if it was likely to arouse “anger, alarm, or resentment in 
others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.”  The Court ruled the ordinance was an 
unconstitutional content- and viewpoint-based regulation.  The Court held that a content-based distinction 
within a category of expression that can constitutionally be restricted nevertheless violates the First 
Amendment.  Although Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment, he disagreed that the ordinance was 
viewpoint based.  Commentators have also subsequently divided on the viewpoint neutrality of the ordinance.  
Compare Cass Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARV. L. REV. 741, 762-63 (1993) (arguing the 
ordinance was not viewpoint discriminatory), with Elena Kagan, The Changing Faces of First Amendment 
Neutrality: R.A.V. v. St. Paul, Rust v. Sullivan, and the Problem of Content-Based Underinclusion, 1992 S. CT.
REV. 29, 69-71 (arguing the ordinance was viewpoint discriminatory).  
112 Huhn, supra note 1, at 808. 
 
113 Id. at 861. 
 
114 Id.  
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 The Viewpoint/Content Distinction 
 Comparatively less scholarship has focused on the Court’s distinction between 
content and viewpoint discrimination.  ACLU counsel Marjorie Heins’ article generally 
traced the history of the Supreme Court’s proscription of viewpoint discriminatory speech 
regulations.115 Heins said the constitutional prohibition against viewpoint discrimination 
“and the jurisprudential pursuit of its converse, ‘viewpoint neutrality,’ arise from the most 
basic values underlying the First Amendment.”116 Those values include the right to think, 
believe, and speak freely, the fostering of intellectual and spiritual growth, and the free 
exchange of ideas necessary to a properly functioning democracy.117 Heins argued, 
“Government action that suppresses or burdens speech on the basis of its viewpoint threatens 
all of these values by skewing public debate, retarding democratic change, depriving people 
of ideas and artistic experiences that could contribute to their growth, and otherwise 
constricting human liberty.”118 
Heins showed that the Court has never wavered in its articulation of the importance of 
viewpoint neutrality, but “it is not always so simple to define exactly what it means or to 
specify how it should apply in the myriad contexts in which government interacts with its 
citizens.”119 And the Court, despite its inspiring rhetoric on the subject, has not been a model 
of clarity, she argued.  Heins criticized the Court for ricocheting in its decisions between a 
focused emphasis on viewpoint discrimination as the ultimate First Amendment evil and 
 
115 Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99 (1996). 
 
116 Id. at 100. 
 
117 Id.  
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 101. 
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broader condemnations of content discrimination.  The Court has confused the matter, she 
said, by sometimes using the terms content and viewpoint interchangeably – even though 
content-based regulations can be capable of passing constitutional muster.  Heins lamented 
that the Court has often failed to classify burdens imposed on political, controversial, or 
offensive speech as viewpoint based.120 The concept of viewpoint neutrality, she concluded, 
has thus been confusing in application, selectively applied in many contexts, and defined too 
narrowly.121 
Heins applauded two Court decisions, Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
School District122 and Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,123 
which established that discrimination against religious expression is viewpoint based and, 
therefore, invalid.124 In Rosenberger, the Court explained that public debate is “complex and 
multi-faceted” and that discrimination against whole categories of ideas (e.g., religious ones) 
can “skew” that debate in “multiple ways.”125 Heins argued that that “crucial perception” 
should apply equally to all categories of ideas, even those labeled by officials as 
 
120 Id. at 102.  Heins listed Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988); Cornelius v. NAACP 
Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985); and Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 
U.S. 298 (1974); as examples.   
 
121 Id. at 103-05. 
 
122 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 
123 515 U.S. 819 (1995).  Like Heins, other commentators have celebrated the Rosenberger decision.  See, e.g., 
Charles Fried, The Supreme Court, 1994 Term: Foreword: Revolutions? 109 HARV. L. REV. 13, 68-73 (1995); 
Richard M. Paul, III & Derek Rose, Comment, The Clash Between the First Amendment and Civil Rights: 
Public University Nondiscrimination Clauses, 60 MO. L. REV. 889, 904 (1995); Note, The Supreme Court, 1994 
Term: Leading Cases, 109 HARV. L. REV. 111, 214 (1995). 
 
124 Since the publication of Heins’ article, the Court has added another to this line of cases.  See Good News 
Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 
125 Id. at 825.   
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controversial, political, or offensive.126 She concluded, “To be fully responsive to underlying 
First Amendment values, viewpoint neutrality must be understood to condemn, at least 
presumptively, government actions that discriminate against speech deemed ‘political,’ 
‘controversial,’ or ‘offensive,’ including expression or information on the subject of sex,” an 
area of speech historically granted less First Amendment protection.127 
Heins’ embrace of the Court’s definition of viewpoint discrimination in Rosenberger 
has been far from unanimous in the scholarly literature.  In Rosenberger, the Court, in a 5-4 
decision, invalidated a University of Virginia policy authorizing payment from the Student 
Activities Fund for the printing costs of a variety of student publications but prohibiting 
payment for any student publication that “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief 
in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”128 Acknowledging that the definition of viewpoint 
discrimination “is not a precise one,”129 the Court nonetheless concluded that “viewpoint 
discrimination is the proper way to interpret the University’s” policy.130 The Court said this 
was so because  
 the University does not exclude religion as a subject matter but selects for 
 disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts with religious editorial 
 viewpoints.  Religion may be a vast area of inquiry, but it also provides, as it 
 did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety 
 of subjects may be discussed and considered.131 
126 Heins, supra note 115, at 103. 
 
127 Id. at 105.  Heins thus argued that all regulations of obscenity – speech which, the Court has long said, is 
outside of First Amendment protection – should be considered viewpoint based. 
 
128 515 U.S. at 822. 
 
129 Id. at 831. 
 
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
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 In dissent, Justice David Souter argued that the “issue whether a distinction is based 
on viewpoint does not turn simply on whether a government regulation happens to be applied 
to a speaker who seeks to advance a particular viewpoint,” but “on whether the burden on 
speech is explained by reference to viewpoint.”132 Justice Souter maintained that the element 
of taking sides in a public debate is what “identifies viewpoint discrimination and makes it 
the most pernicious of all distinctions based on content.”133 The University policy at issue 
did not take sides, Justice Souter argued; it did not “skew debate by funding one position but 
not its competitors.”134 If the policy “amounts to viewpoint discrimination, the Court has all 
but eviscerated the line between viewpoint and content,” he concluded.135 
Professor Kent Greenawalt agreed with Justice Souter.136 “The core of the Court's 
opinion [in Rosenberger] is unconvincing because it fails to elaborate a plausible account of 
what constitutes viewpoint discrimination,” Greenawalt argued.137 Taken at face value, he 
said, “the Rosenberger majority does just what Justice Souter suggests: it undermines the 
distinction between viewpoint discrimination and most other content distinctions.”138 
Greenawalt contended that, until Rosenberger, the Court had understood viewpoint 
discrimination as a speech restriction that favors one position over opposing positions.139 But 
 
132 Id. at 894 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
133 Id. at 895. 
 
134 Id. at 896. 
 
135 Id. at 898. 
 
136 Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints From Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697 (1996). 
 
137 Id. at 697. 
 
138 Id. at 707. 
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in Rosenberger, Greenawalt argued, the Court seemed to have suggested that the fact that 
descriptive treatments of a subject matter (religion in Rosenberger) from a historical or 
psychological perspective are left free by a restriction constitutes viewpoint 
discrimination.140 If that were the case, he concluded, “then there has not yet been (and 
probably never will be) an instance of content discrimination that is not viewpoint 
discrimination.”141 Greenawalt faulted the Court for, in his opinion, eliding the two 
concepts. 
 Professor Wojciech Sadurski, too, argued that the Court “largely blur[red] the 
distinction between [content and viewpoint] neutrality” in Rosenberger.142 Sadurski saw 
important moral distinctions between content- and viewpoint-based regulations and thus 
argued that the two concepts should remain distinguishable.  The reason for and the effect of 
a regulation are the crucial considerations, he argued.  The primary motive and/or effect of 
some regulations is to “skew” a debate by removing particular viewpoints from the 
conversation.143 On the other hand, he said, there are some regulations that are mainly 
motivated by and/or result in the removal of some items, or subjects, from the agenda.144 He 
argued, “These two types of regulation have distinctive and different prima facie moral 
defects, and the distinction between viewpoint and subject matter regulations is a shorthand 
 
139 Id. at 703.  As Hill demonstrates, however, determining precisely what must be present to conclude a 
regulation favors one position over opposing positions has confounded the Court.  
 
140 Id. at 707.   
 
141 Id.  
 
142 Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom of Speech, 15 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315, 319 (1997). 
 
143 Id. at 337. 
 
144 Id. “[P]aternalism may be involved in content discrimination because it might be claimed (as a possible 
argument for a content restriction) that discussing certain matters is bad for the discussants themselves, 
regardless of the viewpoint they wish to express.” Id. at 337. 
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for this moral distinction.”145 Subject matter regulations are morally less objectionable than 
viewpoint regulations, Sadurski maintained.146 The distinction, he argued, is that subject 
matter restrictions are based upon governmental paternalism while viewpoint restrictions are 
usually triggered by governmental intolerance.147 And paternalism, his argument concluded, 
is less problematic as a legislative motivation than intolerance.148 The argument, of course, 
is predicated on the debatable views that governmental motivation can be categorized so 
pristinely and, importantly, that governmental paternalism is less problematic than 
governmental intolerance.149 
Professor Erwin Chemerinsky agreed with Heins’ assessment that the Court has 
defined viewpoint neutrality too narrowly.150 Chemerinsky focused on two Court decisions, 
Arkansas Educational Television Commission v. Forbes 151 and National Endowment for the 
Arts v. Finley,152 which he said “are important because each narrowly defines what 
constitutes viewpoint discrimination.  Each compromises the protection against content-
based regulation by adopting an unduly restrictive definition of viewpoint discrimination.”153 
145 Id.  
146 Id. at 368. 
 
147 Id.  
148 Id.  
149 See Geoffrey Stone, Comment, Anti-Pornography Legislation as Viewpoint-Discrimination, 9 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 461, 465 (1986) (arguing “[p]aternalistic or intolerance-based justifications for the suppression of 
particular viewpoints are incompatible with the basic premises of the First Amendment”). 
 
150 Chemerinsky, supra note 19.  See also Erwin Chemerinsky, Court Takes a Narrow View of Viewpoint 
Discrimination, 35 MAR. TRIAL 90 (1999). 
 
151 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
 
152 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 
153 Chemerinsky, supra note 19, at 56. 
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 In Finley, the Court upheld federal restrictions on the funding of artists.  In 1990, the 
federal statute that created the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) was amended to 
provide that in awarding money the NEA should “take into consideration general standards 
of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”154 In an 8-
1 decision, the Court upheld the “decency and respect” provision.  Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court emphasized that the law did not prevent the NEA from 
funding indecent artistic expression if it wished to.  The law, the Court held, does no more 
than require the NEA to “take ‘decency and respect’ into consideration.”155 Furthermore, the 
Court rejected the claim that, on its face, the law permitted viewpoint discrimination.  The 
Court emphasized that the government must make choices among applicants; the statute’s 
language, the Court said, does “not engender the kind of directed viewpoint discrimination 
that would prompt this Court to invalidate a statute on its face.”156 The Court concluded that 
facially the law was constitutional. 
 In criticizing the Court’s opinion, Chemerinsky contended that the terms “decency 
and respect . . . inherently focus attention on viewpoint.”157 What is decent or indecent 
depends entirely on the evaluator’s views, he said.  Moreover, he argued, determining 
whether art shows respect for values requires a viewpoint-based assessment.  Chemerinsky 
concluded, “There is no conceivable way in which ‘decency and respect’ for values can be 
defined or administered in a viewpoint-neutral fashion.”158 Chemerinsky pointed out that the 
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Court has never clearly defined what constitutes viewpoint discrimination, making Forbes 
and Finley more alarming.  “What is of concern about these two recent decisions is that both 
adopt a narrow definition of viewpoint discrimination and thus give the government more 
latitude to regulate speech.”159 Nothing is more inconsistent with freedom of expression, 
Chemerinsky wrote, than for the government to use its power to advance some views and 
suppress or disfavor others.  By adopting such “an unduly restrictive definition of viewpoint 
discrimination,” Chemerinsky feared, the Court was sanctioning the government to do that 
very thing.160 
Commentator Janna Annest critiqued the Court’s viewpoint/content distinction in the 
context of speech regulations in public schools.161 In Hazelwood School District v. 
Kuhlmeier,162 the Court addressed censorship of a high school student publication for the first 
time.  A majority of the Court found that the newspaper under question, the Spectrum, was 
not a public forum, that it was school-sponsored, and that the actions of the principal were 
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.  Consequently, the censorship was 
upheld.  Although, as discussed above, public forum analysis usually includes an 
examination of viewpoint neutrality, the Hazelwood Court concluded its analysis without any 
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such discussion.  The Court majority did not explicitly say whether school officials had to be 
viewpoint neutral in choosing what they censored.  The omission has subsequently resulted 
in a split in the federal courts of appeals, with three circuits continuing to require viewpoint-
neutral regulation and three circuits eliminating the requirement in school-sponsored 
nonpublic forums.163 
Annest agreed with the latter, arguing that the viewpoint-neutrality requirement 
should be eliminated in school-sponsored forums.  Doing so in that context, she reasoned, 
“would eliminate the doctrinal confusion associated with viewpoint and content-based 
restrictions.”164 Annest criticized the Court’s treatment of the distinction, noting that 
viewpoint and content are related concepts, “but their relationship shifts from case to case.  
. . . The point at which a content-based regulation ceases to affect an entire topic and 
becomes viewpoint-based – oppressing a specific point of view within that topic – remains 
unclear.”165 Annest labeled the rationalizations the Court used in Forbes and Finley to 
characterize the regulations in those cases as viewpoint neutral as “bizarre.”166 Particularly 
in the narrow context of nonpublic forums in public schools, Annest reasoned, the viewpoint 
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label unnecessarily binds courts without offering additional analytical capacity.  “The 
viewpoint label is more of a hindrance than a tool,” Annest concluded.167 
Echoing Annest, commentator Susan Ehrmann argued that the distinction between 
viewpoint and content discrimination is “extremely slippery.”168 Ehrmann argued the 
“sometimes imperceptible distinction”169 between the two was especially apparent in Perry 
Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n.170 In Perry, an officially elected teachers' 
labor union was given exclusive access to the school district's internal mail system, which the 
Court labeled a nonpublic forum.171 The Perry Local Educators’ Association, a rival union, 
sued, claiming that the district’s access policy violated the Constitution.  In a 5-4 decision, 
the Court upheld the challenged policy, ruling that there was “no indication that the school 
board intended to discourage one viewpoint and advance another.”172 Rather, the Court said, 
the access policy was more accurately characterized as based on the status of the respective 
unions rather than their views,173 an argument that the dissenting justices and commentators 
attacked.174 Professor Geoffrey Stone et al., for instance, labeled the access policy at issue in 
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Perry a “speaker-based” restriction – defined as a restriction that treats some speakers 
differently than others but defines the distinction in terms other than viewpoint.175 
“[S]peaker-based restrictions often have clear viewpoint-differential effects,” they wrote.  
“Indeed, in some instances, speaker-based restrictions may correlate almost perfectly with 
viewpoint.”176 In Perry, Stone et al. argued, the policy at issue “unquestionably favored 
some viewpoints over others” because recognized or official bargaining agents are likely to 
take consistent and predictable positions on issues.177 
Professor Stone’s 1983 law review article also illustrated how slippery the content 
and viewpoint labels can be, and have been, for commentators and the Court.178 Stone 
argued that viewpoint-based restrictions – “that is, laws that expressly restrict the 
communication of particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information – are at the very core 
of the content-based/content-neutral distinction.”179 Stone offered two hypothetical statutes: 
State X enacts a law prohibiting all billboards; state X then also enacts a law prohibiting all 
criticism of the anti-billboard law.180 Both statutes reduce expression, but their 
constitutionality would be tested under different standards of review.  The anti-billboard law 
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is content neutral, Stone said, but “the anti-criticism law is content-based.”181 Why?  He 
argued, “The explanation is that the first amendment is concerned, not only with the extent to 
which a law reduces the total quantity of communication, but also – and perhaps even more 
fundamentally – with the extent to which the law distorts public debate.”182 Although the 
anti-criticism statute may produce only a small reduction in the total quantity of 
communication, that reduction falls entirely on one side of the debate.  Also, Stone said, the 
potential distorting effect of the statute is dramatic, as it subjects critics of the anti-billboard 
law to a prohibition on the expression of their view.183 Stone’s anti-criticism law, then, is 
viewpoint based, not merely content based, a point that he concedes.  “My hypothetical anti-
criticism statute is not wholly hypothetical,” he wrote.  “It is, rather, but one example of a 
broad range of content-based restrictions that attempt substantially to prevent the 
communication of a particular idea, viewpoint, or item of information.”184 Collapsing 
viewpoint-based laws into the content-based category, as Stone appeared to do here (and, as 
will be seen, the Court has occasionally done itself), offers little analytical help when 
explaining decisions that strike down laws the Court finds are content, but not viewpoint, 
based – in other words, decisions in which the Court appears to treat content and viewpoint 
as distinguishable concepts.185 
Professor Nicole Casarez grounded her critique of the Court’s application of the 
viewpoint-neutrality principle in the context of nonpublic forums and, especially, cases in 
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which the government subsidizes speech.186 Casarez argued that the Court’s prohibition 
against viewpoint discrimination has increasingly become no more than an empty exhortation 
– “a superfluous inquiry” – for speech in nonpublic forums and speech the government 
subsidizes.187 In the public forum context, Casarez contended, viewpoint discrimination 
continues to be defined in a way that provides substantial protection for First Amendment 
rights.188 This has increasingly not been the case in either the nonpublic forum or the subsidy 
arenas, Casarez concluded.  “As applied by the Court during the last three decades, the rule 
against viewpoint discrimination no longer serves as a material check on the government’s 
ability to censor speech [in nonpublic forums] and subsidized speech outside the public 
forum.”189 In making her argument, Casarez pointed to, among other cases, Forbes, Finley, 
and Rust v. Sullivan,190 a case in which the Court upheld regulations specifying that federally 
funded family planning clinics could not provide abortion counseling or referrals but were 
required to refer pregnant clients for prenatal care.  Casarez argued that the issue in Rust was 
not, as Chief Justice William Rehnquist writing for the majority claimed, whether the 
government must subsidize analogous rights if it chooses to subsidize one protected right.  
“Rather, the real question boiled down to whether the government, by its power of the purse, 
can force private speakers to advance a state-sanctioned view on a controversial topic of 
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public concern.”191 Casarez argued that the government cannot – nor should the Court 
permit it.  For Casarez, the rule against viewpoint discrimination is intended to guard against 
government manipulation of public discourse.  She concluded, “No strong constitutional 
distinction has been advanced by the Court to justify the differing standards of viewpoint 
discrimination that it currently applies.”192 
Proposed Remedies  
The Court’s perceived difficulty in clearly and consistently making the distinction 
between viewpoint and content discrimination has provoked scholars to offer doctrinal 
remedies.  Professor Jacobs reasoned that “even more than the content-based/content-neutral 
inquiry, the content-viewpoint determination requires clarity and the legitimacy that this can 
bring.”193 Jacobs proposed a new method of inquiry for the Court.  The initial question, 
Jacobs said, should be whether the speech is by the government or is private speech.  The 
government/private speech determination should occur first and remain distinct from the 
content/viewpoint determination.  “Mixing them is one cause of the current confusion,” 
Jacobs said.194 If the speech is private, then the content/viewpoint inquiry will occur.  
Secondly, she said, the test to determine whether a regulation is viewpoint discriminatory is 
“whether the government excludes some perspectives on ‘a subject otherwise permitted’ in 
the forum.”195 Applying that test incorporates both substance and procedure, Jacobs said.  
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The government must identify legitimate, viewpoint-neutral boundaries, or access 
qualifications, as Jacobs called them, and those boundaries must be reasonable in light of the 
forum’s purposes.196 Finally, Jacobs said that in administering the forum the government 
must act “under narrow, objective, and definite standards” that are subject to judicial review, 
and it must apply those standards consistently.197 Jacobs’ proposal is interesting, but she 
limited her discussion of the Court’s “confused doctrine”198 to situations in which the 
government is administering a forum.  Her proposal cannot help in evaluating whether and/or 
how the statute at issue in Hill199 or a hate speech law200 is viewpoint based. 
 Commentators Jamin Raskin and Clark LeBlanc put forth a more provocative 
proposal.201 They analyzed the legislative history of the law at issue in Hill along with the 
Court’s majority and dissenting opinions and concluded that “Hill is thus a case that begs for 
the development of an objective content and viewpoint discrimination analysis under the 
First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.”202 Such an analysis, they wrote, would look not 
only at the facial character of a statute and its stated purpose, but the substantive character in 
the social, historical, and political context as well.  Under the analysis, a court would first 
look to the text of the statutory or regulatory enactment and its expressed rationale for any 
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indications of explicit content or viewpoint discrimination.203 If none is apparent or if the 
expressed rationale appears to be mere camouflage, the Court would then assess, among 
other things, the actual operation and social function of the statute.  Bringing all of the factors 
together, the court employing the objective analysis would ask this decisive question: “Given 
all that we know about the historical, legal, and social context of this enactment or policy, 
what is the most plausible understanding of its purpose and function as they relate to the 
content and viewpoint of speech to be affected?”204 
The purpose of formalizing an objective analysis, they said, is to prevent government 
from dressing up speech-discriminatory regulations in the clothing of official neutrality, as 
the Colorado legislature so clearly did in Hill.205 The analysis Raskin and LeBlanc proposed 
arguably places great clout in the hands of the judiciary, in lieu of the deference before given 
to the legislature.  Nevertheless, they argued that courts utilize the technique to screen 
improper motives and purposes in a variety of constitutional cases, including those involving 
the Equal Protection, the Free Exercise, and the Establishment clauses.206 Had the objective 
analysis been applied by the Hill Court, Raskin and LeBlanc posited, “the outcome of the 
content and viewpoint neutrality analysis – and ultimately the case itself – would have been 
radically different.”207 As it stands, Raskin and LeBlanc feared that Hill leaves the 
“vanishing public forum” in need of rescue.208 
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 Raskin and LeBlanc’s proposal is not without flaws.  Although they did argue that the 
statute at issue in Hill was viewpoint discriminatory, their proposed “objective content and 
viewpoint discrimination analysis” appears to elide the content and viewpoint concepts.  
They proposed that their test “should be used only to determine whether a statute is content 
or viewpoint-based, not to determine the whole validity of the statute.”209 Yet Raskin and 
LeBlanc offered no method to distinguish between content-based and viewpoint-based 
regulations, perhaps because, in their eyes, the concepts are not distinguishable.  At least 
Raskin and LeBlanc appeared to treat them that way.  Raskin and LeBlanc maintained that if, 
after applying their test, a court would find content or viewpoint discrimination, “then the 
enactment would still be subject to further review under strict scrutiny.”210 Presumably, then, 
under Raskin and LeBlanc’s proposal, viewpoint-based regulations, like those that are 
content based, can be constitutional, provided the government has a compelling interest and 
restricts speech using the least restrictive means.  Such a conclusion is not supportable, 
however; any proposal that tolerates viewpoint discrimination is antithetical to the First 
Amendment.     
 Judicial Decision Making 
 Raskin and LeBlanc’s proposal, flaws and all, directs us into another area of 
scholarship crucial to this project.  In their article, Raskin and LeBlanc expressed concern 
that Hill, “a case deeply colored by abortion politics,”211 demonstrated how easily ideology 
and preferences of individual justices can influence case outcomes.  They argued that when 
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the “doctrinal pretenses” of the majority and dissenting opinions in Hill are stripped away, 
the true issue of the case is revealed: “the social value and constitutional status of aggressive 
anti-abortion speech outside abortion clinics.”212 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in 
Hill, suggested that anti-abortion “sidewalk counselors” would still be able to get their 
message out since “the statute places no limitation on the number of speakers or the noise 
level, including the use of amplification equipment.”213 Implicit in such arguments, Raskin 
and LeBlanc maintained, is a “swift denigration” of the paradigmatic speech encounter 
desired – often forced – by anti-abortion protesters outside abortion clinics.  Raskin and 
LeBlanc reasoned, “The majority obviously considers such an exchange of so little value that 
normal First Amendment analysis need not apply.”214 
Raskin and LeBlanc quoted approvingly Justice Kennedy’s lamentation in dissent: “It 
should be a profound disappointment to defenders of the First Amendment that the Court 
today refused to apply the same structural analysis when the speech involved is less palatable 
to it.”215 And so it is a disappointment, Raskin and LeBlanc agreed.216 Their “objective 
content and viewpoint discrimination analysis,” they hoped, would prove to be a way to 
rescue “the First Amendment from abortion politics.”217 No matter one’s view on abortion, 
“from a First Amendment perspective all sides are deemed to have viewpoints of equal 
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plausibility and validity,” they concluded.218 Ideology of individual justices should not 
matter when adjudicating cases, they argued; the First Amendment demands government – 
including judicial – neutrality. 
 On that point, Professor James Weinstein wholeheartedly agreed.219 Weinstein 
scoffed at proposals put forth by legal scholars who argued that courts evaluating regulations 
designed to protect access to abortion clinics should modify any First Amendment analysis 
and take into account the fact that abortion is itself a constitutionally protected right.  Such 
proposals, Weinstein said, subject judicial decision making to balancing and ad hoc 
judgments and invite “judicial viewpoint discrimination” – defined as when a judge’s own 
ideological viewpoint seeps into his or her analysis of regulations.220 Weinstein admitted that 
laws that discriminate on the basis of a speaker’s viewpoint are “egregious violations of the 
free speech principle.”221 But, he said, “I want to suggest that a worse transgression is for 
those entrusted with protecting public discourse from viewpoint discrimination to themselves 
engage in such behavior.”222 Judicial viewpoint discrimination, he maintained, corrodes 
constraints on government speech regulation far more than legislative or executive viewpoint 
discrimination because it is the judiciary that is entrusted to serve as the “checking 
mechanism” of the other two branches.223 
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 Weinstein emphasized that he did not mean to suggest that “judges are, as a breed, 
ideological rogues whose discretion must always be closely confined.”224 Judges are, on 
balance, “dedicated professionals who follow doctrine and strive for principled results,” he 
said.225 But, he argued, judges are human beings and are not immune to having personal 
preferences color their decisions.  Weinstein maintained that two conditions increase the risk 
that judges “will illegitimately inject (in many cases unconsciously) their own attitudes 
towards the speaker’s ideology into the doctrinal analysis.”226 The first condition is the 
“more obvious one,” he said: A judge’s own ideological viewpoint is most likely to seep into 
the analysis of regulations passed to regulate the speech of those who aggressively attack 
some important norm that others – especially the judge – are equally as committed (or more 
committed) to defending, a condition obviously present in cases involving First Amendment 
challenges to regulations designed to protect abortion access.227 Second, “uncertain doctrinal 
rules” produce judicial viewpoint discrimination, Weinstein maintained.228 “No matter how 
strongly a judge may share or despise a speaker’s point of view, the more ‘bright line’ the 
doctrinal rules the judge must apply, the less likely it is that illicit judicial sentiments will 
affect the outcome,” he wrote.229 Multifactor balancing tests or standards that call for ad hoc 
judgments invite judicial viewpoint discrimination, he argued.  Weinstein therefore insisted 
that First Amendment jurisprudence be limited to clear, rigid, mechanical rules that, in 
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theory, do not permit judicial ideology to seep into analysis.230 As Weinstein saw it, the 
Court’s early First Amendment jurisprudence, notably the early “clear and present danger” 
cases, was illustrative of judicial antipathy to a speaker’s message determining case outcome.  
Such decisions “have become much rarer,” he said, because “free speech doctrine became 
less subjective and ad hoc as the Court developed more specific rules.”231 
Yet others have suggested that one particular “specific rule” – the Court’s prohibition 
of viewpoint discrimination – is still vulnerable to being manipulated to reach outcome-
driven decisions.  Raskin and LeBlanc’s concerns were documented above.232 Other scholars 
have made similar accusations, not just focusing their commentary on the Court’s decision in 
Hill.  Ehrmann argued that “content and viewpoint discrimination are fluid terms prone to 
manipulation.”233 Such “ambiguous doctrine,” she said, “allows the Court a large margin of 
error, and the opportunity to inject its views.”234 Professor Huhn’s criticism of the Court’s 
content-neutral/content-based distinction included his observation that some of the Court’s 
decisions can be categorized as “result-oriented.”235 “The distinction between content-based 
and content-neutral laws may mask other factors influencing the decision,” he argued.236 
Huhn noted that liberal justices have tended to consider injunctions or statutes that regulate 
abortion protesters content neutral while conservatives have perceived such actions as 
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content based.  That trend “calls the objectivity of the content-based/content-neutral 
distinction into question,” he maintained.237 Such a charge has been leveled against the 
content/viewpoint distinction as well, as Professor Jacobs did when commenting that the 
Court’s application of the distinction is “confused” and “can appear outcome-driven.”238 
These accusations are provocative, yet they have largely been dicta in law review articles, 
unexamined systematically.  Chapter 5 of this dissertation will explore them more fully. 
Weinstein’s call for rigid, mechanical rules in First Amendment decision making 
hearkens a jurisprudential debate familiar in the law: those who champion rules versus those 
who champion more contextualized decision making, informed by standards not inflexible 
rules.  Professor Daniel Farber has written that “most law professors can recite, pretty much 
by heart, the arguments on both sides of the broader debate.”239 Reviewing the voluminous 
literature of that “broader debate” is outside the scope of this dissertation.  It will be useful, 
though, to at least touch on some of its contours.  Rules, the argument goes, have the 
advantage of providing clearer guidance for both lower courts and the general public.240 
Further, because rules, in theory, leave less room for discretion, “they also provide less of a 
toehold for subjective biases.”241 In cases involving free expression, Farber argued, “we 
have particular reason to want to avoid having the judges’ ideological biases enter into the 
decision, lest those biases then have a distorting effect on public discourse.”242 Advocates of 
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flexible standards counter that the supposed certainty of rules may be overstated,243 a point 
that some commentary critiquing the content/viewpoint distinction would appear to support.  
As Farber argued, “[S]ome supposedly clear-cut rules suffer from significant definitional 
problems, rendering their boundaries unpredictable.”244 Also, the argument goes, whatever 
certainty and confinement of discretion is accomplished by bright-line rules comes at a cost.  
Mechanical application of rigid rules can sometimes produce undesirable results – decisions 
that do not promote the purpose of the rules, “or worse yet, frustrate their purpose.”245 For 
instance, the strong presumption against content-based discrimination means that content-
based regulations some might deem to be innocuous run the risk of being struck down while 
some technically content-neutral regulations that present more of an affront to free speech 
principles might be upheld.246 
Professor Stanley Fish sent ripples through the legal community when he published 
There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech roughly a decade ago.247 Fish’s collection of critical 
essays was largely unconcerned with the conventional legal jurisprudential debates just 
described.  Legal scholars nevertheless interpreted his work as an attack on free speech 
doctrine, generally, and the role of judges in interpreting the First Amendment, specifically.  
Fish wrote: 
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 “Free speech” is just the name we give to verbal behavior that serves 
 the substantive agendas we wish to advance; and we give our preferred verbal 
 behavior that name when we can, when we have the power to do so; because 
 in the rhetoric of American life, the label “free speech” is the one you want 
 your favorites to wear.  Free speech, in short, is not an independent value but a 
 political prize.248 
Professor Weinstein read Fish to be arguing that “judicial viewpoint discrimination is 
both omnipresent and unavoidable.”249 Aside from Fish “and a few other radicals,” 
Weinstein wrote, “no one seriously maintains that a person’s right to engage in public 
discourse either should or inevitably does depend on whether a judge is sympathetic or 
hostile to the ‘substantive agenda’ of a particular speaker.”250 Weinstein maintained that free 
speech is not inherently “political” or “ideological,” as Fish argued.251 Weinstein did 
reluctantly concede that justices occasionally must make value choices.  But, he said, “the 
major difference between Stanley Fish and I [sic] is that I think that the pursuit of [judicial] 
viewpoint neutrality in First Amendment doctrine is not only desirable, it is essential.”252 
Some political science scholars who study the Court might wonder what Weinstein’s 
fuss is all about.  Of course justices’ preferences matter when they decide cases; Weinstein’s 
attachment to “judicial viewpoint neutrality” is no more than a false hope predictably held by 
law professors and most, if not all, judges, these scholars would argue.253 Professors Donald 
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253 Judge Richard Posner recently buttressed that point: “The literature on the personal factor in judging still has 
not been integrated into the dominant [legal] academic commentary on the Supreme Court.  That commentary 
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to technical legal questions, even though the commentary itself is suffused with the commentators’ politics.”  
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Songer and Stefanie Lindquist, for instance, maintained that a half century of empirical 
scholarship “has now firmly established that the ideological values and the policy preferences 
of Supreme Court justices have a profound impact on their decisions in many cases.”254 
Professors Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth are largely credited with fortifying that 
position in what is known as the “attitudinal model” in contemporary scholarship.255 The 
model holds that justices’ behavior is largely structured by their individual preferences 
toward issues of public policy.  Segal and Spaeth contrasted their model with the “legal 
model” of judicial decision making, a model they said has long triumphed in the legal 
community but that is ultimately misleading and deficient.256 As Segal and Spaeth described 
it, the legal model posits that the Court decides disputes before it in light of (1) the facts of 
the case vis-à-vis extant precedent and/or (2) the plain meaning of the Constitution and 
statutes; and/or (3) the intent of the framers.  Other scholars have explained that the legal 
model “centers around a rather simple assumption about judicial decision making, namely, 
that legal doctrine, generated by past cases, is the primary determinant of extant case 
outcomes.”257 In other words, the legal model views judges as “constrained decision 
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makers” who reach decisions through a “highly structured” process.258 Segal and Spaeth – 
and other attitudinalists – challenged that view.  Both litigants in a case, Segal and Spaeth 
argued, generally find precedents supporting them259 and “each side typically alleges that 
either the plain meaning of the legal provisions at issue and/or the intent of the law makers 
supports its position.”260 If various aspects of the legal model can support either side of a 
given dispute that comes before the Court, they concluded, “then the legal model hardly 
satisfies as an explanation of Supreme Court decisions.”261 
Segal and Spaeth instead put forth the attitudinal model, which holds that justices 
make decisions by considering the facts of the case in light of their own ideological attitudes 
and values.  More simply put: “[Justice] Rehnquist vote[d] the way he [did] because he [was] 
extremely conservative; [Justice Thurgood] Marshall voted the way he did because he was 
extremely liberal.”262 The attitudinal model, they said, represents a melding together of key 
concepts from legal realism, political science, psychology, and economics.263 Segal and 
Spaeth traced the genesis of the model to the legal realists of the 1920s, who were reacting to 
the conservative and formalistic jurisprudence then in vogue.264 According to the classical 
legal scholars of that time, law was “a complete and autonomous system of logically 
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consistent principles, concepts and rules.  The judge’s techniques were socially neutral, his 
private views irrelevant; judging was more like finding than making, a matter of necessity 
rather than choice.”265 Against that theory of unchanging law that judges merely find rather 
than make, the legal realists argued that lawmaking inhered in judging.266 According to legal 
realist Karl Llewellyn, the first principle of legal realism is the “conception of law in flux, of 
moving law, and of judicial creation of law.”267 Llewellyn maintained judicial creation of 
law was not a result of bad judges seeking power for themselves, but “an inevitable fallout 
from an ever-changing society.”268 As Jerome Frank wrote: 
 The layman thinks that it would be possible so to revise the law books 
 that they would be something like logarithm tables, that the lawyers could, if 
 only they would, contrive some kind of legal sliderule for finding exact legal 
 answers. . . . [But] even in a relatively static society, men have never been 
 able to construct a comprehensive, eternalized set of rules anticipating all 
 possible legal disputes and settling them in advance. . . . Our society would be 
 straight-jacketed were not the courts, with the able assistance of lawyers, 
 constantly overhauling the law and adapting it to the realities of ever-changing 
 social, industrial and political conditions.269 
Yet contending that judges necessarily create law says nothing about how judges 
come to their decisions.  To the legal realists, any explanation of how judges reach decisions 
was not to be found in “legal rules and concepts insofar as they purport to describe what 
either courts or people are actually doing.”270 Judicial opinions containing such rules merely 
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rationalize decisions, Segal and Spaeth contended; they are not the causes of them.271 Legal 
realists called for an empirical, scientific study of law to explain judicial decision making – a 
call, Segal and Spaeth said, to which scholars were slow to respond.272 
Segal and Spaeth were not the first – and are not the only – scholars to test and then 
champion the idea that the best explanation for decision making on the Court lies in the 
personal policy preferences of its members.273 Yet it has been their work in the past decade 
that has served as the definitive presentation of the attitudinal model and has thus sparked 
scholarly debate.  Segal and Spaeth maintained that justices on the Court can further their 
policy goals by voting for their ideological preferences because they lack electoral or 
political accountability and ambition for higher office and comprise a court of last resort that 
effectively controls its own jurisdiction.274 “Although the absence of these factors may 
hinder the personal policy-making capabilities of lower court judges, their presence enables 
the [Supreme Court] justices to vote as they individually see fit,” they wrote.275 
A full discussion of the operationalization of variables276 and the statistical methods 
Segal and Spaeth employed is outside the scope of this dissertation.  The aim of this 
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49
dissertation is not to test their model or challenge their results.  Furthermore, it is important 
to note that Segal and Spaeth’s attitudinal model is not without its detractors.  Scholars have 
charged them with oversimplifying judicial decision making – too casually dismissing the 
important role precedent can, and does, play277 – and with ignoring institutional constraints 
on the Court.278 Nevertheless, although some scholars take issue with the broad charge of the 
model – which posits that justices’ policy preferences are essentially a complete explanation 
of the Court’s decisions – the issue seems to be a matter of degree.  That is, no political 
scientist appears to challenge the model’s underlying thrust: that a justice’s ideological 
preferences do have a significant influence on his or her vote.279 That important insight 
informs Chapter 5’s exploration of the ideological manipulability of the viewpoint and 
content concepts.  As will be shown there, evidence supports claims that justices’ ideological 
preferences drive their determination of content and viewpoint neutrality in the cases studied.                 
 Research Questions and Method 
The preceding review of the literature illustrates the growing scholarly concern with 
the Court’s application of its speech discrimination principles.  Viewpoint discrimination, the 
Court has said, is unconstitutional.  Content discrimination can be tolerated, however, and the 
Court is even more tolerant of content-neutral regulations of speech.  In the abstract, these 
doctrines might appear clear and unambiguous.  In operation, they have proven to be 
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slippery.  Determining whether a regulation is content neutral, content based, or viewpoint 
based frequently results in differing interpretations and fractured opinions.  A crucial free 
speech principle – that the government may not regulate speech on the basis of the speaker’s 
view – lies awash in confusion.  This dissertation aims to untangle that confusion by 
thoroughly exploring how the Court has distinguished between the closely related but 
slippery concepts of content and viewpoint.   
 Specifically, this dissertation addresses the following research questions: 
 RQ1: How has the U.S. Supreme Court distinguished between the closely related 
 concepts of content and viewpoint discrimination? 
To answer that broad question requires addressing several sub-questions: 
 RQ1a: How has the Court defined content discrimination?  Has that  
 definition changed over time?  How has the Court applied the   
 definition to identify instances of content discrimination and its converse,  
 content neutrality? 
 RQ1b: How has the Court defined viewpoint discrimination?    
 Has that definition changed over time?  How has the Court    
 applied the definition to identify instances of viewpoint discrimination and 
 its converse, viewpoint neutrality?   
 RQ1c: What role have legislative purpose and history played in Court  
 determinations of content and viewpoint neutrality? 
 RQ1d: What role has the effect of restrictions played in Court   
 determinations of content and viewpoint neutrality? 
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 RQ1e: In cases in which the Court split over whether a regulation   
 constituted viewpoint discrimination, was such disagreement based on  
 differing definitions of the concept or solely differing applications of the  
 same conceptual definition? 
 RQ2: What evidence, if any, exists to support commentators’ charges that the 
 Court’s speech discrimination principles have been manipulated to justify 
 ideologically based or outcome-driven decisions? 
 
The dissertation utilized a traditional legal research method, that is, critical analysis of 
case law.  The primary method for identifying relevant cases for critical analysis was a 
“Terms and Connectors” search in Westlaw’s electronic Supreme Court Database.280 To 
ensure all relevant case law was captured, key word searches were also conducted in Lexis-
Nexis Academic’s electronic database,281 and the reviewed scholarly literature was scoured 
for case discussion and citations.  As will be discussed, the Burger Court introduced the 
formal terms “content neutral,” “content based,” and “viewpoint based” into First 
Amendment jurisprudence in the early 1970s.  The Court’s speech discrimination principles, 
however, were germinated in a number of pre-Burger Court decisions.  To ensure those cases 
were captured, the scholarly literature was reviewed and Court decisions identified in the 
database searches were scoured in search of cases that the Court cited as precedent.  The 
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searches revealed 99 relevant Court cases.  Of those 99 cases, many are discussed extensively 
in the text.  Less relevant cases are mentioned in footnotes.  
 The Supreme Court Compendium provided the data categorizing justices’ ideological 
voting patterns necessary to address Research Question 2.282 As noted above, scholars have 
alleged that the distinction between content and viewpoint is susceptible to being 
manipulated to reach outcome-driven decisions.  These accusations, while provocative, have 
thus far been largely unexplored systematically.  To examine whether the content- and 
viewpoint-neutrality principles have been vulnerable to ideological manipulation, Chapter 5 
analyzes free speech decisions by the Court in three emotionally charged areas of law that 
have divided conservatives and liberals in social, cultural, and political life outside the Court 
– speech regulations of abortion protesters, regulations of adult theaters and businesses, and 
restrictions on religious expression.  Viewpoint and content discrimination have been central 
issues of significant cases in each area of law.283 Using the Compendium, the analysis 
explores whether a justice’s interpretation of the viewpoint neutrality of a speech regulation 
falls on expected ideological lines.  In the cases involving regulations of adult theaters and 
businesses, for instance, have the constant divisions over the neutrality of the regulations 
pitted conservative versus more liberal voters in the First Amendment area?    
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 To best answer that question, of course, a quantifiable measure of justices’ voting 
behaviors is needed.  The Compendium is a well regarded and comprehensive collection of 
data – the only of its kind, its authors say284 – on the Supreme Court put together by four 
political science professors.  Chapter six of the Compendium, titled “The Justices: Voting 
Behavior and Opinions,” examines, among other things, the official voting behavior of the 
justices on the Court.  The voting data consist of all formally decided cases on the Court’s 
appellate docket from the 1946 through 2001 terms.285 Table 6.2 of the Compendium 
presents the aggregate voting behavior for each justice who served between those terms.  The 
table lists the percentage of cases in which each justice took the liberal position, offering a 
way, then, to assess the ideological voting behavior of justices.286 Votes are broken down 
into eleven aggregate issue areas,287 plus a separate civil liberties column that combines the 
votes from criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, attorneys,288 and 
privacy cases.  One of the issue areas examines justices’ votes in First Amendment cases 
exclusively.289 A vote is counted as liberal if a justice voted “pro-individual against the 
government” in a First Amendment case.290 
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 Organization of the Dissertation 
 It was the Burger Court that introduced the content-based/content-neutral distinction 
into First Amendment case law.  Scholarly discussion frequently discounts, however, that the 
Court’s speech discrimination principles were born in pre-Burger Court decisions.  Chapter 2 
examines those early cases and concludes that before the Court explicitly spoke of “content 
discrimination” and “viewpoint-based regulation” it had already developed the principle that 
government could not single out – or even be granted the discretion to single out – expression 
based on its point of view.  
 As has been seen, extant scholarship has tended to limit analysis to a particular case 
or area of case law.  Chapters 3 and 4 examine exhaustively the Court’s application of its 
content- and viewpoint-neutrality principles since the seminal 1972 case Police Department 
of Chicago v. Mosley,291 the case in which the Court arguably articulated its content-
neutrality rule.  Chapter 3 analyzes the Court’s decisions in cases involving restrictions 
imposed by government on private speech and on speech in traditional public forums.  The 
chapter shows that the definition of content discrimination and the basis for determining 
whether a regulation discriminates based on content are unclear.  The chapter also 
demonstrates that the Court has conflated the content and viewpoint concepts in those 
contexts, clouding the definition of viewpoint discrimination. 
 Chapter 4 discusses content and viewpoint discrimination in limited public forums, 
nonpublic forums, and cases in which the government has subsidized speech.  As will be 
seen, as the Court’s jurisprudence has developed, it has said that content discrimination is 
permissible in those speech contexts.  It has repeated that viewpoint discrimination, however, 
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is not.  The chapter shows that, in spite of the Court’s stated proscription of viewpoint 
discrimination, the Court has applied the concept differently depending on the context. 
 As discussed, Chapter 5 explores the ideological manipulability of the viewpoint and 
content concepts.  The chapter demonstrates that the Court’s malleable definitions and 
inconsistent applications leave the concepts ripe for manipulation.  The final chapter 
summarizes the dissertation’s findings and proposes a new method of analysis for courts to 
follow, one with clear guidelines that, in line with those who champion firm rules in First 
Amendment decision making, aims to “provide less of a toehold for [judges’] subjective 
biases” to influence determinations of a regulation’s neutrality.292
 
292 FARBER, supra note 239, at 37. 
Chapter 2 
Viewpoint Discrimination in Pre-Burger Court Cases  
 
The Court did not introduce the terms “content neutral,” “content based,” and 
“content discrimination” into its First Amendment jurisprudence until the Burger Court did 
so in the early 1970s.  Even so, it is not true, as legal scholar John Fee recently claimed, that 
prior to the 1970s the Court “evinced little concern about speech discrimination.”1 Such a 
charge glosses over a number of important decisions prior to the 1970s in which the Court 
solidified what has become a fundamental tenet of the First Amendment: The government 
cannot discriminate against speech based on its point of view.   
 Here again, though, the Court was developing this principle without employing terms 
now commonplace in First Amendment case law.  In the pre-Burger Court decisions 
discussed in this chapter, the Court did not speak overtly of “viewpoint discrimination” or of 
“viewpoint-based regulation,” as it so commonly does now.  Although not using those 
explicit terms, the decisions still reveal the Court’s early and consistent concern with the 
government’s ability to restrict speech based on its viewpoint.  As this chapter demonstrates, 
the Court consistently struck down regulations – be they statutes, ordinances, or taxes – if 
they discriminated against – or had the potential to discriminate against – proponents of one 
side of a particular issue.2 The Court was especially concerned with prohibiting government 
officials from targeting and censoring disfavored or unpopular views.  This chapter analyzes 
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those pre-Burger Court cases in which the Court’s speech discrimination principles were 
germinated.  
 Early Cases Developing the Concept of Government Neutrality Vis-à-vis Ideas 
 The principle that the Constitution forbids government discrimination against the 
expression of a particular viewpoint – often described in these pre-Burger Court cases as a 
message or idea – emerged in the cases not long after the Court began interpreting the First 
Amendment in the early 20th century.3 The principle arguably first was enunciated under the 
Hughes Court.  In Stromberg v. California4 in 1931, the Court held unconstitutional a 
California state law that made it a felony to display a red flag as a “sign, symbol or emblem 
of opposition to organized government.”5 The appellant, a 19-year-old woman, was one of 
the supervisors of a summer camp for children between the ages of 10 and 15.  At the camp, 
the children were taught, among other things, “class consciousness, the solidarity of the 
workers, and the theory that the workers of the world are of one blood and brothers all.”6
During a daily ceremony at the camp, Stromberg supervised and directed the children in 
raising a red flag and reciting a pledge of allegiance “to the worker’s red flag, and to the 
cause for which it stands”; for that, she was convicted.7 In a 7-2 decision, the Court reversed 
the conviction.  “The maintenance of the opportunity for free political discussion . . . is a 
fundamental principle of our constitutional system,” Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes 
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wrote.8 Stromberg stands as the Court’s first confrontation with symbolic speech – the use of 
nonverbal conduct (in this case raising and saluting a flag) as a means of expression.  As 
applied here, the law punished the display of a flag for the purpose of communicating or 
expressing a view.  It prohibited “peaceful and orderly opposition to government by legal 
means,” the Court ruled, and thus curtailed “the opportunity for free political discussion.”9
Five years later in Grosjean v. American Press Co.10 the Court held unconstitutional a 
Louisiana tax on newspapers with circulations greater than 20,000 copies per week.  As legal 
scholar Paul Stephan has pointed out, Justice George Sutherland’s opinion for a unanimous 
Court “leaves much to be desired in terms of clarity and candor,”11 but one plausible reading 
of the opinion is that the Court grounded its holding on the tax’s discriminatory purpose and 
effect.12 The tax applied to only thirteen of Louisiana’s 163 newspapers, “and twelve of the 
thirteen had constituted the entire journalistic opposition to a recent legislative proposal of 
Governor Huey Long.”13 Long, in fact, intended the tax to be a punishment.  He saw it as a 
tax on lying; in his view, the big papers in the state had lied about him.14 The Court’s 
opinion did not explicitly address that motivation.  Justice Sutherland did conclude, however, 
that “it is not without significance that . . . no state during the one hundred fifty years of our 
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national existence has undertaken to impose a tax like that now in question.”15 Sutherland 
said the form in which the tax was imposed was “suspicious” and that the tax had the “plain 
purpose of penalizing the publishers and curtailing the circulation of a selected group of 
newspapers.”16 The tax was unconstitutional, then, because its purpose and effect was to 
penalize those newspapers espousing a particular viewpoint – one opposing government. 
 Twelve years after Stromberg, the Court faced another symbolic speech case in West 
Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,17 and the Court issued what one commentator 
has called “the Court’s best known and most eloquent expression of the First Amendment’s 
prohibition on viewpoint discrimination.”18 Following the Court’s decision in Minersville 
School District v. Gobitis,19 in which the Court upheld a compulsory flag salute requirement 
for public school students, the West Virginia Board of Education adopted a resolution 
ordering that saluting the American flag become “a regular part of the program of activities 
in the public schools.”20 Failure to conform was “insubordination,” punished by expulsion 
from school.21 
Appellees were Jehovah’s Witnesses who, as a matter of faith, considered the flag to 
be a “graven image” that the Bible forbade them from saluting.  “The sole conflict [in this 
case],” Justice Robert Jackson wrote for the Court, “is between authority and rights of the 
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individual. . . . [W]e are dealing with a compulsion of students to declare a belief.”22 By 
1943, of course, the United States was in the midst of World War II, fighting an enemy 
created and defined by thought control and repression, a fact that surely influenced the 
majority in Barnette.  In a 5-4 decision, the Court overturned Gobitis.  The lesson virtually 
every effort to “compel coherence” of belief has taught – from the Roman persecution of 
Christians to more modern totalitarian regimes – is that such attempts are destined to 
“ultimate futility,” the Court wrote.23 In a democracy, we need not fear opposing views, 
even those that “touch the heart of the existing order.”24 “[F]reedom to differ is not limited 
to things that do not matter much,” Justice Jackson wrote.  “That would be a mere shadow of 
freedom.”25 Only by tolerating diversity and dissent, the Court seemed to be saying, does a 
democracy possess the true freedom of thought and belief necessary for it to thrive.26 Justice 
Jackson eloquently concluded, “If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it 
is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, 
religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith 
therein.”27 
22 Id. at 630-31. 
 
23 Id. at 641. 
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 Without using the term “viewpoint discrimination,” the Court poignantly stated the 
basic tenet of that “reigning principle of First Amendment jurisprudence”:28 the government 
must be viewpoint neutral.  It is not for government officials to “prescribe what shall be 
orthodox” by selectively suppressing opinions or views.  The Court’s concern with 
government-prescribed orthodoxy again explained its decision in Kingsley International 
Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the University of New York.29 In Kingsley, the Court ruled that 
the First Amendment barred a state from censoring a film because of its unconventional 
portrayal of adultery.  A distributor of the film “Lady Chatterley’s Lover” was denied a 
license New York law required in order for a film to be shown because it “approvingly 
portray[ed] an adulterous relationship.”30 In invalidating the law the Court ruled: “What 
New York has done . . . is to prevent the exhibition of a motion picture because that picture 
advocates an idea – that adultery under certain circumstances may be proper behavior.  Yet 
the First Amendment’s basic guarantee is of freedom to advocate ideas.”31 The First 
Amendment’s protection of speech is “not confined to the expression of ideas that are 
conventional or shared by a majority,” Justice Potter Stewart wrote for the Court.  “It protects 
advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper, no less than advocacy of 
socialism or the single tax.”32 As the Court said of the flag salute requirement in Barnette, 
 
28 Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 100 (1996). 
 
29 360 U.S. 684 (1959). 
 
30 Id. at 688. 
 
31 Id.  
32 Id. at 689. 
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the New York law allowed the state to “prescribe what shall be orthodox,” which the First 
Amendment forbids.33 
Dangerous Ideas 
 The Court’s early conceptualization of its viewpoint-neutrality principle included 
condemnation of government action “aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas,” language 
that has continued to appear in more recent Court opinions.34 The phrase emerged in the case 
law during the McCarthy era – a time when the Court, on balance, was less protective of civil 
liberties and often acquiesced in many executive and legislative initiatives intended to 
suppress subversive speech or punish Communist speakers.35 Even at the height of 
McCarthyism, though, the Court at least paid lip service to the notion that the First 
Amendment protected the expression of “dangerous ideas.”36 In American Communications 
 
33 See also Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946), in which the postmaster general revoked Esquire’s 
second-class mail permit because the magazine, he said, did not “contribute to the public good and the public 
welfare.”  Id. at 150.  The postmaster general found several “recurrent features” of the magazine objectionable 
because they reflected “the smoking-room type of humor, featuring . . . sex.”  Id. at 151.  In a unanimous 
opinion, the Court overturned his decision.  As the Court saw it, the postmaster general’s actions were not based 
on whether the magazine published information of a public character (what the Classification Act actually 
required), but ultimately on “whether the contents [we]re ‘good’ or ‘bad.’”  Id.  The Court wrote, “To uphold 
the order of revocation would, therefore, grant the Postmaster General a power of censorship.  Such a power is 
abhorrent to our traditions.”  Id.  The Court examined the legislative history of the Act in which Congress 
established the criteria for second-class mail privileges.  It is a “far cry,” Justice William Douglas wrote for the 
Court, to assume from the history of the Act that Congress’ intentions were to require an applicant for the 
second-class rate to convince the postmaster general that his or her publication positively contributes to the 
public good or public welfare.  “Under our system of government there is an accommodation for the widest 
varieties of tastes and ideas,” the Court ruled.  “[A] requirement that literature or art conform to some norm 
prescribed by an official smacks of an ideology foreign to our system.”  Id. at 157-58.  Although on its face the 
postmaster general’s revocation looks to be an instance of what the Court came to call content discrimination 
(that is, he objected to sexual content in the magazine), using a position some justices on the Court will later 
take when ruling on restrictions involving sexual expression, to be discussed in Chapter 5, it might be argued 
that his actions constituted viewpoint discrimination on the basis that the sexual material transmitted a favorable 
view of relaxed sexual mores.   
 
34 See, e.g., Regan v. Taxation with Representation, 461 U.S. 540, 548 (1983). 
 
35 See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Heins, supra note 28, at 105. 
 
36 American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950).  The phrase, of course, does not refer 
to speech that “is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce 
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Ass’n v. Douds,37 the Court upheld a federal law requiring labor union officers to take a 
noncommunist loyalty oath.38 In the majority opinion, Chief Justice Fred Vinson found a 
“reasonable relation” between the oath and the evil Congress was trying to reach: disruptive 
political strikes instigated by Communists who held positions of union leadership.39 The 
Court wrote that the law was “designed to protect the public not against what Communists 
and others identified therein advocate or believe, but against what Congress has concluded 
they have done and are likely to do again.”40 Looking closely at Congress’ purpose, then, the 
Court ruled that the law was not “frankly aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas”;41 
rather, it was directed at preventing conduct or action – political strikes.  Had it been aimed 
at ideas, the Court implied, the law would have been unconstitutional.  The Court was surely 
too deferential to legislative determinations, as dissenters in the case pointed out.42 It is 
 
such action,” which the Court has said is outside of First Amendment protection.  Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 
U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
 
37 Id.  
38 Section 9(h) of the Management Labor Relations Act required each union officer to file an affidavit with the 
National Labor Relations Board indicating (1) that he was not a member of the Communist party or affiliated 
with the party and (2) that he did not believe in, and was not a member of or supported any organization that 
believed in or taught, the overthrow of the U.S. government by force or by any illegal or unconstitutional 
methods.  Id. at 385-86. 
 
39 Id. at 393.  “It is sufficient to say that Congress had a great mass of material before it which tended to show 
that Communists and others proscribed by the statute had infiltrated union organizations not to support and 
further trade union objectives, including the advocacy of change by democratic methods, but to make them a 
device by which commerce and industry might be disrupted when the dictates of political policy required such 
action.”  Id. at 389. 
 
40 Id. at 396. 
 
41 Id. at 402. 
 
42 Justice Jackson concurred in part and dissented in part.  He agreed with the majority that the noncommunist 
oath was constitutional.  “Congress reasonably could have concluded that the Communist Party is something 
different in fact from any other substantial party we have known, and hence may constitutionally be treated as 
something different in law,” he wrote.  Id. at 423 (Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  He 
objected, however, to the part of the oath that required the union officer to swear that he did not believe in the 
overthrow of the government by force: “While the Governments, State and Federal, have expansive powers to 
curtail action, and some small powers to curtail speech or writing, I think neither has any power, on any pretext, 
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significant, however, that the phrase did appear.  Even when the Court allowed itself to be 
swept up in Communist hysteria, it demanded mental gymnastics of itself to avoid issuing an 
opinion that sanctioned the suppression of dangerous viewpoints. 
 Eight years later, the Court found a speech regulation that was “frankly aimed at the 
suppression of dangerous ideas.”  In Speiser v. Randall,43 the Court invalidated a California 
law that required a loyalty oath be signed as a condition for receiving a veterans’ property tax 
exemption.44 Two honorably discharged World War II veterans who claimed the exemption 
refused to subscribe to the oath and struck it from the form they filed for that tax year.  The 
tax assessors denied the exemption solely for the refusal to sign the oath, and the Supreme 
Court of California upheld the assessors’ decisions, reasoning that any infringement on 
speech was not “substantial.”45 A majority of the Court disagreed.  “To deny an exemption 
to claimants who engage in certain forms of speech is in effect to penalize them for such 
speech,” Justice Brennan wrote for the Court.  “Its deterrent effect is the same as if the State 
were to fine them for this speech.”46 The Court appeared unconcerned with the California 
legislature’s purpose or intent in enacting the law47 and instead focused on the effect the oath 
 
directly or indirectly to attempt foreclosure of any line of thought.”  Id. at 442.  Justice Black, on the other hand, 
found the entire oath unconstitutional, eloquently pointing out that “not the least of the virtues of the First 
Amendment is its protection of each member of the smallest and most unorthodox minority.”  Id. at 448 (Black, 
J., dissenting).  
 
43 357 U.S. 513 (1958). 
 
44 The oath read: “I do not advocate the overthrow of the Government of the United States or of the State of 
California by force or violence or other unlawful means, nor advocate the support of a foreign government 
against the United States in event of hostilities.”  Id. at 515. 
 
45 Id. at 515, 518. 
 
46 Id. at 518. 
 
47 The California legislature actually passed the law to implement a constitutional amendment adopted in 1952.  
The amendment prevented any person or organization that advocated the forcible overthrow of government 
from receiving “any exemption from any tax imposed by this State.”  Id. at 516.   
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would have on free speech; the law had the potential to be constitutionally suspect, the Court 
said, because it, in effect, punished speech the state deemed “dangerous.”  “[T]he denial of a 
tax exemption for engaging in certain speech necessarily will have the effect of coercing the 
claimants to refrain from the proscribed speech,” the Court held.  “The denial is ‘frankly 
aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”48 
In Cammarano v. United States,49 the Court reiterated Speiser’s rule that denying 
government benefits to citizens because of their speech, in effect, amounts to a punishment of 
that speech.50 However, the policy at issue in Cammarano, treasury regulations that barred 
deducting lobby activities as business expenses for federal income tax purposes, was simply 
not such a situation.  “Speiser has no relevance” to the case, Justice John Harlan wrote for a 
unanimous Court.51 “Petitioners are not being denied a tax deduction because they engage in 
constitutionally protected activities, but are simply being required to pay for those activities 
entirely out of their own pockets.”52 The Court determined that Congress may 
 
48 Id. at 519 (quoting American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950)).  The Court 
actually invalidated the law on other grounds.  The California Supreme Court had narrowly construed the 
constitutional amendment to deny the tax exemption only to claimants “who engage in speech which may be 
criminally punished consistently with the free-speech guarantees of the . . . Constitution.”  Id.  The Court 
“assume[d] without deciding” that California could do so but then struck down the oath law because it lacked 
adequate procedural safeguards: “Where the transcendent value of speech is involved, due process certainly 
requires in the circumstances of this case that the State bear the burden of persuasion to show that the appellants 
engaged in criminal speech.”  Id. at 520, 526.  Justices Black and Douglas concurred with the Court’s opinion 
but articulated their continued disapproval of loyalty oaths, which “tend to stifle all forms of unorthodox or 
unpopular thinking or expression,” Justice Black wrote.  Id. at 532 (Black, J., concurring).  Justice Black quoted 
his separate opinion in Yates v. United States, in which he wrote, “[The] First Amendment provides the only 
kind of security system that can preserve a free government – one that leaves the way wide open for people to 
favor, discuss, advocate, or incite causes and doctrines however obnoxious and antagonistic such views may be 
to the rest of us.”  Id. (quoting Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 344 (1957) (Black, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part)).   
49 358 U.S. 498 (1959). 
 
50 See Heins, supra note 28, at 107.    
 
51 Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513. 
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constitutionally decide not to subsidize whole types of speech, such as lobbying, as long as it 
does not discriminate among lobbyists.53 And the Court found no evidence of discrimination 
here.  “Nondiscriminatory denial of deduction from gross income to sums expended to 
promote or defeat legislation is plainly not ‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas,’” 
the Court ruled.54 
In the cases addressed so far, then, two conclusions can be drawn about the Court’s 
early conceptualization of its viewpoint-neutrality principle: (1) The Court categorically held 
that the government cannot “prescribe what shall be orthodox.”  It is not for the government 
to determine what viewpoints are permissible for public discourse and consumption, the 
Court has ruled.  Democracy demands that its citizens tolerate diversity and dissent. (2)  
Offensive, unconventional, or dangerous viewpoints (which the Court has often referred to as 
“ideas”) are protected from regulation, whether the government action is a result of direct 
suppression, compelled speech,55 or manipulation of a government subsidy program.56 
Standardless Regulations 
 In another important line of cases, the Court struck down regulations that may not 
have explicitly suppressed specific viewpoints – in contrast to cases already discussed, which 
did – but permitted government officials to do so.  Although the facts differed, each case 
 
52 Id.  
53 See Heins, supra note 28, at 107. 
 
54 Cammarano, 358 U.S. at 513 (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 519 (1958)).  Justice Douglas wrote 
in his concurring opinion that Congress “has not undertaken to penalize taxpayers for certain types of advocacy. 
. . . Deductions are a matter of grace, not of right.”  Id. at 514 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
 
55 See supra notes 17-27 and accompanying text. 
 
56 Heins, supra note 28, at 109. 
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involved some sort of prior licensing scheme for some type of public expression.57 In each 
case in which the Court struck down the regulation, the standard for granting a license or 
permit was “sufficiently elastic” to allow government authorities to restrict or prevent the 
expression of disfavored or unconventional views.58 It is true that the Court saw other 
constitutional evils in these licensing schemes besides the danger of viewpoint 
discrimination.  Even so, as Stephan has pointed out, these cases support the proposition 
“that the Constitution does not tolerate legislation that grants government the discretion to 
burden the expression of particular ideas.”59 
The first of these cases was Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization,60 
decided in 1939.  Hague is most cited now for its role in giving rise to the Court’s important 
public forum doctrine.  More than forty years before Hague, in Davis v. Massachusetts,61 the 
Court had seemed to grant the government unlimited power to control or deny access to 
public streets and parks however it saw fit.62 Although the Court in Hague did not expressly 
overrule Davis,63 Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion used what one commentator has called “a 
 
57 See Stephan, supra note 2, at 216.  Stephan’s discussion of this line of cases was cursory.  The principles laid 
down by the Court deserve a fuller explication.  
 
58 Id.  
59 Id. at 216-17.  Stephan uses “ideas” as a term synonymous with “viewpoint.”  As has been argued in this 
chapter, that use is an accurate interpretation of the language in the Court’s early opinions.    
 
60 307 U.S. 496 (1939). 
 
61 167 U.S. 43 (1897). 
 
62 In Davis, the Court upheld the criminal conviction of a minister who preached on the Boston Common 
without a permit and without applying to the mayor for one.  In his plurality opinion in Hague, Justice Owen 
Roberts said the decision in Davis “seems to be grounded on the holding of the state court that the Common 
‘was absolutely under the control of the legislature,’ and that it was thus ‘conclusively determined there was no 
right [for] the plaintiff . . . to use the Common except in such mode and subject to such regulations as the 
legislature in its wisdom may have deemed proper to prescribe.’”  Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (plurality opinion).  
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historical approach to re-characterize public streets and parks as public forums.”64 In a now 
oft-quoted line, Justice Roberts wrote, “Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they 
have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have 
been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.”65 The use of streets and parks for expressive purposes “may be 
regulated in the interest of all,” he wrote.66 The use must not, however, “in the guise of 
regulation, be abridged or denied.”67 
The Court found that the use of public property was abridged in Hague.  The 
ordinance in question forbade public assembly in the public streets or parks of the city 
without a permit issued by the Director of Public Safety, who could refuse a permit “on his 
mere opinion that such refusal will prevent ‘riots, disturbances or disorderly assemblage.’”68 
The ordinance thus gave authorities wide discretion, which the facts in Hague indicated they 
had abused.  Jersey City Mayor Frank “I Am the Law” Hague69 had used the ordinance to 
prevent labor organizers and their sympathizers from speaking or meeting in Jersey City “on 
the ground that they [we]re Communists or Communist organizations.”70 Under Hague’s 
 
63 Justice Roberts wrote, “We have no occasion to determine whether, on the facts disclosed, the Davis case was 
rightly decided, but we cannot agree that it rules the instant case.”  Id.  Davis was explicitly overruled four years 
later in Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943). 
64 Casarez, supra note 18, at 506. 
 
65 Hague, 307 U.S. at 515 (plurality opinion). 
 
66 The line continued: “[The privilege to use the streets and parks] is not absolute, but relative, and must be 
exercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good 
order.”  Id. at 515-16. 
 
67 Id. at 516. 
 
68 Id.  
69 See THOMAS TEDFORD, FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 267 (1985). 
 
70 Hague, 307 U.S. at 501 (plurality opinion). 
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orders, police had actually evicted union speakers – and others of whom the Mayor 
disapproved – by forcing them onto ferryboats bound for New York City.71 The Court 
invalidated the ordinance, noting that the discretion given to government officials could, “as 
the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary suppression of free expression of 
views on national affairs.”72 
The plurality’s position in Hague received majority support five months later in 
Schneider v. State.73 In that case, an 8-1 Court invalidated the ordinances of four cities that, 
in one form or another, prohibited the distribution of all types of handbills on public streets.74 
Three of the ordinances barred distributing handbills and literature altogether.75 The fourth 
ordinance, of Irvington, New Jersey, provided that no one could “canvass, solicit, or 
distribute” circulars or “call from house to house” without a permit, secured in advance, from 
the Chief of Police.76 A member of the Jehovah’s Witnesses visited homes door-to-door, 
leaving booklets and seeking contributions, without applying for and obtaining a permit 
“because she conscientiously believed that to do so would be an act of disobedience to the 
command of Almighty God.”77 
71 Id. See also TEDFORD, supra note 69, at 267. 
 
72 Id. at 516. 
 
73 308 U.S. 147 (1939). 
 
74 See TEDFORD, supra note 69, at 269. 
 
75 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 154-57. 
76 Id. at 157-58. 
 
77 Id. at 159. 
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 The Court struck down all four ordinances as unconstitutional, giving support to the 
principle, tentatively set out in Hague,78 that public streets should be open and available for 
public discourse.  “Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, have the duty to keep 
their communities’ streets open and available for movement of people and property,” Justice 
Roberts wrote for the Court.  “So long as legislation to this end does not abridge the 
constitutional liberty of one rightfully upon the street to impart information through speech 
or the distribution of literature, it may lawfully regulate the conduct of those using the 
streets.”79 The Court stressed that the freedoms of speech and press are “fundamental 
personal rights and liberties,” which cannot be abridged.80 The Court then said, “In every 
case, therefore, where legislative abridgment of the [speech and press] rights is asserted, the 
courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged legislation.”81 
In the cases discussed thus far, the Court had largely been silent – and ambiguous 
when it did speak – as to the proper method of analysis judges should use to determine 
whether an abridgement of expression is present.  Here, though, Justice Roberts rather 
confidently emphasized that it is the effect of the regulation that should be controlling.  (As 
will be seen, the Court has not always followed its own advice to the satisfaction of its 
members).  The government’s purpose for the three ordinances that barred distribution of 
handbills was benign, the Court said; those cities aimed to prevent littering of their streets.82 
The effect of the ordinances, however, made them unconstitutional.  “[T]he purpose to keep 
 
78 See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text.   
 
79 Schneider, 308 U.S. at 160. 
 
80 Id. at 161. 
 
81 Id.  
82 Id. at 162. 
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the streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an ordinance which 
prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from handing literature to one willing to 
receive it,” the Court held.83 As for the Irvington ordinance, the Court found that it, like the 
ordinance at issue in Hague, granted the government too much discretion – and the effect of 
that discretion was potential abuse.  The Court said the ordinance was flawed because “it 
bans unlicensed communication of any views or the advocacy of any cause from door to 
door, and permits canvassing only subject to the power of a police officer to determine, as a 
censor, what literature may be distributed from house to house and who may distribute it.”84 
The city argued that the ordinance was intended to prevent fraud and trespass.  The Court 
acknowledged that those were legitimate concerns, but nevertheless held that a city cannot 
“require all who wish to disseminate ideas to present them first to police authorities for their 
consideration and approval, with a discretion in the police to say some ideas may, while 
others may not, be carried to the homes of citizens.”85 
In Saia v. New York,86 a narrowly divided Court used similar reasoning to invalidate 
an ordinance that prohibited the use of sound amplification devices on streets and other 
public places, except with a permit issued by the Chief of Police.  A Jehovah’s Witnesses 
minister, with the Chief’s permission, had used sound equipment mounted atop his car to 
 
83 Id.  
84 Id. at 164.  “In the end, [the applicant for a permit’s] liberty to communicate with the residents of the town at 
their homes depends upon the exercise of the officer’s discretion.”  Id.  
85 Id.  See also Largent v. Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943).  In Largent, a unanimous Court overturned the 
conviction of a woman under an ordinance that made it a crime to solicit orders or sell books without first 
obtaining a permit from the mayor.  “Dissemination of ideas depends upon the approval of the distributor by the 
official,” the Court wrote.  “This is administrative censorship in an extreme form.”  Id. at 422. 
 
86 334 U.S. 558 (1948). 
72
amplify lectures about religious subjects given in a public park.87 When the minister’s 
original permit expired, he applied for another but was refused on the ground that complaints 
had been made about the loudness of the sound during his lectures.88 He used the equipment 
anyway, without a permit, and was arrested.89 
A 5-4 Court overturned the conviction and ruled the ordinance was unconstitutional.  
“To use a loud-speaker or amplifier one has to get a permit from the Chief of Police,” Justice 
Douglas wrote for the Court.  “There are no standards prescribed for the exercise of his 
discretion.”90 Noise from amplification devices can be regulated in other ways, the Court 
suggested.  Decibels could be regulated; the hours and place of public discussion could be 
controlled.91 “But to allow the police to bar the use of loud-speakers because their use can be 
abused is like barring radio receivers because they too make a noise.”92 The Court noted that 
amplification devices, particularly loud-speakers, had become “indispensable instruments of 
effective public speech,”93 especially during political campaigns.  The effect of the 
ordinance, then, was to close off a valuable avenue of political discourse – or at least to place 
that avenue in the potentially fickle hands of the Police Chief.  A majority of the Court was 
unwilling to do that: 
 
87 Id. at 559.  “The lectures were given at a fixed place in a public park on designated Sundays.”  Id.  
88 During his trial in Police Court for violation of the ordinance “some witnesses testified that they were 
annoyed by the sound, though not by the content of the addresses; others were not disturbed by either.”  Id.  
 
89 Id.  
90 Id. at 560. 
 
91 Id. at 562. 
 
92 Id.  
93 Id. at 561. 
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 When a city allows an official to ban [loud-speakers] in his 
 uncontrolled discretion, it sanctions a device for suppression of free 
 communication of ideas. In this case a permit is denied because some persons 
 were said to have found the sound annoying.  In the next one a permit may be 
 denied because some people find the ideas annoying.  Annoyance at ideas can 
 be cloaked in annoyance at sound. The power of censorship inherent in this 
 type of ordinance reveals its vice.94 
In dissent, Justice Felix Frankfurter, joined by Justices Stanley Reed and Harold 
Burton, instead emphasized the potentially intrusive nature of amplification devices, which 
“afford easy . . . opportunities for aural aggression.  If uncontrolled, the result is intrusion 
into cherished privacy.”95 Justice Frankfurter thus was unconcerned with the discretion the 
ordinance granted to the Chief of Police.  The chief, he said, was charged with determining 
“what is in effect a nuisance.”96 If the chief abused his authority, judicial remedies were 
available that could be enforced, Justice Frankfurter argued.97 The entire ordinance need not 
be struck down on its face because the potential for abuse existed, he said.   
 Justice Frankfurter, then, seemed to be articulating a judicial analysis here that would 
rule only on a regulation’s immediate application.  He agreed that “the power to limit the 
abuse of sound equipment may not be exercised with a partiality unrelated to the nuisance.  
But there is here no showing of either arbitrary action or discrimination.”98 There was no 
basis, he argued, for finding or concluding that “noisemakers similar to” the minister would 
 
94 Id. at 562. 
 
95 Id. at 563 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).  “Surely there is not a constitutional right to force unwilling people to 
listen,” Justice Frankfurter wrote.  Id.  As cases discussed in later chapters of this dissertation will demonstrate, 
the Court has been less sure than Justice Frankfurter of this assertion.  
96 Id. at 564. 
 
97 Id. at 565. 
 
98 Id.  
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have obtained a permit for the time and place requested.99 As Justice Frankfurter saw it, the 
chief’s denial of the permit was evenhanded, motivated without malice or disapproval of the 
minister’s viewpoint.100 The potential effect of the ordinance, for him, was not dispositive.  
“State action cannot be found hypothetically unconstitutional,” he argued.101 Because he 
found no evidence of discrimination in the chief of police’s actions, Justice Frankfurter 
concluded the ordinance was constitutional. 
 The Court had no need for debate over proper method of analysis three years later in 
Niemotko v. Maryland102 when it unanimously agreed that viewpoint discrimination was not 
a mere possibility, but a fact of the case.  Two members of the Jehovah’s Witnesses sought 
permission to schedule Bible talks in a public park in Havre de Grace, Maryland.103 The 
town had no ordinance prohibiting or regulating the use of the park, but it had been “custom” 
for organizations and individuals desiring to use it for meetings and demonstrations to obtain 
a permit from the Park Commissioner.104 The Witnesses requested a permit but were refused 
by both the Park Commissioner and the City Council.  When they elected to meet anyway, 
police arrested the Witnesses, who were charged and convicted of disorderly conduct.105 
99 Id.  
100 Justice Jackson’s separate dissent stressed this point as well: “There is not the slightest evidence of 
discrimination or prejudice against the appellant because of his religion or his ideas.”  Id. at 570 (Jackson, J., 
dissenting).   
 
101 Id. at 565 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
 
102 340 U.S. 268 (1951). 
 
103 Id. at 269. 
 
104 Id.  
105 “No sooner had appellant Niemotko opened the meeting and commenced delivering his discourse, than the 
police, who had been ordered to the park by the Mayor, arrested him.”  Id. at 270. 
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 The Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Vinson, overturned the convictions.  There 
was absolutely no evidence of disorder, the Court said.  Each appellant “had conducted 
himself in a manner beyond reproach.”106 The wisdom of the principles laid down in cases 
such as Hague and Saia, the Court said, was especially apparent here, where there was no 
ordinance, only an “amorphous ‘practice’” that placed all authority for the use of the park in 
the Park Commissioner.107 “No standards appear anywhere; no narrowly drawn limitations; 
no circumscribing of this absolute power,” the Court held.108 And whereas the Saia Court 
feared the possibility of abuse, the abuse was tangible in Niemotko.  “[R]arely has any case 
been before this Court which shows so clearly an unwarranted discrimination in a refusal to 
issue such a license,” the Court ruled.109 
Chief Justice Vinson said the Court “searched the record in vain” for a valid basis for 
refusing the permit but could find none.110 The only questions asked of the Witnesses during 
a hearing held by the City Council “pertained to their alleged refusal to salute the flag, their 
views on the Bible, and other issues irrelevant to unencumbered use of the public parks.”111 
At trial, the Mayor testified that permits had been issued allowing other religious 
organizations to use the park.  Thus, the Court held, “the conclusion is inescapable that the 
 
106 Id. at 271. 
 
107 Id. at 271-72. 
 
108 Id. at 272.  See also Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290, 294 (1951), decided the same day as Niemotko, in 
which the Court ruled, “It is sufficient to say that New York cannot vest restraining control over the right to 
speak on religious subjects in an administrative official where there are no appropriate standards to guide his 
action.” 
 
109 Id.  
110 Id.  
111 Id. 
76
use of the park was denied because of the City Council’s dislike for or disagreement with the 
Witnesses or their views.”112 
The Court found a case “on all fours” with Niemotko two years later in Fowler v. 
Rhode Island.113 A local ordinance prevented a person from addressing “any political or 
religious meeting in any public park.”114 A minister of the Jehovah’s Witnesses addressed a 
meeting of the Pawtucket, Rhode Island, congregation in a park, giving a talk titled “The 
Pathway to Peace” to roughly 400 people.115 The minister had been talking only a few 
minutes when he was arrested by police and charged with violating the ordinance; he was 
convicted and fined.116 
During oral argument, the Assistant Attorney General of Rhode Island made two 
concessions that proved dispositive for the Court: (1) the minister was in fact addressing a 
religious meeting, and (2) the ordinance, as construed and applied, did not prohibit church 
services in a public park.117 “Catholics could hold mass in [the park] and Protestants could 
conduct their church services there without violating the ordinance.  Church services 
normally entail not only singing, prayer, and other devotionals but preaching as well,” Justice 
 
112 Id.  In a somewhat cryptic line, the Court seemed to indicate that its ruling was grounded both in the First 
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Douglas wrote for a unanimous Court.  Even so, those services would not be barred by the 
ordinance.  “That broad concession . . . is fatal to Rhode Island’s case,” the Court held.  “For 
it plainly shows that a religious service of Jehovah’s Witnesses is treated differently than a 
religious service of other sects.”118 The Court reasoned that Rhode Island was, in effect, 
calling the words of one minister speaking to his congregation a sermon, immune from 
regulation, while calling the words of another minister an address, subject to punishment 
under the ordinance.  To do that, the Court concluded, “is merely an indirect way of 
preferring one religion over another.”119 And the First Amendment prohibits such 
discrimination, the Court held. 
 Fowler marked the end of a string of important cases in which Jehovah’s Witnesses 
were petitioners before the Court, prevailing in decisions that solidified the First Amendment 
principle that the government cannot discriminate – and cannot be granted the discretion to 
discriminate – against speech because of its point of view.  In the 1960s, that principle was 
affirmed in cases that emerged in the context of southern civil rights demonstrations.  In 
Edwards v. South Carolina,120 187 civil rights protesters had been convicted of South 
Carolina’s common law crime of breach of the peace.  The protesters had walked, in separate 
groups of about 15, to the State House grounds, an area open to the general public.  For 
roughly 45 minutes, they walked through the grounds, carrying placards bearing such 
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120 372 U.S. 229 (1963).  See also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 
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messages as “I am proud to be a Negro” and “Down with segregation.”121 They were 
orderly, and there was no violence or threat of violence, no obstruction of pedestrian or 
vehicular traffic.  Police protection was ample.122 Nevertheless, police authorities told the 
protesters that they would be arrested if they did not disperse within fifteen minutes.  Instead 
of dispersing, one of the protest’s leaders gave a “religious harangue” and the protesters sang 
songs, including the National Anthem, while stamping their feet and clapping their hands.123 
After fifteen minutes, they were “marched . . . off to jail” and convicted of breaching the 
peace.124 
An 8-1 Court found problematic the South Carolina Supreme Court’s admission that 
under that state’s law, breach of the peace “is not susceptible of exact definition.”125 The 
Court said the circumstances in this case – no violence or threat of violence – were much 
different from other cases in which the Court had reviewed breach of the peace or disorderly 
conduct convictions.126 The protesters’ actions here “reflect an exercise of . . . basic 
constitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form,” Justice Stewart wrote.127 The 
Court emphasized that it was not reviewing “criminal convictions resulting from the 
evenhanded application of a precise and narrowly drawn regulatory statute.”128 The 
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protesters were convicted of an ill-defined, generalized offense.129 And, importantly for the 
Court, “they were convicted upon evidence which showed no more than that the opinions 
which they were peaceably expressing were sufficiently opposed to the views of the majority 
of the community to attract a crowd and necessitate police protection.”130 Silencing “the 
peaceful expression of unpopular views” is impermissible, the Court held.131 Examining the 
facts of the case, the Court found no evidence that the protesters were not peaceful.  Absent 
that evidence, then, the Court appeared to assume that they were arrested because of their 
unpopular views, and the convictions could not stand.132 
In Edwards, as in the other cases discussed in this section, the Court struck down a 
law that the Court ruled granted the government too much discretion.  In each case discussed, 
the Court’s concern was that standardless regulations would permit government authorities to 
restrict the expression of unconventional or unpopular views.133 
Neutral Regulations 
 Despite the success of the plaintiffs in the cases discussed above, the Court has never 
held that citizens have an unlimited right of access to public places or that government 
officials are unable to regulate the use of public property.  As has been pointed out, in the 
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cases discussed thus far the Court was concerned with laws that granted government too 
much discretion, permitting officials the opportunity (either real or potential) to censor 
disfavored viewpoints.  But the Court has said that not all laws regulating the use of public 
property (what the Court gradually came to call public forums) are unconstitutional, nor has 
the Court upheld all claims of discrimination.    
 In Cox v. New Hampshire,134 for instance, decided just two years after Hague, a
unanimous Court upheld the conviction of Jehovah’s Witnesses for violating a state statute 
that prohibited a “parade or procession” upon a public street without a “special license.”135 
Roughly ninety Witnesses engaged in an “information march,” in which they walked along 
the sidewalks, single file, of the city’s business districts.  Although the march was pre-
arranged, they did not seek a permit, instead arguing that the purpose of the march was to 
“disseminat[e] information in the public interest” and that it was one of their ways of 
worship.136 
The Court observed that there was no ground for challenging the state court’s ruling 
that the Witnesses were in fact engaged in a “parade or procession” upon the public streets.137 
The question in front of the Court, then, was whether the license requirement was 
constitutionally permissible.  Chief Justice Hughes wrote, “The authority of a municipality to 
impose regulations in order to assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of 
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136 Id. at 573.  In addition to carrying signs and placards, the Witnesses in the march handed out printed leaflets 
that announced the time and location of an upcoming meeting. 
 
137 Id. at 573-74.  The state court ruled: “It was a march in formation, and its advertising and informatory 
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public highways has never been regarded as inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one 
of the means of safeguarding the good order upon which they ultimately depend.”138 The 
question in a particular case, the Court said, is whether the government’s exercise of its 
control over streets denies or “unwarrantedly abridges” the right of citizens to express 
themselves in public places.139 
In Cox, the Court said it was aided by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, which 
construed the statute and defined the limitations placed on government officials in granting 
licenses for parades and processions.140 The state court had restrained the licensing 
authority, the Court said, “only to considerations of time, place and manner so as to conserve 
the public convenience.”141 Such a limited permit requirement had the “obvious advantage” 
of giving public authorities notice in advance “so as to afford opportunity for proper 
policing,” the Court held.142 Fixing the time and place also prevented “overlapping parades 
or processions” and minimized the risk of disorder.143 Importantly, the Court also 
emphasized that the state court had held that “the licensing board was not vested with 
arbitrary power or an unfettered discretion” and that any discretion it did have “must be 
exercised with ‘uniformity of method of treatment, free from improper or inappropriate 
considerations and from unfair discrimination.’”144 
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 In that respect, the Court said, Cox was thus distinguishable from Hague and 
Schneider, cases in which the Court determined the government’s discretion to be 
unbridled.145 The New Hampshire law, on the other hand, did not allow government officials 
to deny a license if they disliked the message of the parade or of those marching in it.  As the 
Court saw it, the law did not even allow officials to consider the viewpoint of the parade; it 
only permitted regulation of the parade’s time, place, and manner.  Chapter 3 will discuss 
how the Court later came to call this type of regulation “content neutral.”  In Cox, as with all 
the cases discussed thus far in this chapter, the justices were unconcerned with formal labels.  
The Court concluded, “There is no evidence that the statute has been administered otherwise 
than in the fair and non-discriminatory manner which the state court has construed it to 
require.”146 The litany of cases that have been discussed involving Jehovah’s Witnesses 
undeniably demonstrates that the sect was often the target of speech regulations.  Not so in 
Cox, the Court held, as the Court was confident that the narrow interpretation of the statute 
precluded “unfettered discretion” and “unfair discrimination.”147 Thus the convictions were 
upheld, and the Court ruled that the statute was constitutional. 
 In Kovacs v. Cooper,148 a 5-4 Court followed Cox and upheld an ordinance that it 
found regulated only the manner of expression.  The interpretation of the ordinance’s reach 
divided the Court.  Justice Reed’s plurality opinion accepted the interpretation of the New 
Jersey Supreme Court that the law under question barred sound trucks “emitting loud and 
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raucous noises” on any public street.149 For the plurality, then, the law was free from the 
flaws of Saia, which had given the Chief of Police standardless discretion to permit the use 
of amplification devices.  The law in Kovacs, the plurality said, was an exercise of the city’s 
authority “to prevent disturbing noises, nuisances well within the municipality’s power to 
control.”150 Justice Reed wrote, “We think it is a permissible exercise of legislative 
discretion to bar sound trucks with broadcasts of public interest, amplified to a loud and 
raucous volume, from the public ways of municipalities.”151 The plurality recognized that 
city streets were “normal place[s] for the exchange of ideas” but emphasized that the freedom 
to do so was not “beyond all control.”152 Justice Reed’s opinion was far from clear on this 
point, but what seemed controlling for the plurality was that, like the law in Cox, the law here 
did not permit consideration of the viewpoint of speech; it only authorized regulation if the 
noise was “loud and raucous.”153 
In dissent, Justice Black chided the plurality for misinterpreting the ordinance and the 
state court’s reading of it.  There is not “even a shadow of evidence” to prove that the noise 
coming from Kovacs’ sound truck was loud or raucous, Justice Black argued.154 Instead, he 
said, “it . . . appears that the appellant was charged and convicted by interpreting the 
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ordinance as an absolute prohibition against the use of sound amplifying devices.”155 With 
that reading, Justice Black concluded, the ordinance was unconstitutional, and his reasoning 
deserves explication.  Justice Black said that “ideas and beliefs” are primarily disseminated 
to citizens through mass communication.156 In 1949 – the year the Court decided Kovacs – 
he said that included primarily newspapers, radio, movies, and “public address systems,” like 
Kovacs’ sound truck.157 Justice Black argued, “The basic premise of the First Amendment is 
that all present instruments of communication, as well as others that inventive genius may 
bring into being, shall be free from governmental censorship or prohibition.”158 A law that 
hampers the free use of one instrument of communication – which he considered sound 
trucks to be – will “thereby favor competing channels.”159 Thus, he said, “unless 
constitutionally prohibited, laws like this Trenton ordinance can give an overpowering 
influence to views of owners of legally favored instruments of communication.”160 Not 
everyone can own a printing press or control a radio station, Justice Black said, but freedom 
of expression “should be protected from absolute censorship for persons without, as for 
persons with, wealth and power.”161 Yet the “inevitable result” of the Kovacs decision, he 
feared, was to favor those with wealth and power.162 The effect of a ban on sound trucks, his 
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argument went, would be to disfavor those who must rely on the trucks to express their 
views.  The law, in other words, would result in a disproportionate effect or impact – 
discriminating against the poor – which Justice Black said should make it unconstitutional. 
 Presumably because the plurality did not interpret the ordinance to include a ban on 
the use of all sound trucks,163 it did not respond to Justice Black’s disproportionate effect 
argument in Kovacs.  Disagreement over the weight effect should have when reviewing First 
Amendment violations did appear to divide the Court in Adderley v Florida,164 however.  A 
group of about 200 Florida A. & M. students marched to the county jail to protest the arrest 
the previous day of several of their classmates who had engaged in a civil rights 
demonstration.  After being asked by a Deputy Sheriff to move away from the jail-door 
entrance, the students “moved back part of the way,” where they stood or sat singing, 
clapping, and dancing on the jail driveway and on an adjacent grassy area on the jail 
premises.165 The driveway was normally not used by the public, but by the Sheriff’s 
Department for transporting prisoners.  The County Sheriff tried to persuade the students to 
leave.  When his persuasion proved fruitless, he ordered them to leave and informed them 
that if they did not do so within ten minutes, he would arrest them for trespassing.166 Some 
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of the students left, but 107 remained and were arrested and later convicted of violating a 
state trespassing statute.167 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court affirmed the convictions.  Justice Black, writing for the 
majority, distinguished the jail in Adderley from other government property at issue in 
previous cases.  The protesters in Adderley had especially relied on Edwards v. South 
Carolina in making their case to the Court.  Justice Black agreed that, as in Edwards, the 
case here arose when a large group of people demonstrated on public property against their 
state’s segregation policies.  But, the Court held, there were important differences between 
the cases – and the property.  In Edwards, the protesters had walked through the State House 
grounds.  In Adderley, protesters went to a jail.  “Traditionally, state capitol grounds are open 
to the public.  Jails, built for security purposes, are not,” Justice Black wrote.168 
Yet even though the jail was not “open to the public,” the Court suggested that the 
government did not have unlimited authority to censor speech there.  The Sheriff, the Court 
said, had the power “to direct that this large crowd of people get off the grounds.”169 The 
Court was careful to point out, however, that the Sheriff did not do so because he disagreed 
with their views.  The Court wrote, “There is not a shred of evidence in this record that this 
power was exercised, or that its exercise was sanctioned by the lower courts, because the 
Sheriff objected to what was being sung or said by the demonstrators or because he disagreed 
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with the objectives of their protest.”170 Rather, the Court said, he objected “only to their 
presence on that part of the jail grounds reserved for jail uses.”171 In other words, the Sheriff 
was only concerned with the place of the protest, not the message of the protesters.  The 
Court emphasized that there was “no evidence at all” that any other group had been permitted 
to gather on the jail grounds “for any purpose,” making enforcement of the statute “even-
handed.”172 Thus, the Court concluded, “The United States Constitution does not forbid a 
State to control the use of its own property for its own lawful nondiscriminatory purpose.”173 
Justice Douglas wrote a biting dissent in which he equated the evils of giving the 
government discretion to “decide when public places shall be used for the communication of 
ideas” – which he thought the majority did – with the evils of the standardless licensing 
schemes the Court had consistently struck down.174 To place such discretion in any public 
official, he argued, “is to place those who assert their First Amendment rights at his mercy.  
It gives him the awesome power to decide whose ideas may be expressed and who shall be 
denied a place to air their claims and petition their government.”175 Justice Douglas was 
unimpressed with the majority’s conclusion that the Sheriff acted without concern for the 
protesters’ views.  He wrote: “It is said that the Sheriff did not make the arrests because of 
the views which petitioners espoused. That excuse is usually given, as we know from the 
many cases involving arrests of minority groups for breaches of the peace, unlawful 
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assemblies, and parading without a permit.”176 Officials almost always seek to justify the 
arrests as a “legitimate function” of government, Justice Douglas observed.177 If the 
constitutionality of regulations that infringed First Amendment rights always turned “on an 
unequivocal showing” that the regulation was intended to inhibit the rights – if the 
government’s “excuse” had to always be exposed as nothing more – “protection would be 
sorely lacking,” he said.178 Instead, “it is not the intent or purpose of the measure but its 
effect on First Amendment rights which is crucial.”179 Justice Douglas thought the majority 
had ignored the effect of the convictions here.  The Court, he said, had allowed “orderly and 
civilized protests against injustice to be suppressed,” a result of granting the government too 
much discretion to determine where it will allow speech to occur.180 
The Court addressed what it said were the difficulties of deciphering the purpose or 
intent behind a regulation two terms later in United States v. O’Brien,181 the Court’s 
landmark case now governing the regulation of symbolic speech.  David Paul O’Brien 
burned his Selective Service registration certificate (i.e., his draft card) on the steps of the 
South Boston Courthouse to symbolize his opposition to the Vietnam War and its draft.  He 
was indicted, tried, and convicted of violating a federal law, a part of the Universal Military 
Training and Service Act that applies to any person “who forges, alters, knowingly destroys, 
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knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes” his draft card.182 The italicized words were 
added by Congress in a 1965 amendment to the law and were the basis for O’Brien’s 
indictment.  In a 7-1 decision, the Court ruled the law was constitutional, both as enacted and 
as applied. 
 The Court stressed that the law plainly did not abridge speech on its face, as there is 
nothing inherently expressive about destroying a draft card.  “The Amendment does not 
distinguish between public and private destruction, and it does not punish only destruction 
engaged in for the purpose of expressing views,” Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote.183 In 
Stromberg, for instance, the law punished displaying a flag as a “sign, symbol or emblem of 
opposition to organized government.”184 The law in O’Brien did not have similar 
constitutional flaws; on its face, it was directed at conduct, not speech.  O’Brien nevertheless 
argued the law was unconstitutional because it infringed his symbolic expression.  He used 
the draft card burning to symbolize his anti-war, anti-draft viewpoint, he said, and his speech 
warranted protection because the First Amendment protects “all modes of ‘communication of 
ideas by conduct.’”185 
The Court rejected his argument: “We cannot accept the view that an apparently 
limitless variety of conduct can be labeled ‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the 
conduct intends thereby to express an idea.”186 And even if O’Brien’s draft-card burning did 
bring the First Amendment into play, the Court said, it did not necessarily follow that the 
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burning was protected activity.  The Court then laid out the criteria for determining whether 
conduct is protected “when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same 
course of conduct”:187 
[W]e think it clear that a government regulation is sufficiently justified 
 if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an 
 important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is 
 unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction 
 on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the 
 furtherance of that interest.188 
Whether the Court intended for that statement to become a rigid four-part test to be 
employed to evaluate every regulation of symbolic speech or not, that is exactly what it has 
become.  And Chapter 3 will demonstrate that the Court has come to understand the test to be 
virtually synonymous with the test it now employs to review all content-neutral regulations 
on speech.  Its significance, then, should not be understated.  As the Court employed it in 
O’Brien, the law under review met “all of the requirements” of the test.  The Court was 
confident that Congress’ purpose (“interest”) for the law was legitimate (“important” or 
“substantial”) and that any restriction on expression was “incidental.”189 The Court 
concluded that “both the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965 Amendment are 
limited to the noncommunicative aspect of O’Brien’s conduct.”  Congress was legitimately 
concerned with “preventing harm to the smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective 
Service System.”190 Destroying a draft card frustrates the government’s interest, the Court 
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said.  The Court was satisfied the law punished only the “noncommunicative impact of his 
conduct,” that Congress was neutral to O’Brien’s message or viewpoint.191 
O’Brien argued otherwise, claiming that Congress’ purpose in enacting the 1965 
Amendment was to “suppress freedom of speech.”192 He charged that Congress’ lone 
motivation was to stamp out draft card burning, which was increasingly becoming an 
effective form of political protest.  The Court, however, rejected O’Brien’s assertion: “[T]he 
purpose of Congress, as O’Brien uses that term, is not a basis for declaring this legislation 
unconstitutional.”193 The Court’s qualification in the sentence – “as O’Brien uses that term” 
– must explain its holding.  Surely the Court realized that it frequently does evaluate 
legislative purpose, that it was evaluating purpose in O’Brien.  The Court’s test makes 
certain, after all, that government has a substantial interest and that the interest is unrelated to 
the suppression of free expression.  Congress’ purpose, the Court determined, was to prevent 
harm to the functioning of the Selective Service System.   But the Court believed O’Brien 
used the term in a different way.  He was alleging illicit motive on the part of members of 
Congress, and the Court expressed discomfort at relying on that motive in its judicial 
analysis.  “It is a familiar principle of constitutional law that this Court will not strike down 
an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative motive,” Chief 
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Justice Warren wrote.  “Inquiries into congressional motives or purposes are a hazardous 
matter.”194 Thus, the Court said it would not “void a statute that is, under well-settled 
criteria, constitutional on its face, on the basis of what fewer than a handful of Congressmen 
said about it.”195 The Court instead said that the “inevitable effect” of a statute, on its face, 
could render it unconstitutional.196 Because the destruction of a draft card is not inevitably 
expressive, the Court said, the law had no “inevitable unconstitutional effect.”197 
Legal commentators have disagreed, both with the Court’s assessment of the law’s 
effect and the Court’s treatment of O’Brien’s “alleged illicit” motive.198 The point here, 
though, is not to critique the Court’s holding in O’Brien, but to draw attention to the 
confusion and inconsistencies in the Court’s method of analysis in these early cases, of which 
O’Brien is an example.  Congress’ interest – its purpose – is important, the Court said in 
O’Brien, but alleged motive will not be dispositive.  Yet as Justice Douglas’ dissent in 
Adderley emphasized, government officials can almost always find an excuse to put forth to 
defend a regulation, disguising true intentions to suppress a particular viewpoint.199 If that is 
true, one might argue the Court should aim to look past excuses and examine charges of 
illicit motive.  For Justice Douglas, though, the answer instead was to focus more closely on 
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the effect of the regulation, a position that the Court has, at times, explicitly supported.200 
Yet, as the powerful dissents in two cases just discussed – Kovacs and Adderley – illustrate, 
for several justices the Court had not gone far enough in its application of that approach.  The 
Court’s inconsistency in relying on purpose and effect in evaluating charges of viewpoint 
(and soon content) discrimination will be a continual focus of this dissertation, as the proper 
method of analysis will continue to confound the Court.              
 Pointing to a Broader Neutrality Rule 
 In the early cases discussed in this chapter, the Court laid down no clear conceptual 
definition of viewpoint discrimination.  Indeed, the Court, as has been discussed, never even 
used that term.  As this chapter has shown, however, the Court did consistently indicate its 
concern with government regulations that discriminated against speech.  Although providing 
no precise definition, then, the Court developed the principle that the government cannot 
discriminate among viewpoints in a body of case law from which we can tease out a 
conclusion.  A close look at the cases discussed here reveals that in every one the Court was 
concerned with discrimination against offensive, unpopular, or disfavored ideas, messages, or 
views that were regarded as unacceptable by the government.201 Based on these cases, then, 
viewpoint discrimination can be defined as regulations that single out – or allow the 
government discretion to single out – speech that contains those offensive, unpopular, or 
disfavored views.  In other words, viewpoint discrimination, the Court seems to have said, is 
present when government suppresses or burdens expression it dislikes or disapproves of 
 
200 See Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (“In every case, therefore, where legislative abridgement of 
[speech and press] rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the challenged 
legislation.”); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 385 (1968) (“These cases stand, not for the proposition 
that legislative motive is a proper basis for declaring a statute unconstitutional, but that the inevitable effect of a 
statute on its face may render it unconstitutional.”).  
 
201 See also Casarez, supra note 18, at 509.  
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while leaving unfettered the expression of closely related messages with which it does not 
disagree.  Cox v. New Hampshire, Kovacs, Adderley, and O’Brien demonstrated that the 
Court would uphold regulations when it was confident the government did not – or could not 
– target disfavored views.  
 Chapters 3 and 4 will demonstrate that this is not the only way the Court has come to 
understand viewpoint discrimination.  Other possible definitions or conceptualizations of the 
term will emerge – as will a seemingly wider prohibition on speech discrimination, 
encompassing not just the suppressing of disfavored views but also the suppressing of entire 
subjects.  The Burger Court, as will be shown, solidified the First Amendment’s aversion to 
“content discrimination” in the 1970s.  The first suggestion of the concept, though, appeared 
during the Warren Court era, in Justice Black’s concurring opinion in Cox v. Louisiana.202 
In Cox, a civil rights leader who led a peaceful march of 2,000 students on a public 
street to protest racial segregation was arrested for and convicted of breaching the peace and 
obstructing a public passageway.203 A majority of the Court overturned both convictions, 
with its holdings rooted in the tradition of the early cases.  Justice Arthur Goldberg’s opinion 
for five justices found flawed the breach of the peace statute because, as in Edwards, its 
vague definition “would allow persons to be punished merely for peacefully expressing 
unpopular views.”204 As for the obstructing public passages conviction, the Count found that 
 
202 379 U.S. 536, 580-81 (1965) (Black, J., concurring).  Justice Tom Clark joined Justice Black’s concurring 
opinion.   
 
203 Cox, 379 U.S. at 539-544.  The leader, Rev. B. Elton Cox, also was convicted of violating a law prohibiting 
demonstrations near a courthouse.  The Court dealt with that conviction in a separate opinion, Cox v. Louisiana 
(Cox II), 379 U.S. 599 (1965).  The Court overturned the conviction, reasoning that authorities had, in effect, 
first given Cox consent to demonstrate near the courthouse before arresting him. 
 
204 Id. at 551.  The Court also concluded that there was insufficient evidence to support the breach of the peace 
conviction. 
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local authorities regularly authorized exceptions to a general prohibition on obstructing 
streets but followed no uniform standards in doing so.  In other words, authorities “permit or 
prohibit parades or street meetings in their completely uncontrolled discretion.”205 As the 
Court’s many prior decisions had established, the Constitution forbids lodging such 
discretion in government officials.  The Court wrote, “It is clearly unconstitutional to enable 
a public official to determine which expressions of view will be permitted and which will not 
or to engage in invidious discrimination among persons or groups,” whether by granting 
broad discretionary licensing power or, “as in this case, the equivalent of such a system by 
selective enforcement of an extremely broad prohibitory statute.”206 
Justice Black agreed with the majority that the ordinances were unconstitutional and 
that the convictions should be overturned.  He did so, however, “for reasons which differ 
somewhat from those stated in the Court's opinion.”207 The state statute prohibiting the 
obstruction of public passages contained an express exception for “a bona fide legitimate 
labor organization or to any of its legal activities.”208 Justice Black argued that the 
unambiguous labor exception rendered the law unconstitutional.  He “not[ed] in passing” that 
the “objectives of labor unions and of the group led by Cox here may have much in 
common.”209 Both groups, Justice Black said, “frequently protest discrimination against their 
members in the matter of employment.”210 “May” is the operative word in Justice Black’s 
 
205 Id. at 557. 
 
206 Id. at 557-58. 
 
207 Id. at 575 (Black, J., concurring). 
 
208 Id. at 552 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. § 14:100.1 (CUM. SUPP. 1962)). 
 
209 Id. at 580 (Black, J., concurring). 
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passing observation, as Cox readily admitted that the demonstration for which he was 
arrested was not a protest against employment discrimination.  Justice Black’s opinion, 
however, did not hinge on the fact that, in some hypothetical demonstration, the statute might 
favor union views over others in a debate over employment discrimination.  He found other 
flaws on the face of the law.  As he said, “[T]o deny this appellant and his group use of the 
streets because of their views against racial discrimination, while allowing other groups to 
use the streets to voice opinions on other subjects, also amounts, I think, to an invidious 
discrimination forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”211 
Justice Black’s invocation of the Equal Protection Clause will be addressed further in 
the next chapter, as the Court will flirt – albeit briefly – with following Justice Black’s lead 
and employing the clause to strike down speech discrimination.  But Justice Black’s opinion 
is noteworthy here for a more important reason.  His explanation of “invidious 
discrimination” in the preceding quotation is different from the conceptualization the Court 
had been using.  The law’s labor exception, in and of itself, did not single out offensive, 
unpopular, or disfavored views or permit the government to do so.  Rather, the government 
had chosen to allow labor unions to “use the streets to voice opinions on [labor] subjects.”212 
The government was favoring a subject (labor expression) – not a viewpoint – over others.  
Justice Black nevertheless concluded that doing so was unconstitutional discrimination.  His 
was a concurring opinion in Cox v. Louisiana. Just seven years later, however, the Court 
would approvingly cite the opinion, give the discrimination he described a name, and, in the 
process, fundamentally alter its First Amendment jurisprudence.
 
210 Id.  
211 Id. at 581. 
 
212 Id. (emphasis added). 
Chapter 3  
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts on Viewpoint and Content Discrimination:  
Private Speech and Public Forum Cases 
 
Justice Black had left the Court, and Warren Burger had joined as Chief Justice, by 
the time the Court decided Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley1 in 1972.  Though 
Justice Black was gone, the version of discrimination he had articulated in his Cox 
concurrence gained majority approval for the first time in Mosley. As will be seen, the 
Mosley Court, in sweeping language, condemned not just discrimination based on viewpoint 
(which is the kind of discrimination discussed in Chapter 2)2 but based on subject matter as 
well.  Mosley is thus now seen as the seminal case in which the Court articulated its concern 
with speech regulations that discriminate based on content.3
Earl Mosley, a postal worker, regularly picketed a Chicago high school during school 
hours.  He walked, usually by himself, along a public sidewalk in front of the school, 
carrying a sign that accused the school of having a quota on black employees and practicing 
“black discrimination.”4 Seven months after his picketing started, Chicago passed an 
 
1 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 
2 In Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970), a Burger Court case decided two years before the broad 
content-neutrality rule was articulated in Mosley, the Court struck down a law using the same conceptualization 
of viewpoint discrimination described in Chapter 2.  A federal law made it a crime for any person without 
authority to wear the uniform of any of the Armed Forces of the United States.  An exception was made for an 
actor in a play or film “if the portrayal does not tend to discredit [the] armed force.”  Id. at 60.  Again without 
explicitly using the term viewpoint discrimination, the Court struck down the law, ruling that a law “which 
leaves Americans free to praise the war in Vietnam but can send persons like Schacht to prison for opposing it, 
cannot survive in a country which has the First Amendment.”  Id. at 63.   
3 See, e.g., DANIEL FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 21 (2003) (“The content distinction found its first clear 
expression in [Mosley].). 
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ordinance – apparently for reasons unrelated to Mosley’s protests – that prohibited picketing 
within 150 feet of any primary or secondary school during school hours and just before and 
after school was in session.5 A proviso in the law exempted “the peaceful picketing of any 
school involved in a labor dispute.”6
Upon learning of passage of the law, Mosley contacted the Chicago Police 
Department to see how it would apply to his picketing.  Police confirmed that if the picketing 
along the sidewalk continued he would be arrested.  Mosley then sued in federal court to 
prevent enforcement of the law.7 He lost in trial court but argued successfully in front of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit that the law was overbroad and therefore 
“patently unconstitutional on its face.”8 The Supreme Court affirmed but rested its decision 
on a different ground.   
 The Court said that because Chicago exempted peaceful labor picketing from an 
otherwise general prohibition – that is, because the city “treat[ed] some picketing differently 
from others”9 – the law was properly analyzed under the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Writing for the Court, Justice Marshall acknowledged that the 
Equal Protection claim was “closely intertwined with First Amendment interests.”10 
Nevertheless, he said, the crucial question in the case was that asked of “all” Equal 
Protection claims: “Whether there is an appropriate governmental interest suitably furthered 
 
4 408 U.S. at 93. 
 
5 Id. 
6 Id. (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE, CH. 193-1 (i) (1968)). 
 
7 Id. at 3-4. 
 
8 Mosley v. Police Dep’t of Chi., 432 F.2d 1256, 1259 (1970). 
 
9 408 U.S. at 94. 
 
10 Id. at 95. 
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by the differential treatment.”11 No such appropriate interest existed here, the Court 
concluded. 
 As other scholars have pointed out, it would have been possible for the Court to have 
rested its decision in Mosley exclusively on a viewpoint-neutrality rule.12 The Chicago 
ordinance, as construed by the Court, permitted working teachers to express their views 
about employment conditions within 150 feet of a school but denied similar access to 
prospective teachers or to interested parents or citizens.13 The law thus favored unionized 
teachers on questions of employment policy and discriminated against those who wished to 
change the school’s employment policy to the detriment of those teachers (a view that was 
held by Mosley, for instance).14 Seen in that light, one scholar wrote, “Mosley’s claim of 
viewpoint discrimination seems at least plausible, if not quite overwhelming.”15 
The Court’s opinion, however, went well beyond condemning viewpoint 
discrimination.  The “central problem” with the law, Justice Marshall wrote, was not that it 
disfavored Mosley’s viewpoint but “that it describes permissible picketing in terms of its 
subject matter.  Peaceful picketing on the subject of a school’s labor-management dispute is 
permitted, but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited.”16 The Court thus seemed to 
announce a much broader principle than one demanding viewpoint neutrality.  The 
government is barred from selecting permissible subjects for public discourse as well, the 
 
11 Id.  
12 See, e.g., FARBER, supra note 3, at 22; Paul Stephan, The First Amendment and Content Discrimination, 68 
VA. L. REV. 203, 233-34 (1982).  
13 Stephan, supra note 12, at 233. 
 
14 Id. at 234. 
 
15 Id.  
 
16 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 95. 
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Court ruled, “[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that government has no power to 
restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”17 The 
Court said that “any restriction on expressive activity because of its content would 
completely undercut” the commitment to uninhibited debate that the First Amendment 
demands.18 Justice Marshall approvingly cited Justice Black’s Cox concurrence for support 
of this broad content-neutrality principle,19 which demanded that once the government opens 
up a forum for expression, it “may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking on the 
basis of what they intend to say.  Selective exclusions from a public forum may not be based 
on content alone, and may not be justified by reference to content alone,” the Court held.20 
“‘[A] concern about content,’” the Court declared, “is never permitted.”21 
The Court’s language is bold and sweeping, the foundation for a new approach to the 
First Amendment.22 Yet as striking and important as the Mosley opinion was, it also 
appeared to raise as many questions as it settled.23 For starters, the Court seemed to 
contradict itself in articulating the rules applicable to content discrimination.24 As the 
 
17 Id.  The Court appears to treat the words “message,” “ideas,” “subject matter,” and “content” in the 
disjunctive here, as if the words each have their own distinctive legal meaning.  As this chapter will 
demonstrate, the Court has not treated them that way in the jurisprudence that has followed in Mosley’s wake. 
 
18 Id. at 96 (emphasis added). 
 
19 Id. at 98.  “We accept Mr. Justice Black’s quoted views.”  Id.  
20 Id. at 96. 
 
21 Id. at 99 (quoting Harry Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 
29).  As another scholar observed, it should be noted that Kalven appeared to use the term “content” to refer to a 
speaker’s viewpoint and not to broad categories, or subjects, of speech, which is how the Court used the term in 
this quotation.  See Stephan, supra note 12, at 251 n.91.  
22 FARBER, supra note 3, at 22. 
 
23 Id.  
24 Id. at 23. 
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quotations above demonstrate, in parts of the opinion the Court flatly asserted that the 
government had “no power” to restrict expression because of its content25 and that a 
distinction based on subject matter “is never permitted.”26 Elsewhere in the opinion, 
however, the Court seemed less absolute, admitting that “there may be sufficient regulatory 
interests justifying selective exclusions or distinctions among pickets”27 and stating that 
“discriminations among pickets must be tailored to serve a substantial governmental 
interest.”28 The Court concluded the law was not so tailored,29 but the analysis seems 
superfluous if indeed the government “is never permitted” to make distinctions based on 
subject matter. 
 The flat assertions denying government’s ability to regulate based on content also 
generated questions about the scope of the content-neutrality principle the Court was 
announcing, a point Chief Justice Burger raised in his concurring opinion.  He warned that 
“some of the language” the majority used could, “if read out of context, be misleading.”30 
Citing cases in which the Court upheld restrictions on obscenity, fighting words, and 
defamation31 – restrictions, arguably, based on the content of speech – Chief Justice Burger 
 
25 408 U.S. at 95. 
 
26 Id. at 99. 
 
27 Id. at 98. 
 
28 Id. at 99. 
 
29 Id. at 99-102.  Chicago argued the ordinance was necessary to prevent school disruption.  The Court 
acknowledged that stopping picketing that disrupts a school was “certainly” a substantial interest but noted that 
the City undermined that interest by permitting peaceful labor picketing during school hours.  Id. at 99.  Justice 
Marshall wrote: “If peaceful labor picketing is permitted, there is no justification for prohibiting all nonlabor 
picketing, both peaceful and nonpeaceful.  ‘Peaceful’ nonlabor picketing, however the term ‘peaceful’ is 
defined, is obviously no more disruptive than ‘peaceful’ labor picketing.”  Id. at 100.  
 
30 Id. at 103 (Burger, C.J., concurring). 
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said that the Court’s broad statements condemning content discrimination were “subject to 
some qualifications.”32 Other justices, as will be seen, have similarly tried to scale back the 
Court’s pronouncement in Mosley.  Justice Stevens, who joined the Court three years after 
the decision, has been especially assertive, arguing in one law review article that although 
Mosley’s language that the government has “no power” to regulate speech based on content 
is “often cited as a proposition of law . . . [it] is perhaps more accurately described as a goal 
or an ideal.”33 At the least, it is clear that the Court in Mosley did not have the intention of 
overruling all of its obscenity or defamation jurisprudence, but the Court failed to explain 
how those cases – or other instances in which the government seemingly regulates speech 
based on content, e.g., incitement to immediate violence – could or should be reconciled with 
the new content-neutrality principle Mosley appeared to declare.34 
The Court muddied the Mosley water in another important way as well.  Though the 
opinion found the law’s subject matter distinction flawed and made broad pronouncements 
condemning discrimination based on content, Justice Marshall, in a crucial passage, also 
relied on viewpoint discrimination in his holding:  
 Necessarily, then, under the Equal Protection Clause, not to mention 
 the First Amendment itself, government may not grant the use of a forum to 
 people whose views it finds acceptable, but deny use to those wishing to 
 express less favored or more controversial views . . . . There is an “equality of 
 status in the field of ideas,” and government must afford all points of view an 
 equal opportunity to be heard.35 
31 The Chief Justice cited Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (fighting words); and New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) 
(defamation). 
 
32 408 U.S. at 103 (Burger, C.J., concurring).  
 
33 Justice John Paul Stevens, The Freedom of Speech, 102 YALE L.J. 1293, 1304 (1993). 
 
34 FARBER, supra note 3, at 22-23. 
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For support, Justice Marshall cited Niemotko v. Maryland36 and Fowler v. Rhode Island37 and 
referenced other cases in which the Court struck down standardless licensing schemes for 
fear they would have permitted the government to suppress “some points of view.”38 The 
passage, then, clearly rested on the principles that emerged from the cases discussed in 
Chapter 2.  The Court therefore relied, at least in part, on its prohibition of viewpoint 
discrimination in striking down a law that it said impermissibly discriminated based on 
content or subject matter.  The Court clearly saw viewpoint and subject matter neutrality to 
be similar concepts, but the Court failed to explain how exactly they were similar and, 
especially, how they were not. 
 Mosley, this discussion should make clear, thus left many questions unanswered and 
perhaps, then, was a harbinger of the jurisprudential confusion that would come in its wake.  
Though riddled with analytical shortcomings, however, the opinion’s significance cannot be 
overstated.  Mosley was a seminal decision for the Court; it is seen as an important moment 
that launched a new approach to First Amendment law.  Chapter 2 discussed the early cases 
in which the Court developed and conceptualized its viewpoint-neutrality principle.  Mosley 
marked the beginning of a broader principle for the Court: a requirement that the government 
must be content, not just viewpoint, neutral.  This chapter and the next analyze the Court’s 
jurisprudence in the areas of content and viewpoint neutrality post-Mosley.  They explore 
how the Court has gone about answering the questions the Mosley opinion left unsettled.  In 
doing so, the chapters examine closely how the Court has struggled interpreting and applying 
 
35 408 U.S. at 96 (quoting ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF 
THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)). 
 
36 340 U.S. 268 (1951). 
 
37 345 U.S. 67 (1953). 
 
38 408 U.S. at 97. 
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its content-neutrality rule.  The discussion is especially concerned with how the Court has 
wrestled in distinguishing content discrimination from the principle of viewpoint neutrality 
that the Court had begun to develop before Mosley and continued to develop in that case’s 
wake. 
 Chapters 3 and 4 will, therefore, discuss a considerable amount of case law.  To make 
the case analysis manageable, the chapters will follow an organization that the Court has 
itself prescribed.39 As the Court’s jurisprudence has developed, the Court has ruled that 
content-based restrictions imposed by government on private speech and on speech in 
traditional public forums40 (such as the sidewalk at issue in Mosley) must pass strict scrutiny 
to be constitutional, a difficult and rarely met standard.  Content-neutral restrictions, on the 
other hand, must pass a more lenient intermediate scrutiny.  The Court’s decisions in these 
areas will be discussed in this chapter.  The following chapter will then discuss the Court’s 
limited public forum and nonpublic forum cases, in which the Court has said that content-
based restrictions are more tolerable.41 Yet even in those types of forums, viewpoint 
discrimination is still unconstitutional, making the line between content and viewpoint 
 
39 Professor Nicole Casarez’s thoughtful 2000 law review article followed a similar organization.  Her primary 
focus, however, was on what she argued was the Court’s lax application of its viewpoint-neutrality principle in 
government subsidy cases.  She, therefore, gave less attention to the Court’s treatment of content and viewpoint 
neutrality in the several other contexts discussed here.  Nicole Casarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and 
Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 ALB. L. REV. 501 (2000).  
 
40 The Court has described traditional public forums as “places which by long tradition or by government fiat 
have been devoted to assembly and debate.”  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 
45 (1983).  As Justice Roberts wrote in Hague v. Committee for Industrial Organization, 307 U.S. 496, 515 
(1939), traditional public forums, such as streets and parks, are places which “have immemorially been held in 
trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating 
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions.”   
41 As will be discussed in more detail below, although the Court decided a handful of cases in the 1970s that 
germinated the principles underlying its three-tiered forum jurisprudence, it was not until the 1983 case Perry 
Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983), that the Court formally labeled forums 
traditional, limited (or designated), or nonpublic.  
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especially stark and important.  Chapter 4 will also discuss how the Court has applied the 
rules of content and viewpoint neutrality when the government subsidizes speech. 
 The Court Cements its Concern with Content 
 If any speculation existed as to whether the holding in Mosley was hyperbole or 
perhaps case-specific, the Court quickly put it to rest.  In Grayned v. City of Rockford,42 
Mosley’s companion case, the Court simply relied on Mosley to strike down an identical anti-
picketing ordinance that had been enacted in Rockford, Illinois.  In an 8-1 decision, the Court 
upheld the conviction of a demonstrator for violating an anti-noise ordinance, however.  The 
ordinance prohibited disturbing a school session by willfully making a noise or diversion 
adjacent to any school building; unlike the anti-picketing ordinance, the anti-noise ordinance 
included no labor exception.43 The Court ruled the ordinance was neither vague nor 
overbroad.  Justice Marshall cited Mosley for the proposition that “clearly, government has 
no power to restrict [expressive] activity [in a public place] because of its message.”44 He 
concluded the anti-noise ordinance at issue did not permit the government to do so. 
 Three years later in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville45 the Court invalidated an 
ordinance that prohibited a drive-in movie theater from showing films containing nudity 
when its screen was visible from a public street or place because the law discriminated on the 
basis of content.  The city’s primary argument was that the law legitimately protected 
citizens against unwilling exposure to offensive material.46 But, the Court pointed out, 
 
42 408 U.S. 104 (1972). 
 
43 Id. at 108. 
 
44 Id. at 115. 
 
45 422 U.S. 205 (1975). 
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“Jacksonville’s ordinance . . . does not protect citizens from all movies that might offend; 
rather it singles out films containing nudity, presumably because the lawmakers considered 
them especially offensive to passersby.”47 Justice Powell, writing for six members of the 
Court, said the First Amendment “strictly limits [the government’s] power” when it seeks to 
shield unwilling viewers or listeners from speech it deems more offensive than others, 
especially when those unwilling viewers can avoid the speech simply by averting their 
eyes.48 “The Jacksonville ordinance discriminates among movies solely on the basis of 
content,” the Court held,49 indicating that the Court considered “content” to include images 
not necessarily associated with a particular subject or viewpoint.  Any nudity, “however 
innocent or even educational,” was prohibited from being shown.50 Because nudity was 
singled out for regulation, because the application of the regulation hinged on the content of 
the movie (that is, whether or not the movie displayed nudity), the Court determined the law 
was content based, concluding that “the limited privacy interest of persons on the public 
streets cannot justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its 
content.”51 
46 Id. at 208. 
 
47 Id.  
48 Id. at 209. 
 
49 Id. at 211. 
 
50 Id.  
51 Id. at 212.  Jacksonville also sought to justify the ordinance as a traffic regulation, claiming that nudity on a 
drive-in movie screen distracts passing motorists.  The Court first noted that “nothing in the record or in the text 
of the ordinance suggests that it is aimed at traffic regulation.”  Id. at 214.  Even if it were, however, the Court 
said the law was “strikingly underinclusive” because “other scenes in the customary screen diet” other than 
nudity would likely be just as distracting to motorists.  Id. at 214-15.  Under the First Amendment, the Court 
said, “even a traffic regulation cannot discriminate on the basis of content unless there are clear reasons for the 
distinctions.”  Id. at 215. 
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 Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Erznoznik, joined by Justice Rehnquist, 
demonstrates that the Court’s frequent disagreements over how to apply Mosley’s content-
neutrality rule began almost immediately.  Chief Justice Burger faulted the majority for, as he 
saw it, beginning and ending its analysis “with the sweeping proposition that, regardless of 
the circumstances, government may not regulate any form of ‘communicative’ activity on the 
basis of its content.”52 Such an approach, he said, is “rigidly simplistic,”53 ignoring the facts 
and context of the case.  A drive-in movie theater, he reasoned, “is a unique type of eye-
catching display that can be highly intrusive and distracting,”54 and public authorities 
therefore have a legitimate interest in regulating them.  Importantly, Chief Justice Burger did 
not find it problematic that the ordinance singled out nudity for regulation.  Unlike a reader 
who can consider nude pictures in a book as part of the whole work, he said, passersby would 
have a “fleeting exposure” to nudity that registers a “slight to nonexistent communicative 
value.”55 Thus, he concluded, “regardless of whether the ordinance involved here can be 
loosely described as regulating the content of a certain type of display, it is not a restriction 
of any ‘message.’”56 He cited Mosley for that assertion, presumably indicating that he read 
Mosley to condemn only the restriction of particular messages, a narrow reading that the 
majority in Erznoznik clearly did not endorse.  For Chief Justice Burger, “fleeting” glimpses 
 
52 Id. at 219 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 
53 Id. at 220. 
 
54 Id. at 222. 
 
55 Id.  
56 Id. at 223. 
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of nudity communicate no message, making Mosley’s rule inapplicable and the “First 
Amendment interests involved in this case . . . trivial at best.”57 
The Court found no reason to disagree that it was reviewing a content regulation two 
years later in Linmark v. Township of Willingboro.58 To stop what was perceived as the 
flight of white homeowners from Willingboro, New Jersey, the township council enacted an 
ordinance prohibiting the posting of “For Sale” or “Sold” signs on real estate.  The township 
maintained the law permissibly restricted one “method of communication,”59 that the law, 
essentially, was no more than a regulation that restricted the place and manner of speech.  A 
unanimous Court disagreed.  Justice Marshall observed that the law did not prohibit all lawn 
signs; rather, the township proscribed particular types of signs “based on their content” 
because it feared the effect the signs would have on those viewing them.60 Only “For Sale” 
or “Sold” signs were barred by the ordinance, making the content – what the sign said – 
dispositive in determining whether the regulation applied.  “If the ordinance is to be 
sustained,” the Court concluded, “it must be on the basis of the township’s interest in 
regulating the content of the communication.”61 In accepting that the ordinance might be 
sustained, Justice Marshall was implicitly rejecting his bold language in Mosley that declared 
that the government had “no power” to regulate the content of speech.62 Nevertheless, the 
 
57 Id.  
58 431 U.S. 85 (1977). 
 
59 Id. at 93. 
 
60 Id. at 94. 
 
61 Id.  
62 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).  
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Court ruled the ordinance was unconstitutional because the law’s effect was to prevent 
Willingboro residents from obtaining information of “vital interest.”63 
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,64 the Court struck down a Massachusetts 
law that forbade banks and business corporations from making contributions or expenditures 
for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum proposals, unless the referendum 
“materially affect[ed] any of the property, business or assets of the corporation.”65 The law 
expressly excluded questions put to voters “solely concerning the taxation of the income, 
property or transactions of individuals” from the “materially affecting” exception.66 Two 
national banking associations and three business corporations wanted to spend money to 
publicize their opposition to a proposed constitutional amendment submitted to voters that 
would have permitted the legislature to impose a graduated income tax on the income of 
individuals.67 The law prevented them from doing so; they sued, arguing the law was 
unconstitutional, and the Court agreed.  Justice Powell, writing for the majority, said the law 
impermissibly discriminated based on the subject matter of speech.  He wrote: “[The law] 
permits a corporation to communicate to the public its views on certain referendum subjects 
– those materially affecting its business – but not others.  It also singles out one kind of ballot 
question – individual taxation – as a subject about which corporations may never make their 
ideas public.”68 Citing Mosley for support, the Court said that “in the realm of protected 
 
63 Linmark, 431 U.S. at 96. 
 
64 435 U.S. 765 (1978). 
 
65 Id. at 768. 
 
66 Id.  
67 Id. at 769. 
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speech, the legislature is constitutionally disqualified from dictating the subjects about which 
persons may speak.”69 The Court subjected the law to “exacting scrutiny” (which it soon 
called strict scrutiny), demanding a compelling governmental interest to sustain the law and 
means that were “closely drawn.”70 The Court held the law failed the scrutiny and was 
therefore unconstitutional. 
 The Court handed down two significant decisions on the same day in 1980 that 
further clarified and reaffirmed its holding in Mosley. In Consolidated Edison v. Public 
Service Commission,71 a privately owned utility company challenged an order from New 
York’s Public Service Commission that barred all utility companies subject to its jurisdiction 
from including bill inserts that express “their opinions or viewpoints on controversial issues 
of public policy.”72 In a 7-2 decision, the Court ruled the order was unconstitutional.  The 
opinion, written again by Justice Powell, first considered whether the order was a content-
neutral time, place, and manner regulation.73 If it were, Justice Powell said, the order would 
be tested under a more lenient judicial review than if it were “based on the content of 
speech,” in which case the action would be “scrutinized more carefully.”74 Time, place, and 
 
68 Id. at 784. 
 
69 Id. at 784-85. 
 
70 Id. at 786. 
 
71 447 U.S. 530 (1980). 
 
72 Id. at 533.  The issue arose after Consolidated Edison had included a bill insert that articulated its position 
that nuclear power was a beneficial energy source and that increased use of it would further the United States’ 
independence from foreign energy sources.  In response to the insert, an organization, the Natural Resources 
Defense Council (NRDC), asked the Public Service Commission to require the utility company to open its 
billing envelopes to contrasting views on controversial issues of public importance.  Id. at 532.  The 
Commission denied NRDC’s request and instead issued the order under review in Consolidated Edison.
73 He used Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941), and Grayned as examples of such regulations, 
concluding that “the essence of time, place, or manner regulation lies in the recognition that various methods of 
speech, regardless of their content, may frustrate legitimate governmental goals.”  Id. at 536. 
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manner regulations, he said, “must be ‘applicable to all speech irrespective of content’”75 and 
“may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.”76 Using those tests, 
the Court had no problem determining that the order at issue here was not a time, place, and 
manner regulation.  The Commission had suppressed “certain bill inserts precisely because 
they address controversial issues of public policy,” the Court said.77 The Commission said 
that it would allow inserts that addressed more benign subjects, such as energy conservation 
measures.78 Because the order permitted some subjects and not others, then, the Court ruled 
it could not “be upheld as a content-neutral time, place, or manner regulation.”79 
Even so, the Commission argued the order was acceptable because it was viewpoint 
neutral, pertaining to subject matter rather than to the viewpoint of a particular speaker.80 
Because the order did not favor either side of a political controversy, the Commission 
reasoned, it was constitutional.  The Court categorically rejected the Commission’s 
argument: “The First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to 
restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an entire 
topic.”81 As will be discussed in much more detail below, the Court has been guilty of 
readily confusing the content and viewpoint labels when reviewing regulations of private 
speech and of speech in public forums.  This line from Consolidated Edison helps explain 
 
74 Id.  
75 Id. (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975)). 
 
76 Id.  
 
77 Id. at 537. 
 
78 Id.  
79 Id.  
80 Id.  
81 Id.  
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why: The Court appeared to use “content based” as an umbrella term that includes both 
viewpoint discrimination and subject matter discrimination.82 The ramifications of that usage 
will be discussed below.   
 Consolidated Edison is interesting in that although it arguably helped confuse the 
distinction between content and viewpoint, it also reaffirmed Mosley’s holding by 
emphasizing that the Court believes there is a distinction and that the Constitution is 
concerned with speech discrimination beyond viewpoint discrimination.  The majority of the 
Court agreed with the Commission that the order was viewpoint neutral.  The order was not 
subject-matter neutral, however, the Court said, and that made the order constitutionally 
problematic. “If the marketplace of ideas is to remain free and open,” Justice Powell wrote, 
“governments must not be allowed to choose ‘which issues are worth discussing or 
debating.’”83 The Court said that “to allow a government the choice of permissible subjects 
for public debate would be to allow that government control over the search for political 
truth.”84 As had become commonplace in the decisions since Mosley, the order was not 
automatically unconstitutional because it was content based.  Rather, the Court said it could 
be sustained “only if the government can show that the regulation is a precisely drawn means 
of serving a compelling state interest.”85 The Court concluded the order was not. 
 Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment only in Consolidated Edison, and his 
opinion is noteworthy.  As he has frequently argued, Justice Stevens thought the Court’s 
 
82 At other times, as will be seen, the Court has treated content and viewpoint as distinguishable concepts, with 
content being synonymous with subject matter, topic, or category. 
 
83 Id. at 537-38 (quoting Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972)). 
 
84 Id. at 538. 
 
85 Id. at 540. 
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sweeping statements condemning discrimination based on subject matter were “hyperbole.”86 
Here, he objected to the Commission’s use of the “controversial nature of speech as the 
touchstone for its regulation,”87 arguing that restricting speech because it is controversial 
threatens the “profound national commitment” to vigorous debate on public issues that is at 
the “very core of the First Amendment.”88 In many other situations, though, he said, the 
Court tolerates restrictions based on subject matter.89 Yet Justice Stevens differed with the 
majority’s holding in Consolidated Edison in a more substantive way: He thought the Court 
erred in concluding that the order was viewpoint neutral.  The majority, looking to the face of 
the order, ruled it was content based because it barred speech on topics or subjects, 
“controversial issues of public policy.”90 Justice Stevens, however, appeared to focus on the 
effect of the order in operation to determine that it constituted viewpoint discrimination.  The 
regulation, he argued, “denies one group of persons the right to address a selected audience 
on ‘controversial issues of public policy.’”91 In the debate over controversial policy issues, 
he reasoned, one distinct perspective or viewpoint – that of the utility – was being eliminated, 
thus making the order viewpoint discriminatory.  Note that Justice Stevens’ conceptualization 
of viewpoint discrimination here is arguably different from the one discussed in Chapter 2.  
His concern appeared to be whether a perspective or viewpoint was eliminated from a 
 
86 Id. at 545 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
 
87 Id. at 546 n.9. 
 
88 Id.  
89 Id. at 544-45.  “Any student of history who has been reprimanded for talking about the World Series during a 
class discussion of the First Amendment knows that it is incorrect to state that a ‘time, place, or manner 
restriction may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.’”  Id. 
90 Id. at 532. 
 
91 Id. at 546 (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment). 
114
narrowly defined debate, regardless of whether the government had eliminated that 
perspective because it found it offensive or disagreeable.  Government suppression of 
disfavored views is therefore sufficient but not necessary for a finding of viewpoint 
discrimination, Justice Stevens seemed to be arguing in Consolidated Edison. As will be 
discussed below, the Court has embraced that conceptualization in determining viewpoint 
discrimination in limited public forums.  
 In the second 1980 case, Carey v. Brown,92 the Court said it decided a case that was 
“constitutionally indistinguishable” from Mosley.93 An Illinois law barred picketing of 
private residences but exempted from the prohibition “the peaceful picketing of a place of 
employment involved in a labor dispute.”94 Several members of the Committee Against 
Racism, a civil rights organization, were convicted of violating the law after they picketed 
the home of the Mayor of Chicago to protest his position on busing.95 In a 6-3 decision, the 
Court overturned their convictions and struck down the law as unconstitutional.  Justice 
Brennan’s majority opinion closely mirrored the Court’s discussion in Mosley. The law, 
Justice Brennan said, “discriminates between lawful and unlawful conduct based upon the 
content of the demonstrator’s communication.  On its face, the Act accords preferential 
 
92 447 U.S. 455 (1980). 
 
93 Id. at 460. 
 
94 Id. at 457.  The law also contained exceptions for a person peacefully picketing his own residence and for 
picketing by anyone at a residence used as a place of business or commonly for meetings to discuss matters of 
public concern.  The Court, however, focused its discussion on the “labor dispute” exception.  Id.  Justice 
Rehnquist’s dissent faulted the Court for ignoring the other exceptions and “selective[ly] quot[ing] from the 
Illinois statute.”  Id. at 473 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).  Justice Rehnquist agreed that the sole determinant of an 
individual’s right to picket in Mosley was the content of speech.  “In contrast,” he said, “the principal 
determinant of a person’s right to picket a residence in Illinois is not content, as the Court suggests, but rather 
the character of the residence sought to be picketed.”  Id. at 474.    
95 Id.  
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treatment to the expression of views on one particular subject.”96 Information about labor 
disputes could be freely disseminated, he reasoned, but discussion of all other issues was 
restricted.  “The permissibility of residential picketing under the Illinois statute is thus 
dependent solely on the nature of the message being conveyed,” he said.97 The Court 
concluded the Illinois law therefore “suffer[ed] from the same constitutional infirmities” as 
the law in Mosley.98 The state argued Carey was distinguishable, however, because the state 
interests were “especially compelling.”99 Although the Court suggested “that certain state 
interests may be so compelling that, where no adequate alternatives exist, a content-based 
distinction – if narrowly drawn – would be a permissible way of furthering those 
objectives,”100 the Court did not agree with the state that such interests were present in the 
Illinois law, and therefore the law was unconstitutional.101 
96 Id. at 460-61.  The Court reiterated the point made in Consolidated Edison: “It is, of course, no answer to 
assert that the Illinois statute does not discriminate on the basis of the speaker’s viewpoint, but only on the basis 
of the subject matter of his message.”  Id. at 463 n.6.  
 
97 Id. at 461.  “[I]t is the content of the speech that determines whether it is within or without the statute’s blunt 
prohibition.”  Id. at 462. 
 
98 Id.  
99 Id. at 464.  The state said the law was enacted to ensure privacy in the home and to support the state’s interest 
– which it said was long encouraged by federal and state law – in providing special protection for labor protests.  
Id. at 464-66. 
 
100 Id. at 465. 
 
101 As it had in Mosley, the Carey majority invoked the Equal Protection Clause in its opinion, a point that 
Justice Potter Stewart attacked in his concurrence.  He said, “[W]hat was actually at stake in Mosley, and is at 
stake here, is the basic meaning of the constitutional protection of free speech.”  Id. at 472 (Stewart, J., 
concurring).  Carey is, in fact, the only of the post-Mosley cases discussed in this section in which the Court 
relied on the Equal Protection Clause in its opinion, in spite of the fact that, as pointed out, the Court in those 
cases also struck down regulations it said were content discriminatory.  Justice Stewart’s position, buttressed by 
other scholarly commentary at the time, soon won out.  The Court now considers content discrimination 
exclusively a First Amendment, not an Equal Protection Clause, issue.  For scholarly discussion of the matter, 
see Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 206 (1983) 
(“The degree of scrutiny that is appropriate in [testing] content-based restrictions [is] fundamentally a first 
amendment issue.  Invocation of the equal protection clause adds nothing constructive to the analysis.”). 
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 In the eight years subsequent to Mosley, then, culminating with Consolidated Edison 
and Carey, the Court decided a number of important cases that cemented its concern with 
content discrimination.  The Court thus had solidified a new approach to First Amendment 
law first begun in Mosley. Under this new approach, the Court’s concern with speech 
discrimination extended beyond viewpoint discrimination to include content discrimination 
as well.  The Court now found flawed regulations that restricted speech based on its subject 
matter or content, even when the Court agreed the regulation was viewpoint neutral.102 
Consolidated Edison and Carey prove to be fitting points of departure for the discussion that 
follows here.  Although the Court found Carey to be “constitutionally indistinguishable” 
from Mosley,103 the opinions did differ in at least one important respect.  The Mosley 
decision had left unsettled the absoluteness of the rule against content discrimination, the 
Court having flatly asserted in some places that the government had “no power” to regulate 
the content of speech but in others implying exceptions might be permissible.104 The Carey 
Court reviewed a law it found “identical”105 to the law at issue in Mosley and clarified that 
such a content-based law can be upheld, provided the government has a compelling interest 
and the restriction is narrowly drawn.106 Consolidated Edison, on the other hand, reminded 
 
102 The Court did carve out exceptions to this new rule as it applied to regulations on otherwise protected private 
speech, though it did so with fiery dissents from justices on the Court.  One of those exceptions – which 
permitted regulation of adult businesses if the regulation was aimed at the secondary effects of speech – will be 
discussed in much more detail below.  Another exception appeared in FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), in 
which a plurality of the Court upheld the FCC’s regulation of a “broadcast of patently offensive words dealing 
with sex and excretion . . . because of its content.”  Id. at 745.  The plurality focused on the unique nature of 
broadcasting, emphasizing that broadcast media have “a uniquely pervasive presence” and are “uniquely 
accessible to children.”  Id. at 748-49.     
 
103 447 U.S. at 460. 
 
104 408 U.S. at 95. 
 
105 447 U.S. at 461. 
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us that content-neutral restrictions receive a much more lenient judicial review.107 Under this 
approach, then, whether a law is content based or content neutral is absolutely crucial in 
determining its constitutionality.  The following section discusses the difficulty and 
inconsistency the Court has shown in determining whether a regulation is content based. 
 Difficulty Making the Content-based/Content-neutral Determination 
 Scholars have lauded the Court’s content-based/content-neutral distinction because it, 
in theory, represents a “categorical jurisprudence” that provides “clean, clear-cut distinctions 
between laws that raise or involve First Amendment issues.”108 Advocates of mechanical 
rules in First Amendment decision making therefore champion the approach, arguing that it 
provides guidance for lower courts and prevents a judge’s subjective biases from influencing 
case outcomes.  As Justice O’Connor has argued, the content-based/content-neutral 
distinction “is a rule, in an area where fairly precise rules are better than more discretionary 
and more subjective balancing tests.”109 Yet it is not a rule the Court has been able to apply 
effortlessly or even consistently.  Determining whether a regulation discriminates based on 
content has frequently divided the Court.  The Court itself has acknowledged that “[d]eciding 
whether a particular regulation is content-based or content-neutral is not always a simple 
task.”110 The Court’s candor is admirable, but that candor cannot downplay the free speech 
ramifications of the Court’s difficulty in determining whether a regulation is content 
discriminatory.  Although a regulation will very rarely pass strict scrutiny, a hallmark of the 
 
106 Id. at 465. 
 
107 447 U.S. at 536. 
 
108 Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly Malleable 
Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 69, 70 (1997). 
 
109 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
110 Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994). 
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Court’s treatment of content-neutral regulations has been that they are almost always 
upheld.111 “Thus,” one scholar has observed, “the outcome of a given case often turns almost 
completely on whether the regulation is characterized as content based.”112 
Yet in spite of the importance of the content-based/content-neutral determination, the 
definition of content discrimination and the basis for determining whether a regulation 
discriminates based on content remain murky.113 The following discussion argues that the 
Court has waffled among three approaches or methods in identifying content discrimination: 
The Court has looked to (1) the face of the speech regulation; (2) the purpose or intent of the 
regulation; and (3) the effect or impact of the regulation.  As the discussion will illustrate, 
majorities and dissenters have often reached different results because they have utilized 
different approaches.  At other times, however, the majority and dissent have utilized the 
same approach yet disagreed over its application.  At still other times, the Court has 
combined elements of approaches in reaching its decision.  Fundamentally, then, the problem 
has been that the Court’s method for determining content discrimination has been 
inconsistent and varied. 
 On the Face 
 One approach justices have used is to hinge the content-based/content-neutral 
determination on the face of the speech regulation, focusing the analysis on whether the 
 
111 See, e.g., FARBER, supra note 3, at 26 (“[T]he Court rarely invalidates a regulation once it has found it to be 
content neutral.”). 
112 Id.  But see United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 181 n.10 (1983), in which the Court struck down a 
“facially content-neutral” federal law that barred the display of flags, banners, or other devices designed to draw 
attention to any party, organization, or movement on the sidewalks surrounding the U.S. Supreme Court 
building. 
 
113 See Edward Carter & Brad Clark, Death of Procedural Safeguards: Prior Restraint, Due Process and the 
Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 225, 234 (2006). 
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terms of the law or regulation on their face draw distinctions based on content.  The cases 
discussed thus far in this chapter in which the Court has found regulations to be content 
based have utilized this approach.  Thus, in Carey, for example, the Court stressed that “on 
its face, the Act accords preferential treatment to the expression of views on one particular 
subject.”114 Similarly, the “central problem” with the law in Mosley was “that it describes 
permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter.”115 And in Erznoznik, the Court ruled the 
law “discriminate[d] among movies solely on the basis of content.”116 The Court said that 
the fact that the law was triggered by any display of nudity on a drive-in movie theater, 
“however innocent or even educational,”117 made it content based. 
 The Court has continued to use the on-the-face approach beyond those early cases.  In 
Burson v. Freeman,118 for instance, the Court ruled that a Tennessee law that prohibited the 
solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of 
the entrance to a polling place was content based.119 “The Tennessee restriction under 
consideration . . . is not a facially content-neutral time, place, or manner restriction,” Justice 
Harry Blackmun wrote.  “Whether individuals may exercise their free speech rights near 
polling places depends entirely on whether their speech is related to a political campaign.”120 
Justice Blackmun noted that the law did not apply to other categories of speech, such as 
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commercial solicitation.121 Hence, the law was content based because, on its face, it 
regulated only one category of speech.122 
The Court used similar reasoning in United States v. Playboy Entertainment 
Group.123 In an attempt to prohibit “signal bleed” of sexual images on cable television,124 
Section 505 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 required cable operators who provided 
channels “primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming”125 either to “fully scramble 
or otherwise fully block”126 those channels or to time-channel them, limiting their 
transmission to hours when children were unlikely to be viewing.127 In ruling the law 
unconstitutional, Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, wrote, “The speech in question is 
defined by its content; and the statute which seeks to restrict it is content based.”128 He 
continued, “Section 505 applies only to channels primarily dedicated to ‘sexually explicit 
adult programming or other programming that is indecent.’  The statute is unconcerned with 
 
121 Id.   
122 Burson, however, demonstrated that strict scrutiny can be met and, therefore, that content-based restrictions 
on private speech and on speech in public forums can be upheld.  Six members of the Court voted to uphold the 
law (all nine justices agreed the law was content based).  Justice Blackmun’s opinion concluded that “it is the 
rare case in which we have held that a law survives strict scrutiny.  This, however, is such a rare case.”  Id. at 
211. 
 
123 529 U.S. 803 (2000). 
 
124 “Signal bleed” occurs when cable customers receive audio or visual images from cable stations to which they 
do not subscribe.  Cable television operators generally use signal “scrambling” to insure that only paying 
customers have access to programming.  Congress enacted Section 505 out of a concern that scrambling was 
insufficient to prevent all signal bleeding and that children, then, would unwittingly see or hear sexually 
oriented programming from channels such as Playboy Television.  
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127 Administrative regulation had set the hours to be between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.  Id.  
 
128 Id. at 811. 
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signal bleed from any other channels.”129 The law therefore did not apply when or if signal 
bleed occurred on other premium channels, such as HBO or the Disney Channel.130 The 
Court acknowledged that Congress’ justification for the regulation was a “concern for the 
effect of the subject matter on young viewers.”131 But that justification, however compelling, 
did not make the law content neutral, the Court said.  “[The law] ‘focuses only on the content 
of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners.’  This is the essence of 
content-based regulation.”132 Justice Kennedy’s emphasis on the face of the law, rather than 
its justification, echoes the majority opinion he authored in Turner Broadcasting System v. 
FCC,133 in which the Court declared that the “mere assertion of a content-neutral purpose 
[would not] be enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.”134 
In Playboy, Justice Kennedy was quoting from the Court’s language in Boos v. 
Barry,135 another case in which the Court used the on-the-face approach to find a statute 
content based.  In Boos, a provision of the District of Columbia Code prohibited the display 
of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy if that sign tended to bring that foreign 
 
129 Id.  
130 Id.  
131 Id.  
132 Id. at 811-12 (emphasis in original) (quoting Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988)).  See also Reno v. 
ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (“[T]he [Communications Decency Act] is a content-based blanket restriction 
on speech, and, as such, cannot be properly analyzed as a form of time, place, and manner regulation.”); 
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656 (2004).  In Playboy, the Court ruled the law was unconstitutional because the 
government did not use the least restrictive alternative it could have in order to achieve its interest. 
 
133 512 U.S. 622 (1994).  Turner will be discussed in more detail below.  As will be seen, the Court split badly 
in the case interpreting Congress’ purpose for the regulation at issue. 
 
134 Id. at 642-43.  Justice Kennedy wrote in another case, “[W]hether a statute is content neutral or content 
based is something that can be determined on the face of it; if the statute describes speech by content then it is 
content based.”  City of L.A. v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in 
judgment).  As will be discussed below, the Court has not always followed that approach. 
 
135 485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
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government into “public odium” or “public disrepute.”136 Justice O’Connor said that the 
“common sense reading” of the law was that it was content based.137 She wrote, “Whether 
individuals may picket in front of a foreign embassy depends entirely upon whether their 
picket signs are critical of the foreign government or not.  One category of speech has been 
completely prohibited within 500 feet of embassies.”138 
In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Board,139 
the Court emphasized that it need not find an illegitimate government purpose in order to 
declare a regulation content based.  The face of the regulation determines whether a 
regulation is content discriminatory, not the presence or absence of an illegitimate purpose, 
the Court said.  In Simon & Schuster, a publishing company challenged a New York law that 
aimed to prevent criminals from profiting from their crimes by reallocating the profits earned 
by criminals from works in which they described their crimes to the crimes’ victims.140 The 
State Crime Victims Board argued that a law that results in discriminatory financial treatment 
should be “suspect under the First Amendment only when the legislature intends to suppress 
certain ideas.”141 In enacting this law, the Board said, the legislature had a compelling 
interest in ensuring that victims of crimes are compensated by those who harm them; the 
 
136 Id. at 315. 
 
137 Id. at 319 (O’Connor, J., plurality).   
 
138 Id. at 318-19.  As will be discussed in more detail below, the Court bizarrely found the regulation at issue in 
Boos to be content based but viewpoint neutral, in spite of the fact that signs speaking favorably of a foreign 
government would have been allowed while critical signs were not.  Regardless, a discussion of Boos here is 
still salient because Justice O’Connor did look to the face of the regulation to find it content based. 
 
139 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
 
140 Id. at 108.  The profits were deposited in an escrow account for five years.  The funds were made available to 
the victims of the crime and to any of the criminal’s creditors.  Id.  
141 Id. at 117. 
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intention was not, then, to suppress ideas.142 The Court nevertheless struck down the law as 
a content-based restriction that was not narrowly tailored, rejecting the argument that 
illegitimate intentions were necessary to make a law subject to the Court’s exacting 
scrutiny.143 “Simon & Schuster need adduce no evidence of an improper censorial motive,” 
Justice O’Connor wrote for the Court.  “[I]llicit legislative intent is not the sine qua non of a
violation of the First Amendment.”144 Regardless of the legitimate purpose for the law, the 
Court said, “the Son of Sam law is . . . a content-based statute.  It singles out income derived 
from expressive activity for a burden the State places on no other income, and it is directed 
only at works with a specified content.”145 The law was triggered only when criminals wrote 
about their crimes.  “[T]he statute plainly imposes a financial disincentive only on speech of 
a particular content,” the Court held, a fact that made the law content based.146 
In the cases discussed thus far, the Court has looked to the face of regulations and 
found them content based.  But the Court has also utilized the on-the-face approach in 
finding regulations content neutral.  In Thomas v. Chicago Park District,147 for instance, the 
Court reviewed an ordinance prescribing the requirements to obtain a park permit for an 
 
142 Id. at 118. 
 
143 The Court agreed with the Board that the interest for the law was compelling. 
 
144 Id. at 117 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 
145 Id. at 116.  The law was a direct response to the publicity the hunt for the serial killer David Berkowitz, 
known as the Son of Sam, received during the summer of 1977. 
 
146 Id.  See also Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), in which the Court ruled that a city 
policy that banned the placement of commercial handbills in newsracks on public property but allowed 
newspapers was content based.  The city claimed the purpose behind the regulation was safety and esthetics, 
and the Court acknowledged that the city had not “acted with animus toward the ideas contained” in the 
commercial handbills.  Id. at 428-29.  Nevertheless, the Court concluded: “Under the city’s newsrack policy, 
whether any particular newsrack falls within the ban is determined by the content of the publication resting 
inside that newsrack.  Thus, by any commonsense understanding of the term, the ban in this case is ‘content 
based.’”  Id. at 429.        
147 534 U.S. 316 (2002). 
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event involving more than 50 people.  The Court unanimously upheld the law as a content-
neutral time, place, and manner regulation.  Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court stressed 
that the law “does not authorize a licensor to pass judgment on the content of speech: None 
of the grounds for denying a permit has anything to do with what a speaker might say.”148 
And in Frisby v. Schultz,149 the Court ruled that a town ordinance that banned picketing 
“before or about” any residence was content neutral.150 Abortion protesters had picketed in 
front of the house of a doctor who performed abortions at two nearby clinics.  Though 
generally peaceful, the picketing generated controversy and numerous complaints, and the 
town resolved to pass a law to restrict future residential picketing.151 For the Court, the 
motivation behind the law was not dispositive; in fact, the Court scarcely addressed it.  
Instead, the face of the law was controlling.  The Court wrote, “[T]he appropriate level of 
scrutiny is initially tied to whether the statute distinguishes between prohibited and permitted 
speech on the basis of content.”152 This law did not, the Court held.  Though the law was a 
response to the conduct of abortion protesters, the Court concluded the face of the law 
indicated that it applied to all pickets, regardless of the subject and viewpoint of the 
picketers.  The Court ruled the law thus had “facial content-neutrality” and was properly 
judged under intermediate scrutiny.153 
148 Id. at 322.  The Court was also careful to find that, in line with the standardless permit cases discussed in 
Chapter 2, the law did not give the government unbridled discretion and instead provided “adequate standards 
to guide the official’s decision.”  Id. at 323.   
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 The justices have not always been able to agree how to employ the on-the-face 
approach.  As noted above, in Erznoznik Chief Justice Burger argued a “fleeting” glimpse of 
nudity did not communicate a message, and he therefore faulted the majority for concluding 
that the law at issue there discriminated based on content.154 In Metromedia v. City of San 
Diego,155 the Court reviewed a challenge to a San Diego ordinance that regulated outdoor 
advertising, or billboard, displays.  Different restrictions applied depending on whether the 
message of the billboard pertained to the premises on which it was located.156 The law 
permitted “on-site” commercial advertising, which included advertising goods or services 
manufactured or sold on the premises.  The law forbade “off-site” billboards, however, 
whether commercial or noncommercial, but made exceptions for, among other things, 
holiday decorations, temporary political campaign signs, and certain public service signs, 
such as those conveying the time and temperature.157 A divided Court ruled the ordinance 
was unconstitutional.  Justice Rehnquist quite accurately described the Court’s many 
opinions in the case as a “virtual Tower of Babel,”158 and much of the focus of the opinions 
is outside the scope of the present discussion.  The Court did appear to disagree, however, on 
whether the ordinance impermissibly discriminated on the basis of content.  Justice Byron 
White’s plurality opinion observed that the law was defined “by reference to the content, or 
message, of the sign.”159 He found the law flawed, in part, because it “distinguishes in 
 
154 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 222 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 
155 453 U.S. 490 (1981). 
 
156 Stephan, supra note 12, at 244. 
 
157 453 U.S. at 494-96. 
 
158 Id. at 569 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 
126
several ways between permissible and impermissible signs at a particular location by 
reference to their content.”160 The law allowed some noncommercial signs but not others, 
rendering it unconstitutional, he argued.  “Because some noncommercial messages may be 
conveyed on billboards throughout the commercial and industrial zones, San Diego must 
similarly allow billboards conveying other noncommercial messages throughout those 
zones,” he wrote.161 
In dissent, Chief Justice Burger said the “off-site” exceptions were “narrow and 
essentially negligible,”162 and thus the law was not properly characterized as content 
discriminatory.  He argued the law simply allowed “noncontroversial things,”163 such as 
conventional signs identifying business enterprises and time-and-temperature signs.  “It 
borders – if not trespasses – on the frivolous to suggest that, by allowing such signs but 
forbidding noncommercial billboards, the city has infringed freedom of speech,” he wrote.164 
Chief Justice Burger faulted the Court for “relying on simplistic platitudes about content 
[and] subject matter.”165 He stressed that, as he saw it, San Diego had “not attempted to 
suppress any point of view or any category of messages.”166 He therefore appeared to focus 
on the city’s purpose.  Had the city “attempted to suppress” expression, he implied, he too 
 
159 Id. at 503 (White, J., plurality).  “[The] restriction is defined in two ways: first, by reference to the structural 
characteristics of the sign; second, by reference to the content, or message, of the sign.”  Id. 
 
160 Id. at 516. 
 
161 Id. at 515. 
 
162 Id. at 562 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 
163 Id. at 564. 
 
164 Id. at 565. 
 
165 Id. at 555. 
 
166 Id. at 562. 
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would have found the law unconstitutional.  As it stood, he seemed to think the on-the-face 
approach was unnecessarily harsh. 
 The justices also disagreed in Regan v. Time, Inc.167 To prevent counterfeiting, a 
federal law restricted the use of photograph reproductions of currency but permitted the 
printing or publishing of illustrations of currency “for philatelic, numismatic, educational, 
historical, or newsworthy purposes in articles, books, journals, newspapers, or albums”168 
(known as the purpose requirement).  In addition, the law required the illustrations to be in 
black and white and either larger or smaller than the actual size of currency (known as the 
color and size limitations).  After a front cover of an issue of Sports Illustrated carried a color 
photograph of $100 bills pouring into a basketball hoop, a Secret Service agent informed 
Time Inc.’s legal department that the photograph violated federal law and that the plates and 
materials used to make the cover would be seized.169 Time sued.  The Court upheld the color 
and size limitations, but eight justices voted to strike down the purpose requirement as 
unconstitutionally content based.  The government argued that the purpose requirement was 
valid as a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation.  The Court disagreed.  Justice 
White wrote:  
 A determination concerning the newsworthiness or educational value 
 of a photograph cannot help but be based on the content of the photograph and 
 the message it delivers.  Under the statute, one photographic reproduction will 
 be allowed and another disallowed solely because the Government determines 
 that the message being conveyed in the one is newsworthy or educational 
 while the message imparted by the other is not.170 
167 468 U.S. 641 (1984). 
 
168 Id. at 644. 
 
169 Id. at 646. 
 
170 Id. at 648.  See also FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984), in which the Court struck down 
a section of the Public Broadcasting Act that forbade any noncommercial educational station that received a 
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 In other words, on its face, the law allowed the printing of currency for some 
purposes and not others, the Court reasoned, requiring the government to examine the 
content of the photograph to determine its purpose.  In sweeping language the Court 
concluded, “Regulations which permit the Government to discriminate on the basis of the 
content of the message cannot be tolerated under the First Amendment.”171 As has been 
argued above, the Court has ruled in a litany of other cases, including cases decided before 
Regan, that such regulations can be tolerated if they pass strict scrutiny.  Here, however, 
without explanation the Court chose to forego evaluating the government’s interest and the 
fit between the means and end and instead broadly declared that because the requirement 
permitted the government to discriminate on the basis of content it was “therefore 
constitutionally infirm.”172 
In dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the purpose of the law “has nothing whatever 
to do with suppressing dissemination of ideas on the basis of content or anything else.”173 
grant from the Corporation for Public Broadcasting to “engage in editorializing.”  Id. at 366.  In his majority 
opinion, Justice Brennan said the ban was “defined solely on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech.”  
Id. at 383.  A wide variety of noneditorial speech by a station was permitted, he said, including “daily 
announcements of the station’s program schedule or over-the-air appeals for contributions.”  Id.  A station was 
not allowed to air editorials, however.  “Consequently, in order to determine whether a particular statement by 
station management constitutes an ‘editorial’ proscribed by [the Act], enforcement authorities must necessarily 
examine the content of the message that is conveyed.”  Id.  In dissent, Justice Stevens said he was “not troubled 
by the fact that the stations are allowed to make ‘daily announcements of the station’s program schedule’ . . . , 
for it is quite plain that this statute is not directed at curtailing expression of particular points of view on 
controversial issues.”  Id. at 414 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  For Justice Stevens, it was irrelevant that 
enforcement authorities might have to review content to determine if it indeed was an editorial.  As he saw it, 
“the restriction is completely neutral in its operation – it prohibits all editorials without any distinction being 
drawn concerning the subject matter or the point of view that might be expressed.”  Id. at 414.  Because the 
prohibition on editorializing was “not directed at any particular message a station might wish to convey,” 
Justice Stevens thought the Act was not constitutionally problematic.  Id.   
171 Id. at 648-49. 
 
172 Id. at 649. 
 
173 Id. at 695 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part). 
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The law was a restriction on the manner, not the content, of expression, he said.174 Justice 
Stevens thus thought the Court had misinterpreted the purpose requirement.  The 
requirement, he said, did not on its face demand the government to scrutinize the purpose of 
a photograph; the government did not have “a license to determine the newsworthiness or the 
value of the substantive message being conveyed.”175 Rather, he thought the question was 
“whether the image is being used to convey information or express an idea,”176 which could 
be answered in the affirmative as long as a person or publication was “attempting to 
communicate [and] not merely reproducing images of the currency for some 
noncommunicative purpose, e.g., to facilitate counterfeiting.”177 Justice Stevens therefore 
concluded the Court had unnecessarily and incorrectly declared the law unconstitutional. 
 As has been discussed, the Court has commonly utilized the on-the-face approach 
both to declare regulations content based and in finding them content neutral.  One scholar, 
Leslie Gielow Jacobs, has faulted the Court for not following the on-the-face approach 
exclusively.  “The problems that haunt the content-based/content-neutral inquiry stem almost 
entirely from the Court’s failure to adhere to the face of a government action as its 
controlling feature,” she argued.178 The approach certainly has its advantages, a primary one 
being that, in theory, it allows for a rather simplistic judicial analysis: On its face, does a 
regulation discriminate based on the content of speech? a judge should ask.  If yes, according 
 
174 Id.  
175 Id. at 698. 
 
176 Id.  
177 Id.  
178 Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint 
Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 620 (2003). 
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to this approach, the regulation is classified as content based.  Yet as the foregoing discussion 
demonstrates, justices have not always agreed that the on-the-face approach is appropriate.  
When dissenting justices seem to have been convinced that a law’s purpose was not to 
restrict expression, they have argued that the on-the-face approach was too severe.   
 Purpose or Intent 
 The on-the-face approach, then, is not the only one the justices have employed to 
determine if a regulation is content based or content neutral.  In fact, in finding regulations 
content neutral the Court has often said that the government’s purpose for the regulation is 
dispositive.  A statement frequently used by the Court is that a regulation is content neutral as 
long as it is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.”179 The 
regulation’s justification, or purpose, should be controlling, the statement suggests.  The 
statement arguably originated in Mosley, when the Court declared that “selective exclusions 
from a public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference 
to content alone.”180 Curiously, however, the first half of Mosley’s declaration has been 
divorced from the second, with the second taking on a life and jurisprudence of its own, born 
in a somewhat passing reference in one of the Court’s landmark commercial speech cases.  In 
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy  v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,181 the Court ruled 
that even speech that does “no more than propose a commercial transaction” is protected by 
the First Amendment.182 In the last few paragraphs of the majority opinion, the Court noted 
that some forms of commercial speech regulation, however, would “surely [be] 
 
179 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). 
 
180 Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) (emphasis added). 
 
181 425 U.S. 748 (1976). 
 
182 Id. at 762. 
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permissible.”183 One of those forms, the Court suggested, would be a time, place, and 
manner restriction.  The Court wrote, “We have often approved restrictions of that kind 
provided that they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech, that 
they serve a significant governmental interest, and that in doing so they leave open ample 
alternative channels for communication of the information.”184 Justice Blackmun, writing for 
the Court, followed that assertion with citation to a number of cases (which have already 
been discussed), in none of which had the Court explicitly used the “justified without 
reference to the content” statement.185 It is not that the statement was necessarily a distortion 
of the Court’s holdings in those cited cases.  The Court just had not explained its holdings in 
those cases in a way that would seem to focus analysis exclusively on a regulation’s 
justification, which the statement in Virginia Pharmacy appeared to do.  In Grayned and 
Kovacs, for instance, two of the cases Justice Blackmun cited, the regulations were also 
neutral on their face; they were not “based on content” in addition to not being “justified by 
reference to content.”186 
Nevertheless, as mentioned above, the Court has repeated the statement in a number 
of cases in which it found regulations to be content neutral.187 In Ward v. Rock Against 
 
183 Id. at 770.  Four years after Virginia Pharmacy, the Court laid out a four-part test for determining the 
constitutionality of regulations on commercial speech in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public 
Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). 
 
184 Id. at 771. 
 
185 He cited Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); 
and Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949). 
 
186 Mosley, 408 U.S. at 96. 
 
187 In addition to the cases discussed here, see also Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, 
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981); Clark for Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).  
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Racism,188 for instance, the Court reviewed a city guideline that required performers using a 
bandshell in Central Park to use sound amplification equipment and a sound technician 
provided by the city.  The city enacted the requirement so that the volume of performances 
would be satisfactory to audiences without disturbing nearby residences.  Rock Against 
Racism, an association that sponsored an annual rock concert at the bandshell, sued, claiming 
the guideline violated the First Amendment.  In a 6-3 decision, the Court disagreed and 
upheld the guideline as a permissible content-neutral regulation.189 
In making the initial content-based/content-neutral determination, the Court focused 
closely on the government’s purpose for enacting the guideline.  The Court wrote, “The 
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality, in speech cases generally and in time, 
place, or manner cases in particular, is whether the government has adopted a regulation of 
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.190 The government’s purpose 
is the controlling consideration.”191 The Court continued, “A regulation that serves purposes 
unrelated to the content of expression is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on 
some speakers or messages but not others.  Government regulation of expressive activity is 
 
188 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 
189 The three dissenters, in an opinion written by Justice Marshall, agreed with the majority that the guideline 
was content neutral.  They argued, however, that it was not narrowly tailored and thus failed intermediate 
scrutiny.  Interestingly, in agreeing that the guideline was content neutral, the dissent did not focus on the 
justifications for the guideline.  Rather, Justice Marshall wrote, “The Guidelines indisputably are content neutral 
as they apply to all bandshell users irrespective of the message of their music.”  Id. at 804 (Marshall, J., 
dissenting).   
 
190 As will be discussed below, this statement seems to suggest, then, that the content-based/content-neutral 
inquiry hinges on the presence of viewpoint discrimination, conflating the content and viewpoint terms. 
 
191 Id. at 791 (citation omitted).  See also Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 763 (1994) (“We 
. . . look to the government’s purpose as the threshold consideration.”); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 646 (1994) (“[E]ven a regulation neutral on its face may be content-based if its manifest purpose is to 
regulate speech because of the message it conveys.”); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 526 (2001) (“In 
determining whether a regulation is content based or content neutral, we look to the purpose behind the 
regulation.”).  
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content neutral so long as it is ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech.’”192 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, italicized “justified” as if to 
emphasize the point.  The justification for the guideline here, the Court said, was the city’s 
desire to control noise levels at bandshell events to avoid “undue intrusion” into nearby 
homes.193 “This justification for the guideline has nothing to do with content, and it satisfies 
the requirement that time, place, or manner regulations be content neutral,” the Court held.194 
The Court has never overruled, and in fact still employs, United States v. O’Brien’s 
command that “this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis 
of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”195 The focus on a regulation’s justification that Ward 
and other cases emphasize, then, does not appear to be the “hazardous” inquiry into alleged 
intent of legislative members that the Court warned against in O’Brien.196 In fact, as the 
Court said in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, “The purpose, or justification, of a 
regulation will often be evident on its face.”197 Yet as the Court’s decision in Turner itself 
demonstrates so well, justices can interpret a regulation’s purpose – even legislative intent 
codified as part of the law under review – in drastically different ways, leading commentators 
to charge that a narrow focus on purpose in making the content-based/content-neutral 
determination is inadequate.198 
192 Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
 
193 Id. at 792. 
 
194 Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 
195 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (quoted in Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 652 
(1994); City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 292 (2000)). 
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 In Turner, a bare 5-4 majority of the Court ruled that a “must-carry” law that required 
cable operators to carry the signals of a specified number of local broadcast television 
stations was content neutral.199 Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, noted that the law 
infringed the rights of cable operators “in two respects: The rules reduce the number of 
channels over which cable operators exercise unfettered control, and they render it more 
difficult for cable programmers to compete for carriage on the limited channels 
remaining.”200 The question for the Court, then, was not whether the First Amendment was 
implicated by the law but what level of scrutiny the Court should apply in reviewing it.  The 
Court ruled the law was content neutral and that intermediate scrutiny was thus the 
appropriate standard.   
 In its opinion, the majority first held that the law was neutral on its face.  “[T]he 
must-carry rules, on their face, impose burdens and confer benefits without reference to the 
content of speech,” the Court wrote.201 Though the law did compel cable operators to carry a 
certain number of broadcast stations, the Court said, “the extent of the interference does not 
depend upon the content of the cable operators’ programming.”202 The Court reasoned that 
the must-carry rules imposed obligations upon all cable operators, regardless of the programs 
or stations they offered.  “Nothing in the Act imposes a restriction, penalty, or burden by 
reason of the views, programs, or stations the cable operator has selected or will select,” the 
 
198 See Calvert, supra note 108, at 93; Jacobs, supra note 178, at 620.  
 
199 The number of commercial stations cable operators were required to carry varied depending on the size of 
the cable system.  512 U.S. at 630-31. 
 
200 Id. at 637. 
 
201 Id. at 643. 
 
202 Id. at 644. 
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Court wrote.203 Likewise, the Court held that the privileges bestowed on broadcast stations 
were unrelated to content because “the rules benefit all full power broadcasters who request 
carriage.”204 It was true, the Court said, that the law distinguished between speakers (cable 
vs. broadcast), but it did so “based only upon the manner in which speakers transmit their 
messages to viewers, and not upon the messages they carry.”205 Broadcasters, who transmit 
over public airwaves, were favored, the Court concluded, while cable programmers, who do 
not, were disfavored. 
 Justice Kennedy said, however, that finding that the law was neutral on its face did 
“not end the inquiry.”206 The appellants in the case argued the regulations were content 
based because Congress’ purpose in enacting them was to promote speech of a favored 
content.207 Declaring that “even a regulation neutral on its face may be content-based if its 
manifest purpose is to regulate speech because of the message it conveys,”208 the Court then 
examined Congress’ purpose but disagreed with the appellants.  The Court concluded, “Our 
review of the Act and its various findings persuades us that Congress’ overriding objective in 
enacting must-carry was not to favor programming of a particular subject matter, viewpoint, 
or format, but rather to preserve access to free television programming for the 40 percent of 
 
203 Id.  
204 Id. at 645 (emphasis added). 
 
205 Id.  “[S]peaker-based laws demand strict scrutiny when they reflect the Government’s preference for the 
substance of what the favored speakers have to say (or aversion to what the disfavored speakers have to say).”  
Id. at 658. 
 
206 Id.  
207 Id. at 646. 
 
208 Id. at 645.  The statement is supported by Ward’s holding that the “government’s purpose is the controlling 
consideration.”  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).  That said, the Court almost never 
labels a regulation content based if it finds it to be facially content neutral.  
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Americans without cable.”209 In finding Congress’ purpose content neutral, Justice Kennedy 
seemed to shift his analysis away from speech and focus instead on economics.210 The law 
was economically based, the Court said, “meant to protect broadcast television from what 
Congress determined to be unfair competition by cable systems.”211 The Court said that in 
“unusually detailed statutory findings”212 Congress demonstrated that cable operators have a 
built-in economic incentive “to delete, reposition, or not carry local broadcast signals” and 
that, absent the must-carry rules, “free local broadcast television would be threatened.”213 
In addition to those economic purposes, Congress’ findings also referred to the value 
of broadcast programming, arguably making clear another purpose for the law beyond 
economic considerations.  Congress said broadcast television was “an important source of 
local news[,] public affairs programming and other local broadcast services critical to an 
informed electorate.”214 Yet the majority in Turner minimized the importance of that 
statement (and others like it, as will be seen below), concluding that “it reflects nothing more 
than the recognition that the services provided by broadcast television have some intrinsic 
value and, thus, are worth preserving against the threats posed by cable.”215 The Court said 
Congress had merely acknowledged that “broadcast television stations make a valuable 
 
209 Id. at 646. 
 
210 Calvert, supra note 108, at 85.  
 
211 Id. at 652. 
 
212 Id. at 646. 
 
213 Id. “The must-carry provisions . . . are justified by special characteristics of the cable medium: the bottleneck 
monopoly power exercised by cable operators and the dangers this power poses to the viability of broadcast 
television.”  Id. at 661. 
 
214 Id. at 648. 
 
215 Id.  
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contribution to the Nation’s communications system.”216 And that acknowledgment, the 
Court reasoned, did not render the law content based.  The Court was thus persuaded that 
Congress’ “overriding objective” was to save free local broadcast television from economic 
doom, not to favor or prefer local broadcast content.217 The Court, it should be noted, offered 
no method for deciphering when one objective or purpose overrides another. 
 In dissent, Justice O’Connor argued such a method would be unnecessary because 
any content-based purpose should render a regulation content based, regardless if another 
neutral purpose might be said to be overriding.  She said:  
 It may well be that Congress also had other, content-neutral, purposes 
 in mind when enacting the statute.  But we have never held that the presence 
 of a permissible justification lessens the impropriety of relying in part on an 
 impermissible justification.  In fact, we have often struck down statutes as 
 being impermissibly content based even though their primary purpose was 
 indubitably content neutral . . . .[W]hen a content-based justification appears 
 on the statute’s face, we cannot ignore it because another, content-neutral 
 justification is present.218 
Whereas the majority had dismissed the law’s language about the importance of local 
broadcast stations as mere “acknowledgment” of their “valuable contribution,”219 the dissent, 
on the other hand, said Congress made clear that the law’s “preference for broadcasters over 
cable programmers is justified with reference to content.”220 To illustrate her point, Justice 
O’Connor quoted a number of statements taken directly from Congress’ codified findings 
explaining its reasons for the law:  “There is a substantial governmental and First 
 
216 Id. at 649. 
 
217 Id. at 646. 
 
218 Id. at 679-80 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
219 Id. at 649. 
 
220 Id. at 676 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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Amendment interest in promoting a diversity of views provided through multiple technology 
media,” the law said.221 “A primary objective and benefit of our Nation’s system of 
regulation of television broadcasting is the local origination of programming.  There is a 
substantial governmental interest in ensuring its continuation,” Congress continued.222 
Justice O’Connor concluded that these statements indisputably indicated the law favored 
local broadcast content.  She wrote, “Preferences for diversity of viewpoints, for localism, for 
educational programming, and for news and public affairs all make reference to content.”223 
Those preferences may be benignly motivated, she said, but that benign motivation cannot 
escape the fact that Congress was concerned with content, and the law should thus be subject 
to strict scrutiny.   
 In Turner, then, the majority and dissent reached dramatically different results in 
determining Congress’ purpose for the must-carry law,224 and the consequences were severe: 
The law was reviewed under intermediate scrutiny, which it passed, because Justice 
Kennedy’s approach triumphed.225 Had Justice O’Connor gotten another vote, strict scrutiny 
would have been the standard for review, which, she was convinced, the law most definitely 
 
221 Id.  
222 Id.  
223 Id. at 677. 
 
224 Turner is not the only case in which the Court has disagreed over government’s purpose or interest when 
determining content neutrality.  Three cases – Texas v. Johnson, United States v. Eichman, and Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre – will be discussed below.  As will be seen, in those cases the Court disagreed over the scope of the 
regulation under question, and that disagreement led justices to draw different conclusions about the 
government’s purpose. 
 
225 In Turner, the Court actually remanded the case for additional fact finding because it concluded the record 
was insufficient to determine whether the law satisfied intermediate scrutiny’s narrow tailoring requirement.  
Three years later in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997) (Turner II), a 5-4 Court ruled the 
law passed intermediate scrutiny and was constitutional.  
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would have failed.226 The dissent arguably had the upper hand in Turner, as the economic 
interest the majority so easily found content neutral is intertwined with the content-based 
objective of the law that favored the preservation of local broadcast programming.  As one 
commentator argued, “The must-carry provisions are necessary to prop up broadcasters 
economically only because [those broadcasters] originate and convey a particular type of 
programming valued by Congress.”227 The majority cast the law in the language of 
economics, blinding itself “from the [conclusion] that a content-based purpose motivated the 
enactment of the law.”228 Turner thus demonstrated that divining purpose can be a tricky, 
subjective affair – even when the governmental body codifies its purposes.   
 Secondary Effects  
 In spite of the Court’s statement in Turner that the “mere assertion of a content-
neutral purpose [would not] be enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based 
on content,”229 in a line of cases dealing with sexual expression the Court has deviated from 
that principle and has, in fact, upheld laws that are facially content based.  In these cases the 
Court has introduced what has become known as the “secondary effects” doctrine, in which 
the Court has relied on the definition of content-neutral regulations as being “justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech”230 to look beyond the content-based 
face of a regulation.  The cases in which the Court has employed this secondary effects 
 
226 Turner, 512 U.S. at 681-82 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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229 Turner, 512 U.S. at 642-43. 
 
230 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).  
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doctrine will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 5.  For now, a brief discussion of the first case 
in which the approach received majority approval, City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 
Inc.,231 will suffice to illustrate the precepts of the doctrine.  In Renton, the city enacted a 
zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture theaters from locating within 1,000 feet 
of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family dwelling, church, park, or school.232 
Although the Court acknowledged that “the ordinance treats theaters that specialize in adult 
films differently from other kinds of theaters,”233 a kind of differentiation that has resulted in 
a content-based label in every other case discussed in this chapter,234 the Court nevertheless 
concluded that the law was “aimed not at the content of the films shown at adult motion 
picture theaters, but rather at the secondary effects of such theaters on the surrounding 
community.”235 The ordinance, the Court said, was designed to prevent crime, protect the 
city’s retail trade, maintain property values, and generally “protect and preserve” the quality 
of life.236 Because the ordinance was aimed at those secondary effects of adult theaters and 
not at the content of films themselves, the Court ruled the law was content neutral. 
 Since Renton, the Court has extended the secondary effects rationale beyond zoning 
restrictions to include a ban on nude dancing.237 The Court, however, has yet to apply the 
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232 Id. at 46. 
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234 Even in Ward, the case in which the Court declared that the “government’s purpose is the controlling 
consideration,” the regulation was also neutral on its face.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 
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235 475 U.S. at 47. 
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doctrine to uphold a regulation in a case not involving sexual speech – though litigants have 
tried.  In Boos v. Barry,238 discussed above, the Court ruled that the “common sense 
reading”239 of a law prohibiting the display of any sign within 500 feet of a foreign embassy 
if that sign tended to bring that foreign government into “public odium” or “public 
disrepute”240 was that the law was content based.  Relying on Renton, however, the city in 
Boos argued that the law was intended to address a secondary effect, “namely, our 
international law obligation to shield diplomats from speech that offends their dignity.”241 A
plurality of the Court rejected the argument, saying the city “misreads Renton.”242 A
listener’s reaction to speech – the “emotive impact of speech on its audience” – is not a 
secondary effect, the plurality said.243 “This justification [put forth by the city] focuses only 
on the content of the speech and the direct impact that speech has on its listeners,” Justice 
O’Connor concluded.  “[The law] must be considered content-based.”244 In other instances, 
however, the Court has seemed to imply that nonspeech justifications helped render a 
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242 Id.  Justice Brennan, who dissented in Renton, agreed the law in Boos was content based.  He did not join the 
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Id. at 335-36. 
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244 Id.  See also Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 430 (1993) (“In contrast to the speech at 
issue in Renton, there are no secondary effects attributable to . . . newsracks [containing commercial handbills] 
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government action content neutral, even though the application of the regulation depended, 
arguably in part, on the content of the speech.245 One commentator’s observation, then, 
seems appropriate to conclude here: “[I]t is unclear the extent to which the ‘justified without 
reference to the content of regulated speech’ test can immunize a facially content 
discriminatory government action.”246 
Effect of Regulations 
 In Ward, the Court ruled that when a regulation serves “purposes unrelated to the 
content of expression [it] is deemed neutral, even if it has an incidental effect on some 
speakers or messages but not others.”247 In cases decided both before and after Ward, 
however, justices have disagreed in interpreting the effects of a regulation and in determining 
the weight and role those effects should have when deciding whether a regulation is content 
discriminatory.  In Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,248 for instance, the Court, 
in a 7-2 decision, upheld a National Park Service regulation that prohibited camping in 
Lafayette Park.  Protesters wished to sleep in the park to call attention to the plight of the 
homeless.  The Park Service issued a permit authorizing the temporary erection of two 
symbolic tent cities but denied the demonstrators’ request for permission to sleep in the 
tents.249 The Court, in an opinion written by Justice White, held that the ban on camping was 
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content neutral and “sustainable under the four-factor standard” governing the regulation of 
symbolic speech set forth in O’Brien.250 
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall agreed with the majority that the regulation 
was facially content neutral.  He faulted the Court, however, for creating what he said was a 
“two-tiered approach to First Amendment cases: while regulations that turn on the content of 
the expression are subjected to a strict form of judicial review, regulations that are aimed at 
matters other than expression receive only a minimal level of scrutiny.”251 The minimal 
scrutiny applied to content-neutral regulations, he asserted, had led “to an unfortunate 
diminution of First Amendment protection.”252 For Justice Marshall, Community for 
Creative Non-Violence provided a perfect example.  He argued that the Court should have 
been more attuned to the effects of the Park Service regulation.  He wrote: “[A] content-
neutral regulation does not necessarily fall with random or equal force upon different groups 
or different points of view.  A content-neutral regulation that restricts an inexpensive mode 
of communication will fall most heavily upon relatively poor speakers and the points of view 
that such speakers typically espouse.”253 And the Court should have considered that 
disproportionate effect here, he concluded: “This sort of latent inequality is very much in 
evidence in this case for respondents lack the financial means necessary to buy access to 
 
250 Id. at 299.  The Court said that the O’Brien standard “in the last analysis is little, if any, different from the 
standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions.”  Indeed, in subsequent cases, the Court has essentially 
morphed the two standards into one standard governing content-neutral regulation.  See, e.g., Turner Broad. 
Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). 
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253 Id. at 314.  This reasoning parallels Justice Black’s dissent in Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 98-102 (1949) 
(Black, J., dissenting), discussed in Chapter 2. 
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more conventional modes of persuasion.”254 Justice Marshall did not appear to argue that the 
regulation’s disproportionate effect should necessarily make it content or viewpoint based.  
Rather, he admonished the Court to more carefully evaluate and consider effects when 
reviewing facially content-neutral regulations.255 
In Hill v. Colorado,256 to be discussed more extensively in Chapter 5, the Court 
disagreed over what weight the effect resulting from a speech restriction that applies to a 
particular location should have in determining content neutrality.  As the phrase “time, place, 
and manner” indicates, a restriction on the place, or location, of expression by itself is 
generally considered to be content neutral.  In Hill, however, the dissenters challenged that 
assumption, arguing that a restriction on location had strong content and viewpoint 
discriminatory effects.257 Justice Kennedy said the location restriction of the law at issue in 
Hill – which prohibited “knowingly approaching” within eight feet of another person to 
 
254 Id. 
255 Justice Brennan made a similar argument in his dissent in Members of the City Council of Los Angeles v. 
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984).  In a 6-3 decision, the Court upheld a city ordinance that barred the 
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manner.”  Id. at 804.  Further, the Court said the problem the city asserted the law addressed – “the visual 
assault on the citizens of Los Angeles presented by an accumulation of signs posted on public property” – 
constituted a “significant substantive evil.”  Id. at 807.  In dissent, Justice Brennan warned that the Court was 
being too lenient in accepting the “purely aesthetic objective” the government put forth.  Id. at 821 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting).  He said it was possible the elimination of visual clutter was the government’s legitimate objective.  
Another possible objective, however, “might simply be the elimination of the messages typically carried by the 
signs,” he said.  Id. at 823.  He pointed out: “The fact that a ban on temporary signs applies to all signs does not 
necessarily imply content-neutrality.  Because particular media are often used disproportionately for certain 
types of messages, a restriction that is content-neutral on its face may, in fact, be content-hostile.”  Id. at 824 
n.5.  To ensure the law did not produce a “content-hostile” effect, Justice Brennan argued the Court “must avoid 
unquestioned acceptance of the City’s bare declaration of an aesthetic objective.”  Id. at 824.  He proposed 
instead that the Court accept such objectives “only if the government demonstrates that it is pursuing an 
identified objective seriously and comprehensively and in ways that are unrelated to the restriction of speech.”  
Id. at 828.   
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educate, protest, or counsel outside of a health care facility258 – combined with its obvious 
effect rendered the law content based.  He argued: “We would close our eyes to reality were 
we to deny that ‘oral protest, education, or counseling’ outside the entrances to medical 
facilities concern[s] . . . one topic in particular.  By confining the law’s application to the 
specific locations where the prohibited discourse occurs, the State has made a content-based 
determination.”259 Justice Scalia, in a separate dissent, agreed with Justice Kennedy that the 
inevitable effect of the location restriction cast doubt on its constitutionality.  “A proper 
regard for the ‘place’ involved in this case should result in, if anything, a commitment by this 
Court to adhere to and rigorously enforce our speech-protective standards,” he wrote.260 
The majority, however, disagreed, holding instead that that law was content neutral on its 
face and the restriction on location was merely a “minor place restriction on an extremely 
broad category of communications.”261 
The justices have also often disagreed in their interpretation of the scope of a 
regulation – in other words, the effect a regulation has, or will have, in application – and that 
disagreement has been determinative at the crucial content-based/content-neutral juncture.262 
This type of disagreement reared its head in the Court’s flag burning cases, Texas v. 
Johnson263 and United States v. Eichman.264 In Johnson, a 5-4 Court struck down a state law 
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that prohibited the desecration of an American flag, defining desecration as actions that 
“deface, damage, or otherwise physically mistreat [a flag] in a way that the actor knows will 
seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his action.”265 Important 
to its holding, the Court ruled the law was “not aimed at protecting the physical integrity of 
the flag in all circumstances, but is designed instead to protect it only against impairments 
that would cause serious offense to others,”266 such as Johnson’s political protest.  The law, 
the Court concluded, was thus content based because whether a treatment of the flag violated 
the law “depended on the likely communicative impact of [the] expressive conduct.”267 In 
dissent, Justice Stevens argued instead that the law applied equally to all flag burners, 
regardless of the intended message.268 He wrote: “The content of respondent’s message has 
no relevance whatsoever to the case.  The concept of ‘desecration’ does not turn on the 
substance of the message the actor tends to convey, but rather on whether those who view the 
act will take serious offense.”269 
In Eichman, the Court, again in a 5-4 decision, struck down the Flag Protection Act of 
1989, even though Congress – attempting to avoid the flaws the Court found in Johnson –
264 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
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268 In a footnote, he explained the point further: “It seems obvious that a prohibition against the desecration of a 
gravesite is content neutral even if it denies some protesters the right to make a symbolic statement by 
extinguishing the flame in Arlington Cemetery where John F. Kennedy is buried while permitting others to 
salute the flame by bowing their heads.  Few would doubt that a protester who extinguishes the flame has 
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do with the content of the message that the symbolic speech is intended to convey.”  Id. at 439 n.1. 
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proscribed all conduct that damaged or mistreated a flag, “without regard to the actor’s 
motive, his intended message, or the likely effects of his conduct on onlookers.”270 The 
government argued the law was thus content neutral because it did not target conduct on the 
basis of its message.  The Court, however, rejected that argument, holding that it was still 
clear the government was concerned with the content of expression.271 Justice Brennan, 
writing for the majority, observed that the respectful burning of an old flag was a permissible 
exception under the law but any mistreatment of a flag – defined by the law to include 
mutilation and defacement – would be a crime.272 “Each of the specified terms . . . 
unmistakably connotes disrespectful treatment of the flag and suggests a focus on those acts 
likely to damage the flag’s symbolic value,” he wrote.273 As one commentator has argued, 
the Court appeared to draw the relevant debate as between protesters and patriots.274 The 
effect of the law was to criminalize the actions of one group (flag desecrators) while 
condoning the actions of the other (respectful burners).275 Justice Stevens again dissented in 
Eichman, refusing to follow the majority’s approach and define the debate so broadly.  For 
Justice Stevens, the law applied evenly to all flag desecrators and thus was content neutral.  
He wrote: “The ideas expressed by flag burners are . . . various and often ambiguous.  The 
Government’s interest in preserving the symbolic value of the flag is, however, essentially 
the same regardless of which of many different ideas may have motivated a particular act of 
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flag burning.”276 Flag burning can communicate a range of ideas, according to the dissent, 
and all of those ideas were equally affected by the law.   
 The Court similarly divided over the scope of a regulation in Barnes v. Glen 
Theatre.277 An Indiana law made it a misdemeanor to appear in a public place “in a state of 
nudity.”278 The law thus prevented adult entertainment establishments from providing totally 
nude dancing, and two such establishments sued.279 A majority of the Court upheld the law.  
In his plurality opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist found the law content neutral, in part, 
because the state had “not banned nude dancing as such, but has proscribed public nudity 
across the board.”280 Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the assertion that the state was 
proscribing nude dancing because of the erotic message conveyed by the dancers.  He wrote: 
“[T]he requirement that the dancers don pasties and G-strings does not deprive the dance of 
whatever erotic message it conveys; it simply makes the message slightly less graphic.  The 
perceived evil that Indiana seeks to address is not erotic dancing, but public nudity.”281 
Four dissenters, in an opinion written by Justice White, interpreted the scope of the 
law differently.  They argued that the purpose of forbidding people to appear nude publicly – 
“in parks, beaches, hot dog stands, and like public places” – is to protect others from 
offense.282 “But that could not possibly be the purpose of preventing nude dancing in 
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theaters and barrooms since the viewers are exclusively consenting adults who pay money to 
see these dances,” Justice White wrote.283 The government’s purpose, the dissent concluded, 
must then be “to protect viewers from what the State believes is the harmful message that 
nude dancing communicates.”284 Justice White said the plurality erred in minimizing the 
significance of the restriction on nude dancing.  “[N]udity is itself an expressive component 
of the dance, not merely incidental ‘conduct,’” he argued.  “The nudity element of nude 
dancing performances cannot be neatly pigeonholed as mere ‘conduct’ independent of any 
expressive component of the dance.”285 The dissent therefore said the law was content based, 
effectively stamping out expression, and it would fail strict scrutiny. 
 Finally, in Hill the majority and dissent differed in deciphering the practical operation 
and effect of the law at issue there.  In dissent, Justice Kennedy argued:  
 Under the most reasonable interpretation of Colorado’s law, if a 
 speaker approaches a fellow citizen within any one of Colorado’s thousands 
 of disfavored-speech zones and chants in praise of the Supreme Court and its 
 abortion decisions, I should think there is neither protest, nor education, nor 
 counseling.  If the opposite message is communicated, however, a prosecution 
 to punish protest is warranted.286 
The majority saw it differently, responding that “the statute is not limited to those who 
oppose abortion.  It applies to the demonstrator in Justice Kennedy’s example.”287 
To summarize, justices have disagreed both over the role the effect of a regulation 
should play in determining content neutrality and in interpreting the scope and effect of 
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regulations.  As with the on-the-face and purpose approaches, the disagreement and 
inconsistency demonstrates justices on the Court have not agreed on a definitive and 
satisfactory understanding of content discrimination.  
 Confusing the Content and Viewpoint Labels 
 The Court has further clouded its jurisprudence by often appearing to use the terms 
content and viewpoint interchangeably.  As will be discussed below, in limited public forums 
and in nonpublic forums, the distinction between content discrimination and viewpoint 
discrimination is crucial: Content discrimination is permissible; viewpoint discrimination, 
however, is not.  Yet when reviewing restrictions on speech in public forums and private 
speech, the Court has often appeared to conflate the concepts.  The Court has done so 
through three interrelated ways: (1) The determination whether a regulation is content based 
or content neutral at times seems driven solely by concerns with viewpoint discrimination; 
(2) the Court has sometimes used the term “content based” as an umbrella term that appears 
to include both viewpoint discrimination and any other type of discrimination based on 
content, be it subject matter, topic, or category; and (3) the Court has occasionally struck 
down restrictions as content based when the real flaw of the restriction – confirmed by the 
language of the Court’s opinion – was that it was viewpoint discriminatory.  As will be seen 
in R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,288 the Court has done so even in decisions in which it has 
recognized a distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination.  This section 
addresses each of the means by which the Court has conflated the two terms; the chapter 
concludes by discussing the consequences of the Court’s slippery usage.   
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 One problem has been that the Court has at times appeared to describe the content-
based/content-neutral determination as pivoting on the presence or absence of viewpoint 
discrimination.289 Statements such as the following, taken from Turner Broadcasting System 
v. FCC,290 are illustrative: “As a general rule, laws that by their terms distinguish favored 
speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed are content 
based.”  However, a law that by its terms distinguishes “favored speech from disfavored 
speech on the basis of the ideas or views expressed” would seem to be a classic instance of 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.  Even if true, that “general rule,” as the Court 
describes it in dictum here, is underinclusive.  As the above discussion of the on-the-face 
approach indicated, the Court has found regulations content based because by their terms 
they distinguished favored from disfavored speech on the basis of the subject or topic of 
speech, not just particular ideas or views. 
 The concern with viewpoint discrimination especially appears to drive the content-
based/content-neutral determination when the Court has focused its inquiry on evaluating the 
purpose of a regulation.  In Ward, the Court held, “The principal inquiry in determining 
content neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech because 
of disagreement with the message it conveys,”291 a statement that reflects the 
conceptualization of viewpoint discrimination in the Court’s early cases described in Chapter 
2.  Viewpoint discrimination, the Court seems to have said in those early cases, occurs when 
the government burdens disfavored messages.  In Ward, then, the Court said, in effect, that 
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the principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is actually determining whether the 
government had viewpoint-neutral purposes for imposing the regulation, conflating the 
content and viewpoint terms.  The government passed the test in Ward, and it also did so in 
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,292 in which the Court employed similar 
language.  The Park Service ban on camping, the majority said, was content neutral because 
it was “not being applied because of disagreement with the message presented.”293 Had the 
government not had a viewpoint-neutral purpose, the holding implies, the ban would not 
have been content neutral. 
 The Court has suggested in other statements that its underlying concern with content- 
-based regulations is indeed that the government has, or will, discriminate based on 
viewpoint.  In Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission,294 for instance, the Court 
wrote, “[W]hen regulation is based on the content of speech, governmental action must be 
scrutinized more carefully to ensure that communication has not been prohibited ‘merely 
because public officials disapprove the speaker’s views.’”295 Yet the Court’s holding in 
Consolidated Edison itself suggests the statement is wanting.  Ensuring that officials have not 
engaged in viewpoint discrimination must not be the only reason the Court scrutinizes 
regulation based on the content of speech carefully, as the Court agreed with the Commission 
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in Consolidated Edison that the order was viewpoint neutral but still struck it down as 
impermissibly content based.  The flaw of the order, the Court ruled, was that it restricted 
speech based on its topic or subject; the order barred inserts on “controversial issues of 
public policy.”296 The Court wrote, “The First Amendment’s hostility to content-based 
regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of 
public discussion of an entire topic.”297 As mentioned above, the statement suggests that 
“content based” is an umbrella term that encompasses subject matter or topic discrimination 
and viewpoint discrimination.  With that understanding then, a viewpoint-based regulation 
would properly be labeled content based.  The Court has repeated the statement in other 
decisions,298 in spite of the fact that, as will be discussed below, the Court has at other times 
emphasized that content and viewpoint neutrality are constitutionally distinguishable 
concepts. 
 Finally, the Court has occasionally struck down restrictions as content based when the 
real flaw of the restriction – and the Court’s language suggested – that it was viewpoint 
discriminatory.299 First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,300 discussed above, was such a 
case.  In invalidating a Massachusetts law that forbade banks and business corporations from 
making contributions or expenditures for the purpose of influencing the vote on referendum 
proposals, unless the referendum “materially affect[ed] any of the property, business or assets 
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of the corporation,”301 the Court cited Mosley and appeared to rest its holding primarily on 
the basis that the law impermissibly discriminated based on the subject matter of speech.302 
A corporation could communicate its views on some referendum subjects – those that 
materially affected its business – but not others, the Court said.  The law also singled out 
individual taxation as a subject about which a corporation could never communicate to the 
public, Justice Powell noted.  Yet, in a short few sentences, the Court seemed to 
acknowledge that viewpoint discrimination was – or at least could have been – the real 
motivating factor behind its decision.  “Especially where, as here, the legislature’s 
suppression of speech suggests an attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an 
advantage in expressing its views to the people, the First Amendment is plainly offended,” 
the Court held.303 On the referendum subject of individual taxation, the law effectively 
suppressed a corporation’s point of view; it eliminated a perspective in the debate.  
Furthermore, as Justice Rehnquist observed in his dissenting opinion, there was stark 
evidence that the legislature enacted the law simply to “muzzle corporations,” in hope that a 
referendum proposing a personal income tax, which had been defeated on more than one 
occasion in part thanks to vigorous opposition from corporations, would finally succeed.304 
The Court, therefore, could have struck down the law on viewpoint discrimination grounds, 
without relying on Mosley’s condemnation of regulations based on subject matter.  
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 In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,305 another of the 
Court’s corporate speech cases, the Court was guilty of mixing the content and viewpoint 
labels.  A Public Utilities Commission enacted a regulation that required Pacific Gas & 
Electric (PG&E), a California utility, to include materials in its billing envelopes from a 
consumer group that often challenged the utility in rate-making procedures.  The 
Commission permitted the consumer group, Toward Utility Rate Normalization (TURN), to 
use PG&E’s billing envelope four times a year to raise funds and to communicate with 
ratepayers.306 During those times, PG&E could not include its own newsletter, Progress, in 
the envelope unless it paid extra postage.  In a 5-3 decision, the Court struck down the 
Commission’s regulation.  Justice Powell’s plurality opinion emphasized that the regulation 
did “not simply award access to the public at large; rather, it discriminates on the basis of 
viewpoints of the selected speakers.”307 Two of the purposes the Commission acknowledged 
for the order, the Court said, were to offer the public a greater variety of views in PG&E’s 
billing envelope and to assist groups like TURN that challenge PG&E in rate-making 
proceedings in raising funds.308 These were not neutral purposes, the Court observed.  “The 
variety of views that the Commission seeks to foster cannot be obtained by including 
speakers whose speech agrees with appellant’s . . . . Access is limited to persons or groups 
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who disagree with PG&E’s views as expressed in Progress and who oppose appellant in 
Commission proceedings,” Justice Powell wrote.309 
Because access was granted only to those who disagreed with its views, PG&E would 
likely be forced to help disseminate a hostile response whenever it spoke out on a given 
issue, the Court reasoned.  Faced with that circumstance, PG&E might instead choose to 
avoid speaking at all.  But even if PG&E did not choose silence, the Court said, the 
regulation was flawed because the Commission’s order required the utility to associate with 
speech with which it disagreed.310 Requiring PG&E to carry TURN’s message, Justice 
Powell said, could result in an appearance that PG&E agreed with the consumer group and/or 
force PG&E to respond.  He wrote:  
 The danger that appellant will be required to alter its own message as a 
 consequence of the government’s coercive action is a proper object of First 
 Amendment solicitude . . . . Where, as in this case, the danger is one that 
 arises from a content-based grant of access to private property, it is a danger 
 that the government may not impose absent a compelling interest.311 
Although the plurality stressed elsewhere in the opinion that the order “discriminates on the 
basis of viewpoints”312 – that it was, in other words, viewpoint based – here the Court instead 
labeled the order’s grant of access content based. 
 In the flag-burning cases discussed above, the Court struck down flag desecration 
statutes as content based even though the laws appeared to be clear examples of viewpoint 
discrimination as described in Chapter 2.  In Texas v. Johnson,313 the Court invalidated a 
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state law prohibiting flag desecration, saying the law was not aimed at protecting the 
integrity of the flag in all circumstances – Texas had no quarrel with dirty or torn flags 
burned as a means of disposal – “but is designed instead to protect it only against 
impairments that would cause serious offense to others.”314 The law was thus content based, 
the Court said, because it was dependent “on the likely communicative impact of . . . 
expressive conduct.”315 
Yet, read closely, the Court’s opinion reveals that the real flaw of the law was that it 
was viewpoint based.  Texas argued it had an interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of 
nationhood and national unity.  According to Texas, if the flag was mistreated in a way that 
would cast doubt on “either the idea that nationhood and national unity are the flag’s 
referents or that national unity actually exists, the message conveyed thereby is a harmful one 
and therefore may be prohibited.”316 Texas claimed its law was not endorsing or prohibiting 
any particular philosophy; its interest in preserving the symbol of the flag did not prefer 
Republicans over Democrats, for example.317 The Court responded, “[I]f Texas means to 
argue that its interest does not prefer any viewpoint over another, it is mistaken; surely one’s 
attitude toward the flag and its referents is a viewpoint.”318 And that viewpoint was 
unconstitutionally being suppressed, the Court argued.  “If there is a bedrock principle 
underlying the First Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of 
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an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable,” Justice 
Brennan eloquently wrote,319 in a line that mirrors the definition of viewpoint discrimination 
that emerged from the Court’s early cases.  The Court said that if it were to hold that Texas 
could forbid flag burning only when it was likely to damage the flag’s symbolic role, but 
allow it when burning a flag promotes that role (for example, ceremoniously burning a dirty 
flag), “we would be saying that when it comes to impairing the flag’s physical integrity, the 
flag itself may be used as a symbol . . . only in one direction.”320 To permit that, the Court 
said, would be to allow Texas to “‘prescribe what shall be orthodox.’”321 The Court 
concluded, “We never before have held that the Government may ensure that a symbol be 
used to express only one view of that symbol or its referents.”322 
The presence of viewpoint discrimination, therefore, drove the Court’s decision in 
Johnson, even though the Court ultimately struck down the law because it said it was content 
based.  In the follow-up flag burning case, United States v. Eichman,323 the Court similarly 
mislabeled its analysis.  Facially, the federal Flag Protection Act of 1989 was free from the 
flaws of the law in Johnson. Unlike the Texas law, the federal statute banned physical harm 
to the flag, regardless of whether the conduct caused offense to others.  Even so, the Court 
found that the government’s interests and intentions were the same.  Congress said it sought 
to protect the physical integrity of the flag under all circumstances in order to safeguard the 
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flag’s identity “as the unique and unalloyed symbol of the Nation.”324 But secretly 
destroying a flag in one’s basement would not threaten the flag’s recognized meaning, the 
Court observed.  “Rather, the Government’s desire to preserve the flag as a symbol for 
certain national ideals is implicated only when a person’s treatment of the flag communicates 
[a] message to others” that is inconsistent or in opposition with those ideals.325 In addition, 
the Court held that the specified terms of the law defining mistreatment of a flag connoted 
“disrespectful treatment” that would “likely damage the flag’s symbolic value,”326 while the 
explicit exemption for disposal of worn or soiled flags protected “certain acts traditionally 
associated with patriotic respect for the flag.”327 Again, the Court couched its rejection of the 
law in the language of content – striking it down because it was a content-based restriction of 
speech – although the Court’s real concern seemed to be that the law only prohibited 
unpopular and unacceptable viewpoints toward the flag.328 
Content and viewpoint discrimination were central in the Court’s 1992 hate speech 
case, R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul.329 In R.A.V., a teenager who burned a cross inside the fenced 
yard of a black family was charged with violating St. Paul’s Bias-Motivated Crime 
Ordinance, which made it a misdemeanor for anyone to place a symbol, object, or graffiti, 
including a swastika or burning cross, on public or private property if it was likely to arouse 
“anger, alarm, or resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
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gender.”330 During proceedings at the lower court, the law was challenged on overbreadth 
grounds.  The Minnesota Supreme Court rejected that argument, however, construing the law 
to prohibit only constitutionally proscribable fighting words.331 
All nine justices on the U.S. Supreme Court agreed that the law was unconstitutional 
though they divided sharply in their reasoning.332 In spite of the state court’s narrow reading 
of the law, four justices still concluded it was unconstitutionally overbroad because it 
punished speech that caused “hurt feelings, offense, or resentment.”333 The remaining five 
justices, however, or the majority of the Court, assumed, arguendo, that the law banned only 
expression that met the definition of fighting words.334 Such words fall outside of First 
Amendment protection; the government could, presumably, ban all fighting words.  The 
inquiry for five justices on the Court, then, was whether a partial ban – one that criminalized 
only those fighting words dealing with race, color, creed, religion or gender – was 
constitutional. 
 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia said that it was not.  He admitted that the First 
Amendment did not ban all regulations of speech based on content.  The Court’s “limited 
categorical approach,” he observed, permitted restrictions on obscenity, defamation, and 
fighting words.335 Perhaps answering a question left unsettled in Mosley, Justice Scalia ruled 
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that although the Court’s categorical approach was permissible, it would be impermissible 
for the government to discriminate within those lower classes of speech for reasons 
“unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.”336 That sort of “content 
discrimination,” he said, would violate the First Amendment.337 Although he spoke of 
“content,” the examples he used to support his argument clearly seemed to be viewpoint 
based.  “Thus,” Justice Scalia wrote, “the government may proscribe libel; but it may not 
make the further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the 
government.”338 
There are some exceptions to the ban on “content discrimination” within otherwise 
constitutionally proscribable speech, the Court wrote.  If the “basis for the content 
discrimination consists entirely of the very reason the entire class of speech at issue is 
proscribable,”339 the First Amendment did not forbid the restriction.340 A state, for instance, 
could prohibit only that obscenity that is the most patently offensive in its prurience, the 
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Court held.  Yet even when discussing the permissible “content” exceptions, Justice Scalia’s 
analysis seemed driven by viewpoint discrimination concerns.  Content discrimination is 
worrisome, he said, because it “raises the specter that the Government may effectively drive 
certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”341 The “content” exceptions are 
permissible, he ruled, only when “there is no realistic possibility that official suppression of 
ideas is afoot.”342 
Applying that “mislabeled analysis”343 to the St. Paul ordinance, Justice Scalia first 
ruled that the law was unconstitutionally content based.  The law, the Court held, only 
applied to fighting words that insult or provoke violence “on the basis of race, color, creed, 
religion or gender.”344 Abusive speech, “no matter how vicious or severe, [is] permissible 
unless [it is] addressed to one of the specified disfavored topics,” Justice Scalia wrote.345 
Under the ordinance, fighting words could be used to express hostility on the basis of 
political affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality without punishment, he noted.346 
But, the Court ruled, “the First Amendment does not permit St. Paul to impose special 
prohibitions on those speakers who express views on disfavored subjects,”347 with disfavored 
serving as the operative word.348 As Chapter 2 demonstrated, the Court’s early cases 
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established that viewpoint discrimination exists when the government suppresses messages 
or ideas it disfavors. 
 Although Justice Scalia’s language appeared to readily conflate the content and 
viewpoint concepts, he did nevertheless see a distinction between the two.  After finding the 
ordinance faulty because it discriminated on the basis of content, he argued St. Paul was 
guilty of viewpoint discrimination as well.  “In its practical operation,” he wrote, “the 
ordinance goes even beyond mere content discrimination, to actual viewpoint 
discrimination.”349 As he interpreted the law’s effect, it would allow proponents of racial 
tolerance and equality to use fighting words – “aspersions upon a person’s mother, for 
example,” that did not invoke race, color, creed, religion, or gender350 – that racial bigots or 
those advocating racial hatred could not.  Justice Scalia created a hypothetical example to 
illustrate his point: “One could hold up a sign saying . . . that all ‘anti-Catholic bigots’ are 
misbegotten; but not that all ‘papists’ are, for that would insult and provoke violence ‘on the 
basis of religion.’”351 He concluded that “St. Paul has no such authority to license one side 
of a debate to fight freestyle, while requiring the other to follow Marquis of Queensberry 
rules.”352 
Justice Stevens concurred in the judgment in R.A.V., illustrating again how differently 
justices can interpret the scope of a regulation and how crucial those varied interpretations 
can be in determinations of viewpoint discrimination.  Throughout much of his concurring 
opinion, Justice Stevens, as he had on other occasions, faulted the Court for its strong 
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language condemning content discrimination.  Content-based distinctions, he argued, “far 
from being presumptively invalid, are an inevitable and indispensable aspect of a coherent 
understanding of the First Amendment.”353 Justice Stevens said the hierarchy of protected 
speech that the Court itself created is based on content, placing, for instance, core political 
speech on the highest rung on the ladder and commercial speech beneath it.  It is the content 
of the speech that determines its place on the ladder, he argued.  Rather than embrace the 
position, as he saw the majority doing, that “all content-based regulations are equally infirm 
and presumptively invalid,” Justice Stevens instead said judicial analysis called for “a more 
complex and subtle analysis, one that considers the content and context of the regulated 
speech, and the nature and scope of the restriction on speech.”354 Had the St. Paul law not 
been overbroad, he said, applying that sort of analysis would have led him to conclude that a 
“selective, subject-matter regulation on proscribable speech is constitutional.”355 He thought 
the law was a justifiable response to the harms inflicted by hate speech.  
 Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice Scalia that the law was viewpoint 
discriminatory, and he responded directly to Justice Scalia’s argument and hypothetical.  As 
Justice Stevens interpreted the effect of the law, its application was “evenhanded,”356 treating 
advocates of tolerance and racial bigots equally.  He argued that Justice Scalia’s hypothetical 
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failed to prove his point.  The response to the Court’s “anti-Catholic bigots” example, Justice 
Stevens reasoned, is not a sign saying that all “papists” are misbegotten but “a sign saying 
that ‘all advocates of religious tolerance are misbegotten.’”357 In that case, neither sign 
would be prohibited “for the attacks were not ‘based on . . . religion’ but rather on one’s 
beliefs about tolerance,” he argued.358 Significantly, Justice Stevens also said the law was 
evenhanded because it applied equally to bar hate speech referring to all races, colors, creeds, 
religions, or genders.  “[J]ust as the ordinance would prohibit a Muslim from hoisting a sign 
claiming that all Catholics were misbegotten, so the ordinance would bar a Catholic from 
hoisting a similar sign attacking Muslims,” he wrote.359 Justice Stevens thus was envisioning 
an argument between members of two religious groups.  Because the law did not “favor one 
side of any debate,”360 it was viewpoint neutral for Justice Stevens.   
 In Boos v. Barry,361 the Court, as it would in R.A.V., recognized a distinction between 
content and viewpoint discrimination, although the Court did so employing a “crabbed 
definition” of viewpoint.362 As explained above, in Boos the Court struck down a provision 
of the District of Columbia Code that prohibited the display of any sign within 500 feet of a 
foreign embassy if that sign tended to bring that foreign government into “public odium” or 
“public disrepute.”363 Under the law, then, signs expressing uncritical opinions or speaking 
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favorably of a foreign government would have been allowed while critical signs were not.  
This would seem to be an instance of vintage viewpoint discrimination.  A plurality of the 
Court, however, startlingly ruled otherwise.364 Justice O’Connor wrote, “The display clause 
determines which viewpoint is acceptable in a neutral fashion by looking to the policies of 
foreign governments.”365 The District of Columbia was not itself determining acceptable 
viewpoints under the law, the reasoning went, but was instead looking neutrally to the 
policies of foreign governments.  Those policies, then, dictated the permissible expression 
within 500 feet of a foreign embassy.  As scholar Marjorie Heins has persuasively argued, 
however, “acquiescence in the viewpoint discrimination of others” should be no more 
permissible than if the government itself suppresses expression based on its view.366 
Nevertheless, even though the Court found the regulation viewpoint neutral, it struck 
it down as unconstitutional content discrimination.  Citing Consolidated Edison v. Public 
Service Commission,367 Justice O’Connor said that a regulation that “does not favor either 
side of a political controversy”368 could nonetheless be impermissible because the “First 
Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends . . . to prohibition of public 
discussion of an entire topic.”369 The plurality thus characterized signs or displays critical of 
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foreign governments as “an entire category of speech”370 rather than as viewpoints.  Because 
“one category of speech [was] completely prohibited,”371 the plurality said the law was 
content based and that it failed strict scrutiny.  Perhaps the case’s confluence with 
international law and foreign policy could explain the Court’s troubled analysis.  Regardless, 
the case demonstrates how malleable these constitutional concepts – content and viewpoint 
discrimination – have been in the Court’s hands. 
 Although the Court’s analysis was troubling in Boos, it is noteworthy that the 
plurality did see a clear demarcation between content and viewpoint discrimination.  Other 
cases discussed in this chapter have supported the position that content neutrality, understood 
as subject matter, topic, or category neutrality, is distinguishable from viewpoint 
neutrality.372 As Justice O’Connor said in her dissent in Turner Broadcasting System v. 
FCC, “Whether a provision is viewpoint-neutral is irrelevant to the question whether it is 
also content-neutral.”373 Yet the distinction is not one the Court has dutifully maintained.  As 
has been discussed in this section, the Court has frequently conflated the content and 
viewpoint concepts when reviewing restrictions on private speech and speech in public 
forums.  Admittedly, the concepts are closely related.  It is true, of course, that a restriction 
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on viewpoint is by definition also a restriction on content.  By suppressing a particular 
viewpoint, the government is concerning itself with the content of expression.  The concepts 
also emerge from a similar fundamental theoretical concern: The government must keep its 
hands off of public debate.  As Justice Kennedy said in United States v. Playboy 
Entertainment Group:374 “The Constitution exists precisely so that opinions and judgments, 
including esthetic and moral judgments about art and literature, can be formed, tested, and 
expressed.  What the Constitution says is that these judgments are for the individual to make, 
not for the Government to decree.”375 When the government regulates speech based on its 
content, whether subject or viewpoint, the Court’s concern has been that the government is 
infringing on the marketplace of ideas, that the government is impermissibly skewing private 
discussion.376 
Conclusion 
 This chapter has shown that the Court’s content-neutrality rule, first announced with 
majority approval in Mosley’s sweeping language, has been plagued by inconsistent 
definition and application.  The Court has varied its approaches or methods in identifying 
content discrimination involving private speech and speech in public forums, waffling among 
looking to the face of the regulation, the purpose or intent of the regulation, and the effect or 
impact of the regulation.  The chapter also demonstrated that the Court has obscured its 
jurisprudence by often appearing to conflate the content and viewpoint concepts.  The Court 
has done so through three interrelated ways, and each was discussed. 
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 As noted, the viewpoint and content concepts are indeed similar.  It is important to 
emphasize, however, that the Court has not treated them as if they are the same.  As will be 
discussed in the next chapter, in limited public forums and in nonpublic forums, the Court 
has expressly held that content discrimination is permissible, even expected.  Even in those 
forums, however, where the government has significant control over speech, viewpoint 
discrimination is unconstitutional.  In other words, a regulation can be content based in 
limited public forums and in nonpublic forums, but it cannot be viewpoint based.  The 
distinction is crucial.  The Court’s conflation of the concepts when reviewing restrictions on 
private speech and speech in public forums, therefore, has at least two significant 
consequences.  First, the conflation seems to imply that viewpoint discrimination in public 
forums and regulation of private speech can be upheld.  The Court, remember, has said that 
content discrimination can be constitutional if it passes the rigorous test of strict scrutiny.  In 
only one case, Burson v. Freeman,377 has a content restriction passed the test; that case 
indicates, nevertheless, that strict scrutiny is not always fatal in fact.  Although the Court has 
never upheld a restriction on private speech or speech in public forums that it found to be 
viewpoint based,378 the Court’s conflation of the content and viewpoint terms in those 
contexts suggests a regulation could be upheld if it were capable of passing strict scrutiny.  If 
true, the Court finds itself with a jurisprudential hiccup: In limited public forums and 
nonpublic forums, where the government has more control over speech, the Court has 
suggested that a finding of viewpoint discrimination on its face invalidates a regulation.379 
377 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
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Yet in public forums and with private speech, where the Court is most concerned with the 
government keeping its hands off debate, the Court has at least implied that viewpoint 
discrimination can be upheld. 
 Second, and in operation perhaps more consequential, because the Court has so often 
conflated the concepts, it has left itself no principled room to make the distinction between 
the two when it has to.380 Consolidated Edison and R.A.V. demonstrated that, even when 
reviewing regulations of private speech and speech in public forums, the Court has been 
divided when determining the line between a subject matter or topic restriction and a 
viewpoint restriction.  In those cases, the distinction did not prove to be particularly crucial; 
though justices disagreed on the viewpoint neutrality of the regulations, the Court 
nevertheless struck them down as content based.  In limited public forums and nonpublic 
forums, however, the constitutionality of a regulation hinges on the content/viewpoint 
distinction; the distinction itself is often dispositive.  In sum, the Court has appeared to 
conflate the concepts in the context of public forums and private speech, clouding the 
definition of viewpoint discrimination.  The Court has thus had a hard time untangling the 
concepts when it needs to in other contexts, as will be illustrated in the following chapter.    
 
In those cases, the Court found that speech regulations were viewpoint discriminatory, but the Court also 
considered whether the regulations were permissible under the Establishment Clause.  They were not, the Court 
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Chapter 4  
The Burger and Rehnquist Courts on Viewpoint and Content Discrimination:  
Limited Public Forum, Nonpublic Forum, and Subsidy Cases 
 
Chapter 3 detailed the Court’s application of its content and viewpoint neutrality 
principles in private speech and public forum cases.  This chapter continues the discussion of 
the concepts but considers their application in different speech contexts.  The chapter first 
will discuss content and viewpoint neutrality in limited public forum and nonpublic forum 
cases.  In those types of forums, viewpoint discrimination is unconstitutional.  Content-based 
restrictions, however, are tolerable, making the line between content and viewpoint and, thus, 
the definition of viewpoint discrimination, especially important.  The chapter will show that 
the Court has appeared to employ a different conceptualization of viewpoint discrimination 
in the two contexts.  The chapter will also discuss how the Court has wrestled with how the 
rules of content and viewpoint neutrality should apply when the government subsidizes 
speech.         
 The Content/Viewpoint Distinction in Limited Public Forums 
 In its jurisprudence, the Court identifies three kinds of forums, each subject to a 
particular set of First Amendment rules: traditional public forums, limited public forums, and 
nonpublic forums.1 The rules applicable to traditional public forums have been discussed: 
Any content-based restriction must pass strict scrutiny; a content-neutral restriction is 
 
1 A full discussion and critique of the Court’s application of its forum jurisprudence is outside the scope of this 
dissertation.  For scholarly commentary, see, Lillian BeVier, Rehabilitating Public Forum Doctrine: In Defense 
of Categories, 1992 SUP. CT. REV. 79; Robert Post, Between Governance and Management: The History and 
Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713 (1987). 
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constitutional if it passes a more lenient intermediate scrutiny.  The government has more 
flexibility, however, in regulating speech when it creates a forum for expression.  A limited, 
sometimes called dedicated, public forum is property that the government “has opened for 
use by the public as a place for expressive activity.”2 As the Court said in Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., “The government does not create a 
limited public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally 
opening a nontraditional public forum for public discourse.”3 A nonpublic forum – to be 
discussed in the next section – by contrast, is a place that is “not by tradition or designation a 
forum for public communication.”4 The ban against viewpoint discrimination is applicable 
in all three types of forums.5 The government has the most control over speech in nonpublic 
forums; any restriction in that type of forum need only be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. 
 Limited public forums, then, occupy a sort of middle ground between traditional 
public forums and nonpublic forums.  The government is not required to either create or 
maintain a limited public forum.6 As long as it does so, though, the Court has said that any 
content restrictions on speech within the forum must meet strict scrutiny; the government, in 
other words, “is bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public forum.”7 One 
critically important caveat exists, however.  The Court has also said that the government is 
responsible for defining the scope of a limited public forum.  The government, the Court 
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ruled, can create a limited public forum “for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups 
or for the discussion of certain subjects.”8 Therefore, the government can bar a class of 
speakers or speech based on its subject or topic (if the government deems the subject or topic 
outside the purposes of the forum) in a limited public forum as long as the exclusion, as in 
nonpublic forums, is reasonable and viewpoint neutral.9
Because the government can permissibly restrict speech based on its content – its 
subject or topic – in limited public forums, the definition of viewpoint discrimination in this 
context is vital.  As scholar Nicole Casarez has pointed out, the Court also has to be wary that 
the government does not successfully exclude disfavored speech from a limited public forum 
simply by classifying it as an undesirable speech topic.10 The stakes are high.  Yet in the rare 
instances in which the Court has found that government created a limited public forum,11 the 
Court has not always been able to agree on how to identify viewpoint discrimination. 
 The Court had no disagreement, however, in the first limited public forum case it 
decided, City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin Employment Relations 
Commission.12 During the course of a regularly scheduled meeting of a local Board of 
Education, open to the public, discussion turned to pending labor negotiations between the 
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jurisprudence, the Court identified City of Madison as a limited public forum case.  See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. 
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). 
174
board and the teacher’s union.  One speaker at the meeting, who was a nonunion teacher, 
over union objection addressed a divisive topic of the pending negotiations: the union’s 
demand for a “fair share” clause, which would have required all teachers, whether union 
members or not, to pay union dues to defray the costs of collective bargaining.13 His 
presentation must have been effective: Later that evening, the school board voted to accede 
to all of the union demands except the “fair share” clause.14 The union subsequently filed a 
complaint with the Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, arguing that the board 
had committed a prohibited labor practice by permitting the nonunion teacher to speak at the 
meeting.  In violation of state law, the union argued, the board had engaged in negotiations 
with a member of the bargaining unit other than the exclusive collective-bargaining 
representative.15 The Commission agreed, and the Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed. 
 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed.  In an opinion written by 
Chief Justice Burger, the Court observed that the teacher “did not seek to bargain or offer to 
enter into any bargain with the board.”16 Although his views were surely not consistent with 
the union, the Court said, expressing those views to the board did not change the fact that the 
union alone was authorized to negotiate and enter a contract with the board.17 Furthermore, 
the Court held that it was significant that the board had opened the meeting to the public, that 
the board had, in effect, created a forum.  The Court wrote, “[The teacher] addressed the 
 
13 429 U.S. at 169.  The speaker read a petition signed by some of the teachers in the district and stated that the 
“fair share” proposal had not been adequately addressed.  “We simply ask for communication, not 
confrontation,” he said.  His presentation lasted less than three minutes.  Id. at 172. 
 
14 Id. at 172. 
 
15 Id. at 172-73. 
 
16 Id. at 174. 
 
17 Id.  
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school board not merely as one of its employees but also as a concerned citizen, seeking to 
express his views on an important decision of his government.”18 The Court conceded that 
“public bodies may confine their meetings to specified subject matter and may hold 
nonpublic sessions to transact business”19 but held that the government cannot confine 
“participation in public discussion of public business . . . to one category of interested 
individuals.”20 And that is precisely what Wisconsin had done here, the Court ruled.  The 
Commission order did not prohibit all speech to the board on the subject of collective 
bargaining.  Union representatives could continue to come before the board at its public 
meetings and express their views.21 Any nonunion speaker, however, could not.  The Court 
concluded, “To permit one side of a debatable public question to have a monopoly in 
expressing its views to the government is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees.”22 
Because the Commission order eliminated the viewpoints (the perspectives) of nonunion 
teachers on the subject of collective bargaining from future board meetings, the Court held 
the order was unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.23 
18 Id. at 174-75. 
 
19 Id. at 176 n.8. 
 
20 Id. at 175. 
 
21 Id. at 176 n.9. 
 
22 Id. at 175-76. 
 
23 In Minnesota State Board for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984), the Court disagreed over 
how to classify “meet and confer” sessions.  Provisions of the Minnesota Public Employment Labor Relations 
Act required public employers to engage in official exchanges of views with their employees on policy 
questions relating to employment but outside the scope of mandatory bargaining.  Participation in these “meet 
and confer” sessions was restricted to the employees’ exclusive representative.  Faculty members at a state 
community college who were not members of the faculty union sued, challenging the provisions.  A lower court 
held that the provisions of the law violated the First Amendment rights of faculty who did not want to join the 
union.  In a 6-3 decision, the Court reversed.  Justice O’Connor, writing for the Court, said the “meet and 
confer” sessions were not limited public forums.  She wrote: “Meet and confer sessions are occasions for public 
employers, acting solely as instrumentalities of the State, to receive policy advice from their professional 
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 In Heffron v. International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,24 the Court ruled 
that a state fair was a limited public forum25 and that a rule restricting expression in that 
forum was content and viewpoint neutral.  The rule in question required that “all persons, 
groups or firms which desire to sell, exhibit or distribute materials during the annual State 
Fair must do so only from fixed locations on the fairgrounds.”26 Violation of the rule was a 
misdemeanor.  The International Society for Krishna Consciousness, an international 
religious society espousing the views of the Krishna religion, challenged the rule, claiming 
that it infringed their First Amendment rights because it would suppress the practice of 
Sankirtan, a religious ritual that enjoined the members of the religion to “go into public 
places to distribute or sell religious literature and to solicit donations for the support of the 
Krishna religion.”27 In reviewing the rule, the Court, looking to the face of the rule, first held 
that it was a content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction.  Justice White wrote for the 
Court: “[T]he Rule applies evenhandedly to all who wish to distribute and sell written 
materials or to solicit funds.  No person or organization, whether commercial or charitable, is 
permitted to engage in such activities except from a booth rented for those purposes.”28 The 
 
employers.  Minnesota has simply restricted the class of persons to whom it will listen in its making of policy.”  
Id. at 282.  “Appellees have no constitutional right to force the government to listen to their views,” the Court 
concluded.  Id. at 283.  In dissent, Justice Stevens relied, in part, on City of Madison to find the regulations 
viewpoint discriminatory.  He argued: “This statute gives the union the same monopoly in expressing its views 
to the government that we condemned in the Madison Joint School District case.  The Minnesota ‘meet and 
confer’ sessions create, in reality, an exclusive method for communication with government, and permit only 
one point of view to be expressed.”  Id. at 319-20 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Justice Stevens thus argued the 
provisions were unconstitutional. 
 
24 452 U.S. 640 (1981). 
 
25 “The Minnesota State Fair is a limited public forum in that it exists to provide a means for a greater number 
of exhibitors temporarily to present their products or views, be they commercial, religious, or political, to a 
large number of people in an efficient fashion.”  Id. at 655. 
 
26 Id. at 643. 
 
27 Id. at 645. 
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Court next said the rule was free from the flaws of the standardless licensing schemes 
discussed in Chapter 2.  In those cases, remember, the Court was concerned that, given 
unbridled discretion, the government would suppress disfavored or unpopular views.  Here, 
though, the Court said there was no cause for concern.  “The method of allocating space is a 
straightforward first-come, first-served system,” the Court wrote.  “The Rule is not open to 
the kind of arbitrary application that this Court has condemned . . . because such discretion 
has the potential for becoming a means of suppressing a particular point of view.”29 Thus, 
the Court concluded the law was a permissible restriction of speech in a limited public forum, 
free from content or viewpoint discrimination, that passed the intermediate scrutiny test.30 
In Heffron, a regulation was deemed content and viewpoint neutral because it applied 
to all speakers, including the religious organization that sought an exception.  In an important 
line of limited public forum cases, however, the Court has been presented with a different 
dilemma.  In these cases, governmental actors, claiming that they are seeking to avoid an 
Establishment Clause violation, have excluded religious expression from a limited forum.  
The government claims that doing so is permissible content discrimination, that the subject or 
topic of religion has legitimately been barred from the forum.  The Court, however, has 
found otherwise.  Using a definition of viewpoint discrimination – akin to the 
conceptualization the Court used in City of Madison – that bases the determination on 
whether the government excludes perspectives “on an otherwise includible subject”31 in the 
 
28 Id. at 649. 
 
29 Id.  
30 The Court unanimously agreed that the rule was content and viewpoint neutral, and all nine justices agreed 
that the restriction on sales and solicitations was constitutional.  Four justices, however, argued that as applied 
to the distribution of literature the rule was unconstitutional because it was “an overly intrusive means of 
achieving the State’s interest in crowd control.”  Id. at 657 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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forum, the Court has ruled that prohibiting religious expression actually constitutes 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 
 The Court has split badly in at least two of these cases, and the entire line of cases 
will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 5, to explore whether individual justices’ preferences for 
the government’s support of religion might be coloring their interpretation of the viewpoint 
neutrality of the restrictions in question.  For now, a brief discussion of Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia,32 arguably the most significant of the cases, 
will demonstrate the scope of the debate for the Court.  In Rosenberger, the Court invalidated 
a University of Virginia policy authorizing payment from the Student Activities Fund for the 
printing costs of a variety of student publications but prohibiting payment for any student 
publication that “primarily promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an 
ultimate reality.”33 The Court acknowledged that it was “something of an understatement to 
speak of religious thought and discussion as just a viewpoint,”34 but nevertheless concluded 
that “viewpoint discrimination is the proper way to interpret the University’s” policy.35 The 
policy did not exclude religion as a subject matter, the Court reasoned, but instead selected 
for disfavored treatment journalistic efforts with religious editorial viewpoints.36 “Religion 
may be a vast area of inquiry,” Justice Kennedy wrote for a 5-4 majority, “but it also 
provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety 
 
31 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993). 
 
32 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 
33 Id. at 822.  The Court said the Student Activities Fund constituted a limited public forum “more in a 
metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are applicable.”  Id. at 830. 
 
34 Id. at 831. 
 
35 Id.  
36 Id.  
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of subjects may be discussed and considered.”37 And because religious perspectives were 
eliminated, the Court held, the regulation was viewpoint discriminatory. 
 Notice that the Court was unconcerned with the University’s purpose for establishing 
the policy.  The University policy on its face appeared to be a well-intentioned attempt to 
avoid any violations of the Establishment Clause.  But that benevolent purpose did not matter 
for the Court.  It also did not seem to matter if the speech was offensive or unpopular, a 
concern that motivated the Court in its early conceptualization of viewpoint discrimination.  
Instead, the Court focused solely on the effect or function of the regulation.  The effect here, 
the Court said, was that religious perspectives or viewpoints on subjects were barred, making 
the denial of funding unconstitutional.  
 In dissent, Justice Souter argued the policy constituted a viewpoint-neutral regulation 
based on content.  The entire subject of religion had been permissibly excluded from the 
forum, he said.  As the dissent saw it, the policy applied evenhandedly to all religious 
publications and to “agnostics and atheists as well as . . . deists and theists.”38 Justice Souter 
concluded, “The Guidelines . . . thus do not skew debate by funding one position but not its 
competitors.”39 Because they did not skew a narrow debate either between religions or 
between theists and atheists, he argued, the guidelines were viewpoint neutral. 
 Justice Kennedy responded to Justice Souter’s argument and indicated that the Court 
took a broader view of what counts as an opposing viewpoint.40 Justice Kennedy said that 
the dissent’s view “that no viewpoint discrimination occurs because the Guidelines 
 
37 Id.  
 
38 Id. at 895 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
39 Id. at 896. 
 
40 Casarez, supra note 9, at 527. 
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discriminate against an entire class of viewpoints reflects an insupportable assumption that 
all debate is bipolar and that antireligious speech is the only response to religious speech.”41 
The Court held that it is “as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an atheistic 
perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, economic, 
or social viewpoint.”42 Religious and anti-religious viewpoints are not the only ones that can 
be had on a given issue, the Court seemed to be arguing.43 Because non-religious viewpoints 
on permissible subjects in the forum would be unregulated, the exclusion of religious and 
anti-religious perspectives thus amounts to viewpoint discrimination, the Court said. 
 The majority thus offered an expansive interpretation of viewpoint discrimination.  
As the dissent and other commentators have noted,44 if religion constitutes a viewpoint and 
not a subject, it is difficult to decipher any line between content and viewpoint.  Outside of 
the context of religious speech, for instance, extending Rosenberger’s rationale would seem 
to imply that any restriction on political speech in a forum would be viewpoint 
discriminatory because apolitical viewpoints or perspectives would be left unfettered.  That 
question was raised but not answered by the Court in Board of Regents of the University of 
Wisconsin v. Southworth.45 The University of Wisconsin, a public university, required full-
time students to pay a non-refundable student activity fee that supported extracurricular 
 
41 515 U.S. at 831. 
 
42 Id.  
43 See Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom of Speech, 15 CARDOZO 
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315, 322 (1997). 
 
44 See, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Viewpoints From Olympus, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 697 (1996); Sadurski, supra note 
43, at 319. 
 
45 529 U.S. 217 (2000).  Professor Casarez’s article also discussed how, had the Court applied Rosenberger’s 
expansive conceptualization of viewpoint discrimination in Southworth, the Court would have struck down the 
funding scheme on viewpoint discrimination grounds.  Casarez, supra note 9, at 528-29.  
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activities of various student organizations, including those engaged in political and 
ideological speech.  Some students and former students of the university sued, claiming the 
mandatory fee forced them to support student organizations that they found objectionable.  
Funds from the fee were distributed either by the student government or through a student 
referendum.  In front of the Court, the parties to the case stipulated that “the process for 
reviewing and approving allocations for funding [by the student government] is administered 
in a viewpoint-neutral fashion.”46 
The Court did not rule that the fee fund was a limited public forum, as it had in 
Rosenberger, but did hold that “the standard of viewpoint neutrality found in the public 
forum cases provides the standard we find controlling.”47 A requirement of viewpoint 
neutrality, the Court said, is “sufficient to protect the rights of the objecting students.”48 
When a university requires its students to pay fees to support the extracurricular expression 
of other students, “it may not prefer some viewpoints to others,” Justice Kennedy wrote for 
the Court.49 The money distributed by the student government did not favor viewpoints; the 
student government neutrally distributed money to requesting organizations, the parties 
agreed.  The Court, however, found the referendum procedure problematic and remanded the 
case to determine “what protection, if any, there is for viewpoint neutrality in this part of the 
process.”50 The Court wrote: “To the extent the referendum substitutes majority 
determinations for viewpoint neutrality it would undermine the constitutional protection the 
 
46 Id. at 224. 
 
47 Id. at 230; See also Casarez, supra note 9, at 529. 
 
48 Southworth, 529 U.S. at 230. 
49 Id. at 233. 
 
50 Id. at 235. 
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program requires.  The whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that minority views are treated 
with the same respect as are majority views.”51 The government cannot regulate speech 
because it is unpopular, the Court has long said. 
 The university’s funding policy established explicit purposes for which fees could not 
be expended.  Student organizations, the policy stated, could not receive reimbursement for 
“gifts, donations, and contributions,” the costs of legal services, or for “activities which are 
politically partisan in nature.”52 At one point in their brief, the objecting students argued that 
the ban against expenditures for “politically partisan” purposes rendered the funding system 
viewpoint discriminatory.53 The Court, however, avoided the question and upheld the 
funding system, relying on the fact that the parties had stipulated “to the contrary at the 
outset of this litigation.”54 It would have been interesting had the Court not bypassed the 
issue.  Under Rosenberger’s expansive conceptualization of viewpoint discrimination, 
funding nonpartisan organizations and activities while excluding partisan organizations from 
funding would arguably constitute viewpoint discrimination.  Political or partisan views 
would be barred from the forum while apolitical or nonpartisan views would be funded and 
facilitated.  Rosenberger would seem to tell us that, no matter the university’s purpose for 
barring partisan speech, the restriction’s effect makes it viewpoint discriminatory. 
 As Professor Casarez has pointed out,55 had the Court ruled that way in Southworth, 
however, it would have implicitly overruled cases, decided long before Rosenberger, in 
 
51 Id.  
52 Id. at 225. 
 
53 Id. at 226. 
 
54 Id.; See also Casarez, supra note 9, at 532.  
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which the Court had already decided that it would consider a restriction on political speech to 
be viewpoint neutral.  The Court did so not in limited public forum cases, however, but in 
cases involving nonpublic forums, which will be discussed next.   
 Viewpoint Discrimination in Nonpublic Forums 
 As discussed above, according to the Court’s forum jurisprudence, public property 
that is not by tradition a public forum or by express designation a limited public forum 
constitutes the third type of forum: the nonpublic forum, in which the government has 
significant control over speech.56 As with any forum, time, place, and manner regulations are 
permissible in nonpublic forums.  In addition, the government can “reserve the forum for its 
intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as long as the regulation on speech is 
reasonable and not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials oppose 
the speaker’s view.”57 Content and speaker-based restrictions are thus acceptable if they 
ensure that the forum is reserved “for its intended purposes,” but even in nonpublic forums 
the ban of viewpoint discrimination still exists.  And, as in limited public forums, the 
definition of viewpoint discrimination is therefore vital.  Yet, unlike in the limited public 
forum cases, the Court has not been quick to find viewpoint discrimination in nonpublic 
forums.  The Court has instead been rather deferential to government, seeming to employ a 
narrower conceptualization of the term than the one the Court announced in Rosenberger.58 
55 Casarez, supra note 9, at 533.  
 
56 “As we have stated on several occasions, the State, no less than a private owner of property, has power to 
preserve the property under its control for the use to which it is lawfully dedicated.”  Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983) (internal quotation and citation omitted).   
 
57 Id.  
58 See also Casarez, supra note 9, at 534 (making a similar argument).  Unlike Casarez, the discussion here 
emphasizes that the critical distinction between the Court’s treatment of the concept in the two contexts has 
been its method of analysis. 
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Crucial to the distinction has been the Court’s method of analysis: In cases involving limited 
public forums, the Court has focused on a regulation’s function or effect.  In nonpublic forum 
cases, on the other hand, the Court has instead hinged the determination of viewpoint 
neutrality on an evaluation of the government’s purpose or intent.  In several of these 
nonpublic forum cases, as will be seen, justices have written powerful dissents, chiding the 
majority for overlooking what the dissenters believed to be viewpoint discrimination. 
 The Court did not fully articulate its three-tiered forum doctrine until the 1983 
nonpublic forum case, Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n.59 Even 
before Perry, however, the Court had decided cases that it would later specifically label 
nonpublic forum cases, including one significant decision, Lehman v. City of Shaker 
Heights,60 in which dissenters thought the Court took too narrow a view of viewpoint 
discrimination.  In Lehman, a candidate for the Ohio General Assembly who wanted to 
promote his candidacy by purchasing advertising space on city buses challenged the city’s 
policy of not permitting political advertising on its transit vehicles.61 The buses displayed an 
array of commercial advertising62 but, during the 26 years of the transit system’s operation, 
the city had “not accepted or permitted any political or public issue advertising on its 
vehicles.”63 A majority of the Court held that the exclusion was permissible.64 The Court 
 
59 460 U.S. 37 (1983).   
 
60 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
 
61 Id. at 299-300. 
 
62 The city had accepted ads “from cigarette companies, banks, savings and loan associations, liquor companies, 
retail and service establishments, churches, and civic and public-service oriented groups.”  Id. at 300. 
 
63 Id. at 301. 
 
64 Justice Blackmun wrote an opinion for four justices.  Justice Douglas agreed that no public forum had been 
created but concurred in the judgment only, basing his decision solely on a captive audience rationale.  He 
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said the space for advertising on city buses did not constitute a public forum65 and the city 
“consciously ha[d] limited access” to the advertising space “in order to minimize chances of 
abuse, the appearance of favoritism, and the risk of imposing upon a captive audience.”66 
Those were “reasonable legislative objectives,” Justice Blackmun wrote for a plurality of the 
Court, “advanced by the city in a proprietary capacity.”67 Justice Blackmun recognized that 
the city did not have unlimited authority to restrict speech, however.  “The policies and 
practices governing access to the transit system’s advertising space must not be arbitrary, 
capricious, or invidious,” he wrote.68 They were not here, the Court concluded, so the 
restriction on political and public issue advertising was upheld. 
 In dissent, Justice Brennan argued the city created a public forum by accepting and 
displaying commercial advertisements.69 Once the forum had been established, he said, the 
city was forbidden from discriminating based on the subject matter of speech, which it did by 
prohibiting political and public issue advertising.  Although he spoke of subject matter, in a 
crucial passage he argued how, in operation, the regulation effectively discriminated based 
on viewpoint.  Using a broad conceptualization of viewpoint discrimination that the majority 
 
wrote: “While petitioner clearly has a right to express his views to those who wish to listen, he has no right to 
force his message upon an audience incapable of declining to receive it.  In my view the right of the commuters 
to be free from forced intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public 
transportation into forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience.”  Id. at 307 (Douglas, J., 
concurring in judgment).  
 
65 “Here, we have no open spaces, no meeting hall, park, street corner, or other public thoroughfare.  Instead, 
the city is engaged in commerce. . . . The car card space, although incidental to the provision of public 
transportation, is a part of the commercial venture.”  Id. at 303. 
 
66 Id. at 304. 
 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 303. 
 
69 “Once [commercial advertisements] have been accepted and displayed, the existence of a forum for 
communication cannot be gainsaid.”  Id. at 315 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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would adopt in Rosenberger, Justice Brennan argued that the distinction between commercial 
and political advertising could be seen as viewpoint based.  He wrote, “For instance, a 
commercial advertisement peddling snowmobiles would be accepted, while a counter-
advertisement calling upon the public to support legislation controlling the environmental 
destruction and noise pollution caused by snowmobiles would be rejected.”70 The “political” 
viewpoint, in other words, had been eliminated from the debate.71 The plurality did not 
respond to Justice Brennan’s argument and instead concluded, as mentioned above, that the 
city had legitimate purposes for excluding political advertising. 
 Two years later the Court upheld another restriction on political speech in a nonpublic 
forum in Greer v. Spock.72 The case involved a U.S. Army post: Fort Dix, a military 
reservation devoted primarily to basic training for newly inducted Army personnel.  
Although the federal government exercised exclusive jurisdiction over the entire area within 
Fort Dix, civilian vehicular traffic was permitted on paved roads within the reservation, and 
civilians were freely permitted to visit unrestricted areas of the base.73 Army officers also 
had occasionally invited civilian speakers to the base to address military personnel.  Subjects 
of talks ranged from business management to drug abuse.  Visiting clergymen had, by 
invitation, led religious services at the base chapel.  Speeches and demonstrations of a 
 
70 Id. at 317.  In a footnote, Justice Brennan quoted from a California Supreme Court decision reviewing a 
similar regulation of political advertising.  The California Supreme Court wrote: “A cigarette company is 
permitted to advertise the desirability of smoking its brand, but a cancer society is not entitled to caution by 
advertisement that cigarette smoking is injurious to health.  A theater may advertise a motion picture that 
portrays sex and violence, but the Legion for Decency has no right to post a message calling for clean films.”  
Id. at 318 n.10 (quoting Wirta v. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit Dist., 434 P.2d 982, 986-87 (Cal. 1967)). 
 
71 There is no suggestion here that “political speech” could be defined in a uniform way.  Rather, Justice 
Brennan’s point seemed to be that political or public issue advertisements were, in a sense, crucial anti-
commercial advertisements that were being eliminated from the forum. 
 
72 424 U.S. 828 (1976). 
 
73 Id. at 830. 
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partisan political nature, however, were barred by a regulation that provided that 
“[d]emonstrations, picketing, sit-ins, protest marches, political speeches and similar activities 
are prohibited and will not be conducted on the Fort Dix Military Reservation.”74 Another 
regulation banned the distribution of literature without prior approval.   
 In 1972, Benjamin Spock and his running mate, who were candidates of the People’s 
Party for President and Vice President of the United States, sought permission to enter the 
base to hold a meeting to discuss election issues with service personnel and their dependents 
and to distribute campaign literature.75 Their request was denied, and they sued.  In a 6-2 
decision, the Court upheld the regulations, rejecting the principle “that whenever members of 
the public are permitted freely to visit a place owned or operated by the Government, then 
that place becomes a ‘public forum’ for purposes of the First Amendment.”76 Justice 
Stewart’s opinion for the Court said the “business of a military installation,” like Fort Dix, is 
“to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum.”77 Spock, therefore, had no constitutional 
right to make political speeches or distribute leaflets at Fort Dix, the Court ruled.  The fact 
that other non-political speakers had been invited to appear at the base, the Court said, did 
not convert the base into a public forum or render authorities powerless to limit access to 
prevent future speakers or restrict certain subjects.78 Importantly, the Court held that military 
authorities did not discriminate “in any way” among candidates for public office based upon 
 
74 Id. at 831. 
 
75 Id. at 832. 
 
76 Id. at 836. 
 
77 Id. at 838. 
 
78 Id. at 838 n.10. 
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the candidates’ political views.79 No candidate, in fact, had ever been permitted to campaign 
on the base.  The Court thus concluded, “What the record shows, therefore, is a considered 
Fort Dix policy, objectively and evenhandedly applied, of keeping official military activities 
there wholly free of entanglement with partisan political campaigns of any kind.”80 As long 
as officials did not discriminate among candidates but instead uniformly barred them all, the 
Court found the regulations sufficiently neutral.81 
As discussed above, the Court decided its landmark nonpublic forum case in 1983, 
Perry Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n.82 In Perry, a union was elected 
exclusive bargaining representative for the teachers of a school district.  As part of its 
collective bargaining agreement, that union, but no other union, was given access to the 
interschool mail system and teacher mailboxes in the district’s schools.83 A rival union, 
 
79 Id. at 838. 
 
80 Id. at 839. 
 
81 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented in Greer, faulting the Court for focusing its emphasis 
on whether the base was a public forum.  What is needed instead, he said, is a “flexible approach [for] 
determining when public expression should be protected.”  Id. at 859-60 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  Furthermore, 
Justice Brennan rejected the argument that an interest in “military neutrality” justified the restrictions.  “[I]t 
borders on casuistry to contend that by evenhandedly permitting public expression to occur in unrestricted 
portions of a military installation, the military will be viewed as sanctioning the causes there espoused,” he 
wrote.  Id. at 867. 
 
82 460 U.S. 37 (1983).  The Burger Court decided two other cases before Perry that it would later recognize as 
nonpublic forum cases, though neither case is relevant for the present discussion.  In Jones v. North Carolina 
Prisoners’ Labor Union, 433 U.S. 119 (1977), the Court ruled that a prison is “most emphatically not a public 
forum” and that prison officials could permissibly prohibit inmates from soliciting other inmates to join a 
prisoners’ union and bar all meetings of the union.  Id. at 136.  In United States Postal Service v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114 (1981), the Court upheld a federal law prohibiting the deposit of 
unstamped “mailable matter” in a mail box approved by the U.S. Postal Service.  A nonprofit civic association 
that routinely delivered its messages by placing unstamped notices in mail boxes had sued, claiming the law 
infringed its First Amendment rights.  Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that “there is neither historical nor 
constitutional support for the characterization of a letterbox as a public forum.”  Id. at 128.  Further, the Court 
said the law was reasonable and “there simply is no question that [it] does not regulate speech on the basis of 
content.”  Id. at 132.  Dissents by Justices Marshall and Stevens did not challenge that latter point.  In neither 
case, then, were there claims of viewpoint discrimination.   
 
83 Id. at 39. 
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which before the collective bargaining agreement had also represented teachers in the district 
and had equal access to the mail system, sued, claiming the district’s access policy violated 
the Constitution.  In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the policy.  As mentioned, the Court 
gave form to its three-tiered forum doctrine for the first time in Perry. The school mail 
facilities at issue in the case, Justice White wrote for the Court, fell into the third category of 
forums the Court described, the nonpublic forum.84 The rival union, pointing to the fact that 
schools permitted outside organizations such as the YMCA, Cub Scouts, and church 
organizations to use the mail system, argued that the mail facilities thus had become a limited 
public forum.85 The Court responded that “if by policy or by practice” the school district had 
opened its mail system “for indiscriminate use by the general public,” the rival union’s 
argument would have been persuasive.86 That was not the case, however, the Court held.  
Even the permitted outside organizations had to secure permission from individual 
principals.87 The Court, therefore, concluded that the mail system was a nonpublic forum, 
meaning the exclusion of the rival union needed only to be reasonable and viewpoint neutral.  
 The Court rejected the court of appeals’ holding and Justice Brennan’s argument in 
dissent that the exclusion was viewpoint discriminatory.  “There is no indication that the 
School Board intended to discourage one viewpoint and advance another,” Justice White 
 
84 Id. at 46. 
 
85 Id. at 47. 
 
86 Id.  
87 The Court also observed that even if the district had created a limited public forum by granting access to 
organizations like the Cub Scouts and YMCA, “the constitutional right of access would in any event extend 
only to other entities of similar character.”  Id. at 48.  The rival union was “concerned with terms and conditions 
of teacher employment” and could have been excluded from a forum dedicated to “activities of interest and 
educational relevance to students,” the Court said.  Id.  
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wrote.88 The Court’s holding seemed focused on the board’s purpose or intent, ruling that 
the policy was not “motivated by a desire to suppress [the rival union’s] views.”89 Instead, 
the Court said, the access policy should be characterized as “based on the status of the 
respective unions rather than their views.”90 “Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic 
forum,” the Court held, “is the right to make distinctions in access on the basis of subject 
matter and speaker identity.”91 The Court ruled this speaker-based policy was a reasonable 
means to ensure the property – the school mail facilities – was preserved for business use by 
the teachers’ exclusive bargaining representative.92 
Unlike in the limited public forum cases, the majority in Perry gave no attention to 
the effect of the policy.  In Rosenberger, for instance, the Court was unconcerned with the 
university’s motivation and instead focused on the funding denial’s effect to find it viewpoint 
discriminatory.  In Perry, however, because the Court was satisfied that the policy was not 
“motivated by a desire to suppress [the rival union’s] views,”93 the policy’s effect or impact 
was irrelevant for the Court.  But it was not for the dissent in the case.  Justice Brennan’s 
dissent, which was joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens, chided the Court for 
focusing its analysis too closely on whether the mail system constituted a limited public 
forum.  By doing so, he argued, the Court “disregards the independent First Amendment 
 
88 Id. at 49. 
 
89 Id. at 49 n.9. 
 
90 Id. at 49. 
 
91 Id.  “These distinctions may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the 
process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended purpose of the property.”  Id.   
92 Id. at 51.  The Court added, “Moreover, exclusion of the rival union may reasonably be considered a means of 
insuring labor peace within the schools.”  Id.  
93 Id. at 49 n.9. 
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protection afforded by the prohibition against viewpoint discrimination.”94 The access policy 
violated that prohibition, he said, and he reached that conclusion by looking to the policy’s 
effect.  “The intent to discriminate can be inferred from the effect of the policy, which is to 
deny an effective channel of communication to the [rival union],” he argued.95 By granting 
access to that effective channel to only one union, the school district had skewed debate on 
labor relations in the schools, the dissent recognized.  As Justice Brennan pointed out, “[T]he 
teachers inevitably will receive from [the union] self-laudatory descriptions of its activities 
on their behalf and will be denied the critical perspective offered by the [rival union].”96 The 
effect of the policy, then, was to eliminate viewpoints on subjects the exclusive bargaining 
representative was permitted to address.  And that effect made the policy viewpoint 
discriminatory, the dissent concluded.97 
The Court divided again in reviewing the viewpoint neutrality of a speech regulation 
in a nonpublic forum two years later.  In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and 
Educational Fund, Inc.,98 a plurality of the Court ruled that the Combined Federal Campaign 
(CFC), an annual charitable fundraising drive conducted in the federal workplace during 
working hours, was a nonpublic forum.  By Executive Order, participation in the CFC was 
limited to charitable agencies that provided direct health and welfare services; “legal defense 
 
94 Id. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
95 Id. at 64. 
 
96 Id. at 65. 
 
97 Justice Brennan also pointed to “other factors” that suggested the policy discriminated among viewpoints.  In 
particular, he was troubled that the rival union appeared to be the only group “explicitly denied access to the 
mail system.”  Id. at 65.  The only reason for the union to seek an exclusive-access policy, he inferred, “is to 
deny its rivals access to an effective channel of communication.”  Id.  By agreeing to the policy, he said, the 
school board had “agreed to amplify the speech of the petitioner, while repressing the speech of the respondents 
based on the respondents’ point of view.”  Id.  
98 473 U.S. 788 (1985). 
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and political advocacy organizations” were specifically excluded.99 Several of those 
excluded organizations sued.   
 In a 4-3 decision, the Court ruled that the CFC was a nonpublic forum because neither 
the practice nor policy of the fundraising drive indicated intent on the part of the government 
to designate the CFC as a public forum open to all tax-exempt organizations.100 Rather, 
Justice O’Connor wrote for the Court, the government’s “consistent policy” had been to limit 
participation in the CFC to “appropriate” voluntary agencies and to require agencies seeking 
admission to obtain permission from federal and local CFC officials.101 The government 
argued that its interest in excluding legal defense and political advocacy organizations was to 
avoid controversy that would disrupt the workplace and adversely affect the CFC.102 
Although noting that avoidance of controversy “is not a valid ground for restricting speech in 
a public forum,” Justice O’Connor wrote that the “First Amendment does not forbid a 
viewpoint-neutral exclusion of speakers who would disrupt a nonpublic forum and hinder its 
effectiveness for its intended purpose.”103 The plurality thus said the government’s grounds 
for the exclusion were reasonable and “facially neutral.”104 
Justice O’Connor expressed concern, however, that “the purported concern to avoid 
controversy excited by particular groups may conceal a bias against the viewpoint advanced 
 
99 Id. at 790. 
 
100 Id. at 804.  Justices Marshall and Powell did not participate in the decision. 
 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 809.  “[T]he President determined that agencies seeking to affect the outcome of elections or the 
determination of public policy should be denied access to the CFC in order to avoid the reality and the 
appearance of Government favoritism or entanglement with particular viewpoints.”  Id. at 807. 
 
103 Id. at 811. 
 
104 Id. at 812. 
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by the excluded speakers.”105 The facial neutrality may, in fact, have been a facade, she 
worried.   Like the majority in Perry, the plurality’s concern was therefore with the 
motivation or intent of the government in enacting the regulation.  Justice O’Connor noted 
that organizations that did not provide direct health and welfare services, such as the World 
Wildlife Fund, had been permitted to participate in the CFC, thus casting doubt on the 
government’s asserted purpose in excluding legal defense and political advocacy 
organizations.  Because the question of viewpoint discrimination was “neither decided below 
nor fully briefed before this Court,” the plurality remanded the case to determine “whether 
the exclusion of respondents was impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a 
particular point of view.”106 In United States v. O’Brien,107 remember, the Court had warned 
against “hazardous” inquiries into motives or intent.108 Here, however, the Court remanded a 
case in which it determined the government’s stated purpose was “facially neutral”109 to 
determine if that purpose was really a pretext for viewpoint discrimination. 
 
105 Id. 
106 Id. at 812-13.  Three years after Cornelius, the Court ruled a school-sponsored student newspaper was a 
nonpublic forum in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).  The Court held that 
educators could exercise control “over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive 
activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  Id. at 273.  Central 
to its decision, the Court said that educators must be able to take into account the emotional maturity of students 
in deciding whether to disseminate student speech on “potentially sensitive topics.”  Id. at 272.  As mentioned 
in Chapter 1, the Hazelwood majority concluded its analysis in the case without explicitly saying whether 
school officials had to be viewpoint neutral in choosing what they censored, resulting in a split in the federal 
courts of appeals.  In his dissent in Hazelwood, however, Justice Brennan – echoing the plurality’s concern that 
facial neutrality was a facade in Cornelius – worried that the Court’s holding would allow school officials to 
“camouflage viewpoint discrimination as the ‘mere’ protection of students from sensitive topics.”  Id. at 288 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
107 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 
108 Id. at 383. 
 
109 473 U.S. at 812. 
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 The three dissenting justices in the case instead argued the exclusion was viewpoint 
discriminatory on its face.  Justice Blackmun’s dissent, foreshadowing an argument a 
majority of the Court would make in Rosenberger, took a wide view of the underlying 
debate.110 The government argued that the eligibility criteria were viewpoint neutral because 
they applied “equally to all ‘advocacy’ groups regardless of their ‘political or philosophical 
leanings.’”111 Justice Blackmun said the relevant comparison, however, was not among the 
organizations that were excluded, “but between those organizations allowed access to the 
CFC and those denied such access.”112 By devoting resources to a particular activity, he 
argued, “a charity expresses a view about the manner in which charitable goals can best be 
achieved.”113 Charities working toward the same broad goal may have a variety of views 
about the path to that goal, he said.  Justice Blackmun used “improved health”114 as an 
example.  Some of the health services charities participating in the CFC believed that they 
could improve health care through medical research; others focused their resources on public 
education.  Those excluded legal defense and political advocacy organizations concerned 
with the goal of improved health, on the other hand, “obviously think that the best way to 
achieve that goal is by changing social policy, creating new rights for various groups in 
society, or enforcing existing rights through litigation, lobbying, and political activism.”115 
Yet that view is prohibited from the CFC, Justice Blackmun argued.  “Government 
 
110 Justice Blackmun spent much of his dissent attacking the plurality’s holding that the CFC was a nonpublic 
forum. 
 
111 Id. at 832 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 
112 Id.  
113 Id.  
114 Id.  
115 Id.  
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employees may hear only from those charities that think that charitable goals can best be 
achieved within the confines of existing social policy and the status quo,” he wrote.116 
Because the distinction between status quo and social change was “blatantly viewpoint 
based,” Justice Blackmun said there was no reason to remand the case.117 
In United States v. Kokinda,118 a plurality of the Court ruled that a sidewalk located 
entirely on Postal Service property was a nonpublic forum.  Justice O’Connor said the 
sidewalk was not considered a public forum because it did “not have the characteristics of 
public sidewalks traditionally open to expressive activity.”119 Rather, it was “constructed 
solely to provide for the passage of individuals engaged in postal business.”120 Members of a 
political advocacy group set up a table on the postal sidewalk to distribute literature and 
solicit contributions.  They were asked to leave; when they refused they were arrested and 
convicted of violating a Postal Service regulation that prohibited any person from soliciting 
contributions on “postal premises.”121 The Court upheld the regulation as it was applied. 
 
116 Id. at 833. 
 
117 As Professor Casarez argued, one need not adopt Justice Blackmun’s broader outline of the debate to find 
viewpoint discrimination in Cornelius. Evidence showed that only twenty-six percent of the organizations 
participating in the CFC actually distributed food or health benefits, a fact that undercut the government’s 
asserted viewpoint-neutral reason to exclude the plaintiffs.  Casarez, supra note 9, at 540.  In a separate dissent 
in Cornelius, Justice Stevens suggested that the exclusion may not have been the product of a “conscious 
prejudice against advocacy groups,” but a “subconscious bias, based on nothing more than a habitual attitude of 
disfavor.”  473 U.S. at 835 n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  He agreed with Justice Blackmun that the exclusion 
was viewpoint based on its face because the reasons the government put forth to defend it were “wholly without 
merit.”  Id. at 836.  
 
118 497 U.S. 720 (1990). 
 
119 Id. at 727. 
 
120 Id.  The sidewalk was the sole means by which customers traveled from the parking lot to the post office 
building. 
121 Id. at 722. 
196
 Justice O’Connor said that in enacting the regulation the Postal Service reasonably 
concluded, “based on its long experience,”122 that “solicitation is inherently disruptive of the 
postal service’s business.”123 In dissent, Justice Brennan found flawed one of the Postal 
Service’s asserted interests for the regulation: barring solicitation because it “would be likely 
to produce hostile reactions and to cause people to avoid post offices.”124 That interest, 
Justice Brennan said, “is related to the suppression of expression.”125 The Postal Service was 
concerned that being asked for money might be embarrassing or annoying to people, 
“particularly when the speaker is a member of a disfavored or unpopular political advocacy 
group,” he argued.126 Justice O’Connor, on the other hand, was willing to be more 
deferential to the Postal Service’s asserted purpose.  “The Postal Service has never intimated 
that it intends to suppress the views of any ‘disfavored or unpopular political advocacy 
group,’” she wrote.127 Instead, she said, it was the “inherent nature of solicitation itself” that 
the Postal Service justifiably relied upon.128 For the plurality, there was no question that the 
 
122 Id. at 735. 
 
123 Id. at 733.  The Court said solicitation impeded the normal flow of traffic and was more intrusive and 
intimidating than an encounter with a person merely giving out information.  Id. at 733-34. 
 
124 Id. at 736.  Justice Brennan’s dissent was joined by Justices Marshall and Stevens and in part by Justice 
Blackmun. 
 
125 Id. at 754 (Brennan, J., dissenting).  As he had in other decisions discussed here, Justice Brennan thought the 
Court had mislabeled the postal sidewalk as a nonpublic forum.  In addition to his arguments discussed in the 
text here, he argued the regulation was an impermissible content-based restriction in a traditional or limited 
public forum.  The regulation was “tied explicitly to the content of speech,” he argued.  Id. at 753.  If a person 
says, “Please support my political advocacy group,” the regulation would not apply, Justice Brennan reasoned.  
But if that person says, “Please contribute $10,” she is subject to criminal prosecution.  “[P]unishment depends 
entirely on what [she] says,” he wrote.  Id.  Echoing debates discussed in Chapter 3, he said that, no matter the 
government’s purpose for the regulation, “any restriction on speech, the application of which turns on the 
substance of the speech, is content based.”  Id. at 754.  
 
126 Id.  
127 Id. at 736. 
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regulation was neither content nor viewpoint discriminatory.  There was no suggestion, 
Justice O’Connor said, that the Postal Service intended to suppress one viewpoint and 
advance another.  “The Service’s concern about losing customers because of the potentially 
unpleasant situation created by solicitation does not reveal ‘an effort to suppress expression 
merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view,’” she concluded.129 
The Court arguably continued its trend of applying a narrow conceptualization of 
viewpoint discrimination in nonpublic forum cases in Arkansas Educational Television 
Commission v. Forbes.130 In Forbes, a public television station staged a debate among 
candidates for a congressional seat but invited only the Democratic and Republican nominees 
to participate.  Ralph Forbes, a minor party candidate who had obtained the requisite 
signatures to appear on the ballot, asked to be included in the debate.131 He was denied 
participation, with the Executive Director of AETC explaining that the station had “made a 
bona fide journalistic judgment that our viewers would be best served by limiting the debate” 
to the candidates already invited.132 Forbes sued, arguing that his exclusion violated the First 
Amendment. 
 In a 6-3 decision, the Court ruled against Forbes.  As a general rule, Justice Kennedy 
wrote for the Court, public television broadcasting should be considered to be outside of the 
Court’s forum doctrine.  Public television broadcasters are required, like private journalists, 
to exercise substantial editorial discretion and judgment in the selection and presentation of 
 
128 Id. 
129 Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983)). 
 
130 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
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their programming.  “[T]he nature of editorial discretion counsels against subjecting 
broadcasters to claims of viewpoint discrimination,” the Court wrote.133 Candidate debates, 
however, present “the narrow exception to the rule,” the Court held.134 Because the debate 
was, by design, a forum for political speech, and because candidate debates “are of 
exceptional significance in the electoral process,”135 the Court said the forum doctrine should 
apply and that the debate was properly characterized as a nonpublic forum.  For Forbes’ 
exclusion to be constitutional, then, it needed to be reasonable and viewpoint neutral. 
 The Court was satisfied that it was.  Justice Kennedy noted that the jury in the case 
found Forbes’ exclusion was not based “on objections or opposition to his views,” and “the 
record provides ample support for this finding.”136 AETC’s director testified that Forbes’ 
views had “‘absolutely’ no role” in the decision to exclude him from the debate.137 The 
Court cited the director’s additional testimony that said that voters and news organizations 
did not consider Forbes a serious candidate and that Forbes had little, if any, financial 
support.138 Forbes himself, the Court observed, described his campaign organization as 
“bedlam.”139 Forbes was thus excluded “not because of his viewpoint but because he had 
generated no appreciable public interest,” the Court wrote.140 He was not denied access 
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because his views were disagreeable, unpopular, or out of the mainstream, the Court 
concluded, but because of his “own objective lack of support.”141 Again, the Court seemed 
to focus its analysis in Forbes on searching for an illegitimate governmental purpose.  When 
it found none, the regulation was deemed viewpoint neutral, no matter its effect. 
 Justice Stevens’ dissent in Forbes, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg, critiqued 
the “standardless character of the decision to exclude Forbes from the debate.”142 Justice 
Stevens stressed that he did not endorse the position that all candidates who qualify for a 
position on the ballot are necessarily entitled to access to a state-sponsored debate.143 If a 
station is to exclude a candidate, however, he argued the station must act with “‘narrow, 
objective, and definite standards.’”144 He was quoting the phrase from Shuttlesworth v. City 
of Birmingham,145 one of the many standardless licensing scheme cases discussed in Chapter 
2.  Justice Stevens said the reasons that supported avoiding giving the government unbridled 
discretion in those cases “apply directly to the wholly subjective access decisions made by 
the staff of AETC.”146 No written criteria cabined the discretion of the AETC staff, he noted.  
“Their subjective judgment about a candidate’s ‘viability’ or ‘newsworthiness’ allowed them 
wide latitude either to permit or to exclude a third participant in any debate,” he argued.147 
141 Id. at 683. 
 
142 Id. at 684 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
143 Id. at 694. 
 
144 Id. at 684 (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1969)).  
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 Importantly, Justice Stevens observed that the factors the staff relied on to justify 
excluding Forbes arguably should have favored the opposite decision.  Thus, he said, the fact 
that Forbes “had little financial support was considered as evidence of his lack of viability 
when that factor might have provided an independent reason for allowing him to share a free 
forum with wealthier candidates.”148 As Justice Stevens pointed out, it was particularly 
troubling that AETC excluded the only independent candidate but invited the major-party 
candidates to participate, regardless of their chances of success.149 The station seemed to 
assume the viability of major-party candidates, even those who had raised little money or had 
little chance of winning, yet it subjected Forbes to an ad hoc viability test.  Justice Stevens 
was hinting here at perhaps a more biting criticism of the Court’s decision.  As one scholar 
argued, apparently Justice Kennedy, the author of the opinion in Rosenberger, saw no need 
for more than bi-polar debate in the nonpublic forum context.150 By focusing its analysis on 
trying to sniff out any disagreement the station might have had with Forbes as its motivation 
for excluding him, the Court ignored the exclusion’s practical effect: An unpopular political 
viewpoint by an unpopular candidate was barred from the debate.  It was Justice Kennedy 
himself who would write two years later that “the whole theory of viewpoint neutrality is that 
minority views are treated with the same respect as are majority views.”151 The Court 
appeared to veer from that theory in Forbes. 
 As this section has argued, however, the fact that the Court appeared insensitive to a 
claim of viewpoint discrimination in Forbes is not surprising.  In none of the nonpublic 
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forum cases discussed here did the Court find a regulation viewpoint based.  In stark contrast, 
the Court has employed a much wider conceptualization of viewpoint discrimination in the 
limited public forum cases it has decided, particularly those cases dealing with restrictions on 
religious speech.  Religion can be considered a viewpoint, not just a subject, the Court has 
held, although dissenters have argued that position blurs the distinction between content and 
viewpoint (a distinction the Court had already helped blur when reviewing restrictions on 
private speech and in public forums, as discussed in the preceding chapter).  Arguably the 
most significant difference between the Court’s treatment of cases in the two contexts has 
been its method of analysis.  In cases involving limited public forums, the Court has largely 
been unconcerned with the government’s intent or purpose and instead has focused on the 
function or impact of the regulation.  In nonpublic forum cases, however, the opposite has 
been true: The Court has largely focused its analysis on evaluating – quite deferentially – 
government’s purpose, ignoring any viewpoint discriminatory impact or effect.    
 Content and Viewpoint Neutrality in Government Subsidy Cases 
 When the government itself speaks, it is immune from claims of content and 
viewpoint discrimination.  To function effectively, the government must be able to express 
its own ideas and distinguish among policies and points of view.152 If the government wishes 
to produce an advertising campaign promoting the view that smoking is dangerous and 
unhealthy, for instance, it is not also required to produce ads with a contrary point of view. 
 But when the government subsidizes speech, whether through a tax exemption or 
more direct government funding, the Court has, in general, said that the rules of viewpoint – 
and, in the case of the press, content – neutrality apply.  These have not been easy cases for 
 
152 Marjorie Heins, Viewpoint Discrimination, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 99, 150 (1996). 
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the Court.  The different forms of aid have divided justices, and the Court has not always 
been able to agree what standards to apply.153 In general, the issue of government funding of 
speech is complex.  It has attracted voluminous scholarly literature154 and could merit a 
dissertation in its own right.  This section here, therefore, is only narrowly concerned with 
the way the Court has struggled to apply the principles of content and viewpoint neutrality 
when the government subsidizes speech. 
 In Regan v. Taxation With Representation,155 a unanimous Court upheld a tax code 
provision that denied charitable deductions for contributions to organizations that engaged in 
lobbying.  Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, said that tax exemptions and deductions 
were the equivalent of a subsidy.  Taxation With Representation of Washington (TWR), a 
nonprofit corporation dedicated to promoting the “public interest” in the area of federal 
taxation,156 claimed that Congress’ decision not to subsidize its lobbying violated the First 
Amendment.  The Court responded that although “the government may not deny a benefit to 
a person because he exercises a constitutional right,”157 it can permissibly decide what kinds 
of activities it wants to subsidize.  Relying on Cammarano v. United States,158 discussed in 
Chapter 2, the Court said that “Congress has simply chosen not to pay for TWR’s 
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lobbying.”159 The case would be different, the Court said, “if Congress were to discriminate 
invidiously in its subsidies in such a way as to ‘[aim] at the suppression of dangerous 
ideas.’”160 In distributing subsidies, then, the Court suggested, Congress could not engage in 
viewpoint discrimination.  But it had not done so here, the Court concluded.  TWR attacked 
the provision because, in another section of the tax code, Congress had chosen that it would 
subsidize lobbying by veterans’ organizations.  The Court stressed that veterans’ 
organizations were entitled to receive tax-deductible contributions “regardless of the content 
of any speech they may use, including lobbying,”161 and that the exemption for veterans was 
reasonably related to the government’s interest in “compensating veterans for their past 
contributions.”162 The Court thus concluded it found “no indication that the statute was 
intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration it has had that effect.”163 
One year later in FCC v. League of Women Voters,164 Justice Rehnquist would have 
relied on Regan to uphold a section of the Public Broadcasting Act that forbade any 
noncommercial educational station that received a grant from the Corporation for Public 
Broadcasting to “engage in editorializing.”165 The government cannot “attach any condition 
to its largess,” he conceded,166 but when the government is exercising its power to allocate its 
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own funds, Justice Rehnquist said the Court needed only to find that the condition imposed 
“has a rational relationship to Congress’ purpose” and is not “aimed at the suppression of 
dangerous ideas.”167 Congress’ decision not to fund public broadcasting stations that 
editorialized met those criteria, he concluded.  But Justice Rehnquist’s was a dissenting 
opinion in League of Women Voters. A bare majority of the Court struck down the law, 
reasoning that the law was not a permissible denial of a government subsidy but an 
unconstitutional penalty imposed on grantees.  Though acknowledging that broadcasters 
generally receive less First Amendment protection than their print counterparts, the Court 
stressed that the restriction suppressed the expression of editorial opinion, which “lies at the 
heart of First Amendment protection.”168 Further, the Court said, the ban was “defined solely 
on the basis of the content of the suppressed speech.”169 The regulation was impermissibly 
content based, the Court held, because the content of a message would have to be examined 
in order to determine whether the ban applied.170 Justice Brennan, writing for the Court, said 
the law “singles out noncommercial broadcasters and denies them the right to address their 
chosen audience on matters of public importance.”171 The law presented a “substantial 
abridgement of important journalistic freedoms,”172 which Congress could not justify, the 
Court concluded.  
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 The Court also employed its content-neutrality rule in striking down a sales tax 
scheme that exempted all newspapers but only certain types of magazines in Arkansas 
Writers’ Project v. Ragland.173 Arkansas imposed a tax on receipts from sales of tangible 
personal property but exempted newspapers and “religious, professional, trade, and sports 
journals and/or publications”174 that were printed and published in the state.  Arkansas 
Writers’ Project, the publisher of a general interest monthly magazine, was forced to pay the 
tax because its magazine, the Arkansas Times, could not be classified as fitting into one of 
the specified exemptions.  The publisher sued, and in a 7-2 decision the Court struck down 
the tax.  Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court began by recognizing that Court precedent 
disfavored discriminatory taxes imposed on the press.175 Even without evidence of 
“censorial motive,” he said, “selective taxation of the press . . . poses a particular danger of 
abuse by the State.”176 In operation, the tax scheme, like the one the Court struck down four 
years earlier in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Commissioner of Revenue,177 
singled out a small group within the press.178 But Justice Marshall said the tax at issue in 
Ragland was even more problematic than the tax in Minneapolis Star because “the basis on 
which Arkansas differentiates between magazines is particularly repugnant to First 
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Amendment principles: a magazine’s tax status depends entirely on its content.”179 If 
Arkansas Times were uniformly devoted to religion or sports, the magazine would be exempt 
from the sales tax.  Because it was not, because it dealt with a variety of subjects, the state 
had determined that it could be taxed.  Using the on-the-face approach discussed in Chapter 
3, the Court said that in order to determine whether the sales tax applied the state would have 
to examine the content of the magazine.  “Such official scrutiny of the content of publications 
as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely incompatible with the First Amendment’s guarantee 
of the freedom of the press,” Justice Marshall wrote.180 
Justice Scalia dissented, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist.  As then-Justice 
Rehnquist had argued in League of Women Voters, Justice Scalia thought the tax was a 
permissible non-subsidy and the Court had erred in striking it down as content 
discriminatory.  He explained, “The reason that denial of participation in a tax exemption or 
other subsidy scheme does not necessarily ‘infringe’ a fundamental right is that – unlike 
direct restriction or prohibition – such a denial does not, as a general rule, have any 
significant coercive effect.”181 The denial could be manipulated to have such an effect, he 
acknowledged, and in that situation the Court should provide relief.  “But that is not remotely 
the case here,” he concluded.182 
An Arkansas sales tax was before the Court again in Leathers v. Medlock.183 This 
time a majority of the Court voted to uphold a tax that exempted newspapers and magazines 
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but applied to cable television and satellite services.  In a 7-2 decision, the Court said the tax 
was free of the flaws that proved fatal in Minneapolis Star and Ragland. In those cases, a 
small group of newspapers and magazines had been singled out by a tax.  Justice O’Connor’s 
opinion for the Court said that viewpoint discrimination was the real danger of a tax that 
targets a small group of speakers.  “[T]he fear is censorship of particular ideas or 
viewpoints,” she wrote.  “[A] tax on a small number of speakers runs the risk of affecting 
only a limited range of views.”184 In Leathers, however, the tax applied uniformly to nearly 
100 cable and satellite services.  The Court said there was no risk of viewpoint discrimination 
“from a tax on the services provided by a large number of cable operators offering a wide 
variety of programming throughout the State.”185 The Court also stressed that, unlike the tax 
in Ragland, this sales tax scheme was content neutral.  Looking to the face of the law, the 
Court said, “[N]othing in the language of the statute . . . refers to the content of mass media 
communications.”186 Finally, the Court rejected the argument that the tax was 
unconstitutional because it discriminated among media, taxing electronic media but not print.  
Relying on Regan, Justice O’Connor said that “inherent in the power to tax is the power to 
discriminate in taxation.”187 Differential taxation of speakers, even members of the press, the 
Court concluded, does not violate the First Amendment “unless the tax is directed at, or 
presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas.”188 The Court was persuaded that 
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nothing in the record indicated that Arkansas’ “broad-based, content-neutral sales tax is 
likely to stifle the free exchange of ideas.”189 Thus, the Court found the tax constitutional. 
 In dissent, Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Blackmun, argued that differential 
taxation among like-situated media presented a “risk of covert censorship” that provided 
reason enough for the Court to strike down the tax.190 Further, he said, if the Court’s prior 
precedents stood for anything, “it is that the ‘power to tax’ does not include ‘the power to 
discriminate’ when the press is involved.”191 Regan stood for the proposition that the 
government could selectively subsidize one group of non-media speakers, he argued.  “But 
our cases on the selective taxation of the press strike a different posture.”192 The 
indispensable role the press plays in democracy warranted differential treatment by the 
Court, he concluded. 
 Leathers aside, Justice Marshall was generally correct that the Court has treated 
subsidization of the press differently than subsidization of non-media grantees.  The Court 
has been quick to find the dangers of viewpoint discrimination present when the government 
selectively subsidizes the press.193 The Court has also imported its content-neutrality 
principle from other contexts in reviewing subsidy cases involving the press, striking down 
schemes that require government to evaluate the content of messages to determine if a rule of 
law applies.  Dissenters in League of Women and Ragland put forth the argument, relying on 
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the Court’s decision in Regan, that the government has significant discretion to spend its 
money as it sees fit, even when the press is involved, provided the government is not aiming 
to suppress dangerous ideas.  The Court, however, has approached subsidization of the press 
from a different posture. 
 Two contentious Court cases decided in the 1990s involved subsidization of non-
media federal grantees.  In addition to being divisive outside the Court, the cases 
demonstrated disagreement among justices about the proper relationship between 
government subsidization and viewpoint discrimination.194 In Rust v. Sullivan,195 the Court 
reviewed Department of Health and Human Services regulations that limited the ability of 
fund recipients to engage in abortion-related activities.  A federal law provided federal 
funding for family-planning services but mandated that none of the funds “shall be used in 
programs where abortion is a method of family planning.”196 In 1988, the Secretary of 
Health and Human Services promulgated new regulations that clarified that grantees 
receiving funding (1) could not provide counseling concerning abortion or refer women to 
abortion providers, even upon request and (2) could not engage in activities that encouraged, 
promoted, or advocated abortion as a method of family planning.  Grantees were required to 
refer every pregnant client “for appropriate prenatal and/or social services by furnishing a list 
of available providers that promote the welfare of mother and unborn child.”197 Because the 
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project did not consider “abortion an appropriate method of family planning,” however, 
grantees could not counsel or refer for an abortion.198 
In a 5-4 decision, the Court upheld the regulations, rejecting the grantees’ argument 
that the regulations were viewpoint discriminatory because they prohibited all discussion 
about abortion as a lawful option but compelled clinics and counselors to provide 
information that promoted carrying a pregnancy to term.  Chief Justice Rehnquist’s majority 
opinion said there was “no question” that the regulations were constitutional.199 The 
government was not impermissibly suppressing speech, the Court said, but instead had 
legitimately designed the regulations to prevent program money from being spent for 
purposes outside its scope.  Citing Maher v. Roe,200 in which the Court held that the 
government could “make a value judgment favoring childbirth over abortion and . . . 
implement that judgment by the allocation of public finds,”201 Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote: 
 The Government can, without violating the Constitution, selectively 
 fund a program to encourage certain activities it believes to be in the public 
 interest, without at the same time funding an alternative program which seeks 
 to deal with the problem in another way.  In so doing, the Government has not 
 discriminated on the basis of viewpoint; it has merely chosen to fund one 
 activity to the exclusion of the other.202 
The government was not “suppressing a dangerous idea,” he said (implying that if it 
were, the regulations would be unconstitutional), but was merely prohibiting a project 
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grantee “from engaging in activities outside of the project’s scope.”203 To hold that the 
government discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it chooses to fund a program 
designed to advance certain goals because alternative goals are necessarily discouraged, he 
said, “would render numerous Government programs constitutionally suspect.”204 He offered 
an example: “When Congress established a National Endowment for Democracy to 
encourage other countries to adopt democratic principles, it was not constitutionally required 
to fund a program to encourage competing lines of political philosophy such as communism 
and fascism.”205 The Court said that when the government “appropriates public funds to 
establish a program it is entitled to define the limits of that program.”206 Grantees were free 
to pursue abortion-related activities acting as private individuals, the Court reasoned.  But 
when working as grantees, the government had permissibly restricted the use of its money. 
 In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued the Court had, for the first time, upheld 
“viewpoint-based suppression of speech simply because that suppression was a condition 
upon the acceptance of public funds.”207 Justice Blackmun first argued that the regulations 
constituted content-based discrimination: Grantees could provide counseling and referral 
regarding a wide range of family planning and other topics but not abortion.  More 
damaging, he said, was that the regulations were also “clearly viewpoint based.”208 Grantees 
were required to facilitate access to prenatal care and social services, he reasoned, but barred 
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from doing so for abortion services.  He wrote, “If a client asks directly about abortion, a 
Title X physician or counselor is required to say, in essence, that the project does not 
consider abortion to be an appropriate method of family planning.”209 The regulations 
forbidding advocacy of abortion were “even more explicitly viewpoint based,” he argued.210 
The regulations barred encouraging, promoting, or advocating abortion as a method of family 
planning but said nothing about anti-abortion advocacy, he reasoned.  “By refusing to fund 
those family-planning projects that advocate abortion because they advocate abortion,” he 
wrote, “the Government plainly has targeted a particular viewpoint.”211 And Justice 
Blackmun thought that viewpoint discrimination could not be excused because the 
government funded it.  “Clearly, there are some bases upon which government may not rest 
its decision to fund or not to fund,” he argued.212 Ideological disagreement – which this was, 
he thought – was one of them.  Justice Blackmun was particularly troubled that the 
regulations intruded “upon a wide range of communicative conduct, including the very words 
spoken to a woman by her physician.”213 
In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,214 the justices disagreed over the 
degree of neutrality a government subsidy program demanded.  In 1990, the federal statute 
that created the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) was amended to provide that in 
awarding money the NEA should “take into consideration general standards of decency and 
 
209 Id.  
210 Id. at 210. 
 
211 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
212 Id.  
213 Id. at 211. 
 
214 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
213
respect for the diverse beliefs and values of the American public.”215 Two provocative 
works, which were partially funded by the NEA, prompted public controversy in 1989, 
leading to reevaluation of NEA’s funding priorities and, eventually, to the law’s 
amendment.216 Four artists challenged the law, claiming that on its face the decency and 
respect provision was unconstitutionally viewpoint discriminatory.  In an 8-1 decision, the 
Court rejected their argument. 
 Justice O’Connor’s opinion for the Court stressed that, as she interpreted the law, it 
imposed “no categorical requirement.”217 Rather, the provision simply added 
“considerations” to the grant-making process.218 The law, in other words, did not prevent the 
NEA from funding indecent or disrespectful art, the Court said; instead, it required the NEA 
to take “decency and respect” into consideration when awarding grants.  Further, Justice 
O’Connor looked to the “political context,” or legislative history, of the law to support her 
conclusion that the law did not constitute unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination.219 Other 
proposed amendments on the House floor, she observed, aimed to eliminate the NEA’s 
funding altogether or substantially constrain its grant-making authority.220 She therefore 
characterized the “decency and respect” provision as a “bipartisan” compromise intended to 
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protect speech.221 She wrote, “That [the provision] admonishes the NEA merely to take 
‘decency and respect’ into consideration, and that the legislation was aimed at reforming 
procedures rather than precluding speech, undercut respondents’ argument that the provision 
inevitably will be utilized as a tool for invidious viewpoint discrimination.”222 
The Court acknowledged that the standards were vague and subjective but argued 
such subjectivity was inevitable in arts funding, where the government constantly must make 
content-based choices in awarding competitive grants.223 Justice O’Connor emphasized that 
an as-applied challenge could someday show that denial of a grant was in fact the product of 
viewpoint discrimination.  She repeated that, even in the provision of a subsidy, the 
government could not “aim at the suppression of dangerous ideas.”224 If the NEA funding 
were “manipulated to have a coercive effect” or “certain ideas or viewpoints [were being 
driven] from the marketplace,” the Court said, judicial relief would be appropriate.225 But 
absent that evidence, the Court concluded, “the considerations that the provision introduces   
. . . do not engender the kind of directed viewpoint discrimination that would prompt this 
Court to invalidate a statute on its face.”226 
Justice Scalia concurred in Finley, but in the judgment only.  As he interpreted it, the 
provision “unquestionably constitutes viewpoint discrimination.”227 He agreed with the 
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Court that the law did not impose a categorical requirement but reasoned that the “factors 
need not be conclusive to be discriminatory.”228 The “considerations” cannot be treated 
superficially, he argued.  What they mean, he said, is that, all else being equal, the NEA “will 
favor applications that display decency and respect, and disfavor applications that do not.”229 
As Chapter 2 indicated, disfavoring disagreeable messages is viewpoint discrimination, the 
Court has long said.  Yet Justice Scalia said that, in the subsidy context, viewpoint 
discrimination is permissible because no abridgment of expression exists.  Artists remain free 
to create indecent art, he said, “they are merely deprived of the additional satisfaction of 
having the bourgeoisie taxed to pay for it.  It is preposterous to equate the denial of taxpayer 
subsidy with measures ‘aimed at the suppression of dangerous ideas.’”230 
In his dissent, Justice Souter agreed with Justice Scalia that the provision was 
viewpoint discriminatory, but he disagreed that it should nonetheless be upheld because it 
involved a funding decision by Congress.  Looking to the government’s purpose, Justice 
Souter said one needed to do no more than read the text of the law “to conclude that 
Congress’ purpose in imposing the decency and respect criteria was to prevent the funding of 
art that conveys an offensive message; the decency and respect provision on its face is 
quintessentially viewpoint based.”231 And whereas the majority had looked to the legislative 
history as a reason to uphold the law, Justice Souter, on the other hand, argued “quotations 
from the Congressional Record merely confirm the obvious legislative purpose.”232 
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Responding to Justice Scalia’s argument, Justice Souter said that even when the government 
acts as patron, subsidizing the expression of others, “it may not prefer one lawfully stated 
view over another.”233 Jusice Souter said that Rust v. Sullivan stood for the proposition that 
when the government acts as speaker, it can define the limits of its programs, even 
“dictat[ing] the viewpoint expressed by speakers who are paid to participate in [them].”234 
The NEA, however, was a subsidy scheme “created to encourage expression of a diversity of 
views from private speakers.”235 He therefore would have struck down the provision on its 
face. 
 By the 2001 subsidy case Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,236 the Court had 
embraced the narrow interpretation of Rust that Justice Souter put forth in Finley. In Rust, 
remember, the Court held that regulations prohibiting grantees from engaging in abortion-
related activities were not viewpoint discriminatory but instead were permissible restrictions 
on the scope of a government project.  In Velazquez, however, the Court interpreted Rust’s 
holding to permit viewpoint-based funding in instances in which the government is itself the 
speaker or in which the government uses private speakers to transmit information pertaining 
to its own programs, which the Court said it did in Rust.237 When the government finances 
private speech, however, the Court in Velazquez suggested the government would have much 
less control than Chief Justice Rehnquist articulated in Rust.
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 In Velazquez, in a 5-4 decision the Court struck down a condition imposed by 
Congress on the use of Legal Services Corporation (LSC) funds.  The LSC is a nonprofit 
corporation that distributes funds appropriated by Congress to local legal aid organizations 
for the poor.  The challenged condition prohibited legal representation funded by recipients 
of LSC monies if the representation “involves an effort to amend or otherwise challenge 
existing welfare law.”238 Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion distinguished the Court’s 
holding in Rust. “[T]he LSC program was designed to facilitate private speech, not to 
promote a governmental message,” he wrote.239 The LSC lawyer speaks on behalf of her 
private, indigent client; unlike in Rust, she is not the government’s speaker, the Court held.  
The government argued that the restriction helped the current welfare system function in a 
more efficient and fair manner by removing from the program complex challenges to existing 
welfare laws.240 The Court responded, however, that the effect of the restriction was to 
impermissibly shield existing welfare laws from claims of unconstitutionality.  Justice 
Kennedy wrote: 
 Congress cannot recast a condition on funding as a mere definition of 
 its program in every case, lest the First Amendment be reduced to a simple 
 semantic exercise.  Here, notwithstanding Congress’ purpose to confine and 
 limit its program, the restriction operates to insulate current welfare laws from 
 constitutional scrutiny and certain other legal challenges, a condition 
 implicating central First Amendment concerns.241 
Were the Court to allow the restriction, Justice Kennedy said, it would be permitting 
Congress “to define the scope of the litigation it funds to exclude certain vital theories and 
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ideas.”242 When private speech is involved, the government cannot aim at “the suppression 
of ideas thought inimical to the government’s own interest,” the Court held.243 Because 
Congress had done so here, the Court concluded, the funding restriction was unconstitutional. 
 Justice Scalia’s dissent articulated his by-now familiar argument that the government 
has substantial discretion to choose what it funds.244 “The LSC Act is a federal subsidy 
program, not a federal regulatory program, and there is a basic difference between [the two.]  
Regulations directly restrict speech; subsidies do not,” he wrote.245 Although viewpoint-
neutrality is not even a requirement for Justice Scalia in the subsidy context, he nevertheless 
concluded that the funding restriction was, “since it funds neither challenges to nor defenses 
of existing welfare law.”246 Refusing to accept the majority’s position that the idea of 
welfare reform was being suppressed, he said the provision “simply declines to subsidize a 
certain class of litigation.”247 Justice Scalia actually suggested that the majority’s fondness 
for “reform through the courts” colored its resolution of the case.248 For the dissent, Rust was 
the controlling precedent, and the funding restriction was perfectly constitutional.  The 
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government had simply decided to create a program for routine welfare litigation, not law 
reform litigation.249 
The discussion here demonstrates that the Court has not agreed on a satisfactory way 
to marry the relationship between government subsidization of speech and viewpoint 
discrimination.  In each case, the Court has reiterated that the government cannot “aim at the 
suppression of dangerous ideas.”  Only in Velazquez, however, did a majority of the Court 
strike down a funding restriction on a non-media grantee because the government had failed 
that test.  In Rust and Finley, the Court appeared to grant government wide discretion, 
overlooking what dissenters argued were clear viewpoint discriminatory aspects of the 
restrictions.  Velazquez, of course, was a narrow 5-4 holding, indicating the Court is far from 
a consensus in this area.250 
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 Conclusion 
 In all three speech contexts discussed in this chapter – limited public forums, 
nonpublic forums, and subsidy cases – the Court has said that viewpoint discrimination is 
impermissible.  As this chapter has shown, however, the Court has not employed the same 
conceptualization of the term in each context.  In cases involving limited public forums, the 
Court has embraced a wide conceptualization of viewpoint discrimination.  Focusing closely 
on the effect or function of speech regulations, the Court has said that religion can be 
considered a viewpoint and not a subject because restrictions on religious expression 
eliminate religious perspectives from the debate.  By contrast, in nonpublic forum cases the 
Court has looked deferentially to the government’s purpose in evaluating viewpoint 
neutrality, ignoring any viewpoint discriminatory impact or effect.  Indeed, in none of the 
nonpublic forum cases discussed here did the Court find a regulation viewpoint based.  In 
cases in which government subsidized speech, the Court has similarly had a mixed approach.  
In cases involving the press, the Court has been sensitive to dangers of viewpoint 
discrimination and has employed its content-neutrality rule in striking down schemes that 
require government to evaluate the content of messages.  When government subsidizes the 
speech of non-media grantees, however, the Court has been more deferential.  The Court has 
repeated that, even when it subsidizes speech, the government cannot “aim at the suppression 
of dangerous ideas.”  But, as dissenters have argued, the Court has applied a light version of 
that test to uphold restrictions of non-media grantees.  In the recent subsidy case Legal 
Services Corp. v. Velazquez,251 however, the Court appeared to offer a restricted reading of 
earlier precedent.  In Velazquez, the Court looked, in part, to the discriminatory impact of a 
subsidy restriction to strike it down.  Velazquez was a narrow decision, with a biting dissent 
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accusing the majority of letting is policy preference for “reform through the courts” drive its 
decision.252 The next chapter will explore whether evidence supports charges that the 
Court’s content- and viewpoint-neutrality principles have indeed been susceptible to 
ideological manipulation. 
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Chapter 5  
The Ideological Manipulability of the Content and Viewpoint Concepts 
 
Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated that the definitions of content and viewpoint 
discrimination are murky and that the Court has been guilty of differently stating tests and of 
varying its methods of analysis in determining content and viewpoint neutrality, resulting in 
frequent and sharp disagreements among justices.  A handful of scholars have worried that 
the Court’s ill-defined distinctions might allow for justices to manipulate the content and 
viewpoint concepts to reach decisions that fit their ideological preferences.  Commentator 
Susan Ehrmann, for instance, warned that “content and viewpoint discrimination are fluid 
terms prone to manipulation.”1 Such “ambiguous doctrine allows the Court a large margin of 
error, and the opportunity to inject its views,” she argued.2 Other scholars have expressed 
similar concerns.3 Yet that commentary has largely been dicta in law review articles.  This 
chapter will explore the ideological manipulability of the content and viewpoint concepts 
more fully and systematically. 
 As discussed in Chapter 1, research done by political scientists has suggested that the 
ideological values and policy preferences of justices, in the words of Professors Donald 
 
1 Susan Ehrmann, Note, Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District: Creating Greater 
Protection for Religious Speech Through the Illusion of Public Forum Analysis, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 965, 995 
(1994).   
 
2 Id.  
3 See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that are Both Content-Based and Content-
Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 853-54 (2004); Jamin Raskin & Clark 
LeBlanc, Disfavored Speech About Favored Rights: Hill v. Colorado, the Vanishing Public Forum and the Need 
for an Objective Speech Discrimination Test, 51 AM. U.L. REV. 179, 220-26 (2001). 
223
Songer and Stefanie Lindquist, “have a profound impact on their decisions in many cases.”4
The “attitudinal model” in contemporary political science scholarship described in Chapter 1, 
put forth by Professors Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, in fact posits that justices’ policy 
preferences are essentially a complete explanation of the Court’s decisions.5 Scholars have 
rightly challenged the broad charge of that model.6 But although not every political scientist 
supports the argument that ideology is the only explanation for Court decisions, all do appear 
to agree that ideological preferences have an important influence on a justice’s vote.  This 
chapter borrows that insight and examines whether the content- and viewpoint-neutrality 
principles have been vulnerable to ideological manipulation.  Has the Court’s ill-defined and 
inconsistent approach in determining content and viewpoint discrimination permitted justices 
to manipulate the concepts to reach ideologically driven decisions?   
 To help answer that question, this chapter examines Court decisions in three socially 
divisive areas of law – speech regulations of abortion protesters, regulations of adult theaters 
and businesses, and restrictions on religious expression.  In each area, content and viewpoint 
discrimination have taken center stage in significant cases.  Using a well-regarded source, 
The Supreme Court Compendium,7 that categorizes the ideological voting patterns of justices 
on the Court, the chapter explores whether a justice’s interpretation of the neutrality of a 
speech regulation in these cases falls on expected ideological lines.  Might ideological 
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preferences help explain why majorities and dissents interpret the content- and viewpoint-
neutrality of regulations so differently in these emotionally charged areas?  In looking at each 
case, the chapter will also focus on the conceptualization of the content and viewpoint terms 
and the methods of analysis majorities and dissenters have used.  The analysis begins with 
the three cases in which the Court has reviewed regulations restricting the speech of abortion 
protesters.   
 Speech Regulations of Abortion Protesters 
 It would be no understatement to say that abortion has been one of the, if not the, 
most divisive social issues over the last three decades.  In the controversial 1973 case Roe v. 
Wade,8 the Court extended the constitutional right of privacy “to encompass a woman’s 
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”9 Roe has produced an uproar that, 
thirty-three years later, continues to splinter society and divide the Court.  Abortion foes had 
hoped, even anticipated, that the conservative Rehnquist Court would reverse Roe.10 In spite 
of the fact that at one point four justices on the Rehnquist Court supported Roe’s outright 
reversal, that position was never able to command a majority, and Roe remains good law.  In 
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,11 the 1992 case conservatives 
hoped would finally slay Roe, the Court upheld a number of abortion restrictions, but in an 
unusual co-authored opinion by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, the Court 
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reaffirmed Roe’s “essential holding” that women have a right “to choose to have an abortion 
before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from the State.”12 
Abortion opponents, therefore, have argued that the areas outside of abortion clinics 
represent one of the only places left for those opposed to the practice to have influence.13 
Abortion protesters outside clinics have proven to be strident, persistent, and, in some cases, 
physical.  Consequently, courts have issued injunctions and legislatures have passed statutes 
intended to protect the rights of patients entering clinics.  And those injunctions and statutes 
have reached the Court, resulting in fiery disagreements among justices as to whether they 
should properly be characterized as content neutral, content based, or viewpoint based.   
 The Court has decided three cases in the past twelve years involving restrictions on 
abortion protesters.  In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.14 and Schenck v. Pro-Choice 
Network of Western New York,15 the Court upheld injunctions issued against protesters.  And 
in Hill v. Colorado,16 the Court upheld an allegedly generally applicable law that restricted 
speech outside of health clinics.  As will be discussed in more detail below, an argument can 
be made that most justices on the Court saw these cases as pitting two constitutional rights 
against one another: free speech and the right to privacy that informs the Court’s abortion 
jurisprudence.  If ideological preferences for or against abortion drove justices’ decisions in 
 
12 Id. at 846.  In Casey, four justices – Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Thomas, and White – argued 
that Roe should be abandoned. 
 
13 The anti-abortion fight is far from over in state legislatures, however, as a recently passed South Dakota law 
indicates.  The law, defying Court precedents, makes every abortion that is not necessary to save the life of the 
mother a crime.  Its backers hope the new Roberts Court (John Roberts became Chief Justice in September 2005 
and Samuel Alito joined the Court in January 2006) will have more success in overturning Roe. See Editorial, A
Warning From South Dakota, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2006, at A11.  
 
14 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
 
15 519 U.S. 357 (1997). 
 
16 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
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these cases, the expectation would be that those justices who have been supportive of 
abortion rights would uphold the regulations as content neutral while justices opposed to 
abortion rights would strike them down, instead siding with the speech rights of protesters.  
As Table 5.1 demonstrates, the lineup of justices in the three cases generally follows that 
expectation – though not perfectly.  With few exceptions, the justices’ positions in privacy 
cases appeared to drive their resolution of the cases discussed here.  The opinions in the cases 
will be discussed in detail below.  Table 5.1 shows the lineup of justices and the frequency 
with which they have supported the liberal position in three relevant issue areas. 
 As mentioned, the data presented in the table are taken from The Supreme Court 
Compendium. The figures listed indicate the percentage of cases in which the justice took 
the liberal position in the area during his or her duration on the Court.  The authors of the 
Compendium defined the First Amendment area as “guarantees contained therein.”17 Privacy 
included abortion, contraception, and Freedom of Information Act cases.  A vote was 
counted as liberal if a justice voted “pro-individual against the government” in First 
Amendment and privacy cases.18 The Civil Liberties area combined the votes from criminal 
procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due process, attorneys, and privacy cases.  Pro-
defendant votes in criminal procedure cases and pro-women or pro–minorities votes in civil 
rights cases were considered liberal.    
 
17 EPSTEIN ET AL., supra note 7, at 489. 
 
18 Id.  
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TABLE 5.1 
Votes of Justices in Cases Involving Regulations of Abortion Protesters 
and the Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Those Justices in Relevant Issue Areas 
 
Case: Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. (1994) 
Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Individual Justices 
in Relevant Issue Areas (in percentages) 
First Amendment Civil Liberties Privacy 
Rehnquist (author) 21.3 21.8 16.4 
Blackmun 56.9 52.8 50.9 
Majority  
(Against 1st Am 
Claim) Ginsburg 75 64.6 62.5 
O’Connor 42.9 35.7 40.5 
Souter 76.7 60.8 60 
Stevens 68 64.5 51.7 
Scalia (author) 33.1 28.4 25 Dissent 
(For 1st Am Claim) Kennedy 52.8 36.6 21.4 
Thomas 34.8 25.1 27.8 
Case: Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York (1997) 
Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Justices in Relevant 
Issue Areas (in percentages) 
First Amendment Civil Liberties Privacy 
Rehnquist (author) 21.3 21.8 16.4 
Breyer 60.4 61.2 46.2 
Majority  
(Against 1st Am 
Claim) Ginsburg 75 64.6 62.5 
O’Connor 42.9 35.7 40.5 
Souter 76.7 60.8 60 
Stevens 68 64.5 51.7 
Scalia (author) 33.1 28.4 25 Dissent 
(For 1st Am Claim) Kennedy 52.8 36.6 21.4 
Thomas 34.8 25.1 27.8 
Case: Hill v. Colorado (2000) 
Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Justices in Relevant 
Issue Areas (in percentages) 
First Amendment Civil Liberties Privacy 
Stevens (author) 68 64.5 51.7 
Breyer 60.4 61.2 46.2 
Majority  
(Against 1st Am 
Claim) Ginsburg 75 64.6 62.5 
O’Connor 42.9 35.7 40.5 
Rehnquist 21.3 21.8 16.4 
Souter 76.7 60.8 60 
Scalia (author) 33.1 28.4 25 Dissent 
(For 1st Am Claim) Kennedy (author) 52.8 36.6 21.4 
Thomas 34.8 25.1 27.8 
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Note: The liberal voting record percentages are taken from The Supreme Court Compendium. The figures listed 
indicate the percentage of cases in which the justice took the liberal position in the area during his or her 
duration on the Court.  The authors of the Compendium defined the First Amendment area as “guarantees 
contained therein.”  Privacy included abortion, contraception, and Freedom of Information Act cases.  A vote 
was counted as liberal if a justice voted “pro-individual against the government” in First Amendment and 
privacy cases.  The Civil Liberties area combined the votes from criminal procedure, civil rights, First 
Amendment, due process, attorneys, and privacy cases.  Pro-defendant votes in criminal procedure cases and 
pro-women or pro–minorities votes in civil rights cases were considered liberal.  
 
The table can be interpreted in the following way: In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., a six-justice 
majority, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Blackmun, Ginsburg, O’Connor, Souter, and Stevens, voted 
against the abortion protesters’ First Amendment claim.  Chief Justice Rehnquist authored the majority opinion.  
Three justices, Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, dissented in the case and voted to support the First 
Amendment claim of the protesters.  Justice Scalia authored the dissenting opinion.  The figures indicate the 
percentage of cases in which the justice took the liberal position in the respective issue area.  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, for instance, voted liberally – that is, he supported the individual against the government in First 
Amendment cases – 21.3 percent of the time during his duration on the Court.  In privacy cases, he took the 
liberal position 16.4 percent of the time.  An evaluation of the justices’ aggregate ideological voting behavior in 
the issue areas is instructive.  Notice that of the six justices in the majority in the abortion cases, four voted the 
most liberally in privacy and civil liberties cases.  Those four justices also voted more liberally than the 
dissenters in First Amendment cases.  Yet in these three cases it was the more conservative dissenters 
supporting the First Amendment rights of abortion protesters, voting to strike down the regulations.   
 
In each case, the table shows, three of the justices who have voted the most 
conservatively in privacy and civil liberties cases voted to strike down the regulations on 
abortion protesters.  Conversely, of the six justices in the majority, four of them have voted 
the most liberally in privacy and civil liberties cases and have been the most supportive of 
abortion rights.  Notice that those justices – Justices Blackmun, Ginsburg, Souter, and 
Stevens in Madsen and Justice Breyer (who replaced Justice Blackmun on the Court in 1994) 
in Schenck and Hill – have also voted more liberally than the dissenters in First Amendment 
cases.  Yet in these three cases it was the more conservative dissenters supporting the First 
Amendment rights of abortion protesters, voting to strike down the regulations as content and 
viewpoint based. 
 Justice O’Connor voted with the majority in each case.  She was a frequent swing 
voter in abortion cases during her time on the Court, having supported the liberal position in 
privacy cases slightly more than forty percent of the time.  Unlike the other majority justices 
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just discussed, however, Justice O’Connor did not vote decidedly more liberally than the 
dissenters in the other areas as well.  In fact, she voted more conservatively in First 
Amendment and civil liberties cases than did Justice Kennedy.  Justice O’Connor thus resists 
easy categorization here, as she so frequently did during her duration on the Court.19 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, of course, stands out as a glaring exception.  During his time 
on the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist was one of the Court’s most conservative members, as 
evidenced by the low percentage of liberal votes cast in all three areas.  He was a strong critic 
of Roe, and he articulated his desire to overturn that decision.  Unsurprisingly, then, he also 
wrote and joined opinions upholding restrictions on abortion and dissented in cases in which 
the Court did not.20 Indeed, had he joined the dissenters in these three cases the lineup would 
have been a familiar one to observers of the Court’s abortion decisions.  In Stenberg v. 
Carhart,21 for instance, decided the same year as Hill, a 5-4 majority struck down a state ban 
on partial birth abortions.  Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas 
dissented, with Justice Scalia’s dissent bitingly indicating he thought the decision would 
someday take its “rightful place in the history of this Court's jurisprudence” alongside the 
reviled Dred Scott decision.22 Justice O’Connor, as was so often the case, was the critical 
swing vote in Stenberg and would have been in the three speech cases discussed here as well 
 
19 See, e.g., TINSLEY YARBROUGH, THE REHNQUIST COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 267 (2000) (arguing that 
Justice O’Connor proved to be much less predictable than her appointing president “no doubt would have 
preferred”). 
 
20 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Webster v. Reprod. Health Serv., 492 U.S. 490 (1989); Stenberg 
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  
 
21 530 U.S. 914 (2000). 
 
22 Id. at 953 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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had Chief Justice Rehnquist aligned with his ideological brethren.23 He did not, however, 
perhaps throwing a dart at the argument that ideological preferences alone explained the 
justices’ resolution of these cases.  Yet it is important to point out that, although upholding 
restrictions on abortion protesters did not line up with his vehement opposition to 
constitutionally protected abortion rights, his support of the regulations did align with his 
generally conservative approach to the First Amendment.  Upholding regulations of abortion 
protesters is an anti-liberal decision as The Supreme Court Compendium defined the term 
because the decision sides with the government and not individuals.  As the table shows, 
Chief Justice Rehnquist voted the most conservatively of any justice on the Court in the First 
Amendment area during the time these cases were decided.  In that sense at least, he stayed 
true to his ideological form, while the Court’s otherwise more liberal voters in the First 
Amendment area who joined him changed course and sided with the government. 
 We turn now to examine the facts and holdings of the three cases.  In each of the 
cases, the majority held that the regulations of abortion protesters were content neutral.  The 
dissent, on the other hand, countered that the regulations were unconstitutionally content or 
viewpoint based.  In the first case, Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc.,24 the Court ruled 
that an injunction issued by a Florida state court that prohibited abortion protesters from 
demonstrating in certain places and in various ways outside of an abortion clinic was content 
neutral.  The state court had originally enjoined a group of abortion protesters from blocking 
access to the clinic and from physically assaulting clinic patients.  The court felt that 
injunction proved ineffective, so it issued an amended injunction that, among other things, 
 
23 Although Justice Kennedy co-authored the decision in Casey that reaffirmed Roe’s “essential holding,” as the 
table demonstrates he has otherwise generally voted conservatively in privacy cases. 
 
24 512 U.S. 753 (1994). 
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created a thirty-six-foot buffer zone around the clinic entrance and driveway and to the north 
and west of the clinic property.25 The injunction applied to the petitioners and to those acting 
“in concert” with them.26 
In front of the Supreme Court, the petitioners argued that the injunction was 
necessarily content and viewpoint based because it only restricted the speech of abortion 
protesters.  The Court, however, flatly rejected that argument.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote: 
 To accept petitioners’ claim would be to classify virtually every 
 injunction as content or viewpoint based.  An injunction, by its very nature, 
 applies only to a particular group (or individuals) and regulates the activities, 
 and perhaps the speech, of that group.  It does so, however, because of the 
 group’s past actions in the context of a specific dispute between real parties.27 
The Court said there was an easy explanation why the injunction did not also prohibit the 
activities of pro-choice individuals: “the lack of any similar demonstrations by those in favor 
of abortion.”28 There was no suggestion, the Court ruled, that Florida law would not equally 
restrain speech “directed at a target having nothing to do with abortion; none of the 
restrictions imposed by the court were directed at the contents of petitioners’ message.”29 
Citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism,30 a case discussed in Chapter 3, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist said the principal inquiry in determining content neutrality is whether the 
 
25 In addition, the injunction limited noise within earshot of and images observable by patients inside the clinic; 
created a 300-foot zone around the clinic that prevented approaching a person entering or leaving the clinic 
without permission; and prohibited picketing, demonstrating, and using sound amplification equipment within 
300 feet of the residences of clinic staff.  Id. at 759-61.  
 
26 Id. at 761 n.1. 
 
27 Id. at 762. 
 
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 763. 
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government has adopted a regulation “without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech.”31 For the majority, then, the threshold consideration in the case was the 
government’s purpose.32 Here, the Court ruled the injunction imposed “incidental” 
restrictions on the protesters’ anti-abortion message “because [the named protesters] 
repeatedly violated the court’s original order.”33 The majority thus seemed to draw on a 
speech/conduct distinction to find the injunction content neutral.34 The injunction was not 
imposed because of disagreement with the protesters’ speech, the Court determined, but 
because of their prior unlawful conduct.  Thus, the majority said the injunction was properly 
characterized as content neutral, and the restrictions, in part, were upheld as constitutional.35 
Justice Scalia authored a fiery dissent.  He would have agreed with the assertion that 
ideology could help explain the case’s outcome – at least as pertained to the majority.  He 
accused the majority of letting their preference for abortion and their disfavor of abortion 
protesters color the case.  In any other context, he argued, “the entire injunction . . . would 
have been regarded as a candidate for summary reversal.”36 But the context here was 
 
30 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
 
31 512 U.S. at 763 (internal quotations omitted). 
32 Id.  
33 Id.  
34 See Clay Calvert, Free Speech and Content-Neutrality: Inconsistent Applications of an Increasingly 
Malleable Doctrine, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 69, 96 (1997).  
 
35 The Court said that there were “obvious differences” between an injunction and a generally applicable 
ordinance, and the traditional test of intermediate scrutiny therefore was not “sufficiently rigorous.”  512 U.S. at 
764-65.  Because injunctions carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application, the Court said the 
standard when evaluating a content-neutral injunction should be whether the injunction “burden[s] no more 
speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.”  Id. at 765.  Chief Justice Rehnquist said that 
test was more rigorous than intermediate scrutiny but less demanding than strict scrutiny.  (Justice Scalia in 
dissent mocked the new test and suggested the Court call it “intermediate-intermediate scrutiny.”)  Using the 
new standard, the Court upheld the limited noise restrictions and the 36-foot buffer zone around the clinic 
entrance and driveway but struck down the remaining provisions of the injunction. 
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abortion, he said, where the Court had frequently put to work an “ad hoc nullification 
machine” to push aside whatever constitutional doctrines interfered with the practice of 
abortion.37 Justice Scalia made no attempt to reconcile that argument with the fact that in 
Madsen it was Chief Justice Rehnquist, long an abortion rights opponent, authoring the 
majority opinion.38 
Justice Scalia’s dissent attacked the Court’s conclusion that the injunction was 
content neutral and thus not subject to strict scrutiny.  “[A] restriction upon speech imposed 
by injunction (whether nominally content based or nominally content neutral) is at least as 
deserving of strict scrutiny as a statutory, content-based restriction,” he argued.39 Echoing 
debates on the Court highlighted in Chapters 3 and 4, Justice Scalia said the Court was wrong 
to focus its determination of content neutrality exclusively on whether a regulation was 
motivated by an illegitimate purpose.  The vice of content-based legislation, he said, “is not 
that it is always used for invidious, thought-control purposes, but that it lends itself to use for 
those purposes.”40 The effect or operation of a law, in other words, could render it content 
based, even absent an invidious purpose, he suggested.  Because an injunction invariably can 
target one side of an ideological dispute – because, like a content-based law, it can lend itself 
to “thought-control purposes” – Justice Scalia reasoned that any speech-restricting injunction 
warranted strict scrutiny. 
 
36 Id. at 785 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).   
 
37 Id.  
38 Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion did not address Justice Scalia’s accusation that a preference for abortion 
colored the majority’s decision. 
 
39 Id. at 792 (emphasis in original). 
 
40 Id. at 794 (emphasis in original). 
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 He argued that such a rigorous standard was especially necessary in this case, in 
which the injunction, he said, “was content based (indeed, viewpoint based) to boot.”41 He 
rejected the speech/conduct distinction that Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to draw in the 
majority opinion, and he cast doubt on the purported neutral purpose that the Court found so 
satisfying.  If it were true, he said, that the injunction was directed at those who violated the 
earlier injunction and not at those who merely spoke certain things (anti-abortion 
sentiments), “then the injunction’s residual coverage of ‘all persons acting in concert or 
participation with [the named individuals and organizations], or on their behalf,’ would not 
include those who merely entertained the same beliefs and wished to express the same views 
as the named defendants.”42 Yet, looking closely at the transcripts of an in-court hearing 
before the judge who issued the injunction, Justice Scalia determined that was precisely what 
was happening.  “All those who wish to express the same views as the named defendants are 
deemed to be ‘acting in concert or participation,’” he argued.43 To buttress his point, in the 
text of his dissent he quoted several exchanges between the trial judge and people who had 
been arrested for walking within the buffer zone but had not been named in the amended 
injunction, and he appended several more pages of the transcripts to his opinion.44 In one of 
the exchanges, a defendant asked the trial judge, “When you issued the Injunction did you 
determine that it would only apply to – that it would apply only to people that were 
demonstrating that were pro-life?”45 “In effect, yes,” the judge responded, leading Justice 
 
41 Id. at 795. 
 
42 Id. 
43 Id.  
44 Id. at 815-20. 
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Scalia to conclude that there was “no doubt that the revised injunction here is tailored to 
restrain persons distinguished, not by proscribable conduct, but by proscribable views.”46 
The majority largely ignored Justice Scalia’s argument and the statements from the in-court 
hearing.  For Justice Scalia, however, those statements were smoking-gun evidence that in 
operation the injunction was unconstitutionally viewpoint based.47 
The Court reviewed another injunction-imposed buffer zone three years later in 
Schenck.  Relying on Madsen, again a 6-3 Court ruled the injunction was content neutral.  In 
its decision, the Court upheld the provisions of a fixed fifteen-foot buffer zone around a 
clinic’s doorways, driveways, and parking lot entrances but struck down a fifteen-foot 
“floating” buffer zone around any person or vehicle entering or leaving the clinic.48 The 
injunction included a provision that permitted two protesters inside the fixed buffer zone to 
have non-threatening conversations with individuals entering or leaving the clinic provided 
the protesters would “cease and desist” if a person with whom they wished to speak indicated 
a desire to end the conversation.49 The protesters argued the provision was content based 
because it allowed a clinic patient to terminate a protester’s speech because the patient 
disagreed with the message.  The Court, however, again drew on the speech/conduct 
distinction it had articulated in Madsen to reject their argument.  Chief Justice Rehnquist 
wrote, “These [protesters] remain free to espouse their message outside the fifteen-foot 
 
45 Id. at 796. 
 
46 Id. at 796-97 (emphasis in original). 
47 Justice Scalia argued that even under the Court’s articulated standard for content-neutral injunctions, the 
injunction should have been declared unconstitutional because there was insufficient evidence to prove that the 
original injunction had ever been violated.  Id. at 803-09.  
 
48 The Court said the floating buffer zone would have been difficult to enforce and, because the sidewalk 
outside the clinic was only seventeen-feet wide, protesters would likely have been pushed out into the street. 
 
49 519 U.S. at 384. 
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buffer zone, and the condition on their freedom to espouse it within the buffer zone is the 
result of their own previous harassment and intimidation of patients.”50 Their prior conduct 
justified any restriction on speech, the Court reasoned. 
 Justice Scalia dissented, again joined by Justices Kennedy and Thomas, all three of 
whom have voted conservatively in privacy cases.  Justice Scalia did not argue, as he had in 
Madsen, that the injunction was viewpoint based.  Instead, he chided the majority for, as he 
saw it, exceeding its authority by elevating interests not put before it to justify the injunction.  
Justice Scalia, for instance, said it was patently obvious that the “cease and desist” provision 
was issued to protect patients from unwanted conversations, “to protect the right of the 
people approaching and entering the facilities to be left alone.”51 The majority had 
questioned whether that interest was valid52 but nevertheless upheld the injunction.  Justice 
Scalia responded, “Instead of evaluating the injunction before us on the basis of the reasons 
for which it was issued, the Court today postulates other reasons that might have justified it 
and pronounces those never-determined reasons adequate.”53 He said the majority’s opinion 
was “alarming”54 and that the injunction should have been declared unconstitutional. 
 In the final case involving regulations of abortion protesters, Hill v. Colorado,55 the 
Court divided over the content and viewpoint neutrality of a law that prohibited anyone 
within 100 feet of a heath care facility from knowingly approaching within eight feet of 
 
50 Id. at 385. 
 
51 Id. at 383. 
 
52 “We doubt that the District Court’s reason for including that provision accurately reflects our First 
Amendment jurisprudence in this area.”  Id.  
 
53 Id. at 385 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 
54 Id. at 391. 
 
55 530 U.S. 703 (2000). 
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another person, without that person’s consent, in order to pass out leaflets or handbills or 
engage in “oral protest, education, or counseling.”56 Hill was already discussed at length in 
Chapter 1.  The more narrow focus here will be on the differing methods of analysis the 
majority and dissenters used to reach their respective conclusions.  Justice Stevens, writing 
for the same six-justice majority that had upheld the injunction in Schenck, was satisfied that 
the law was content neutral essentially for two reasons.  First, on its face the law did not 
make any explicit textual distinctions between any subjects or viewpoints, the Court ruled.  
As the majority interpreted the law, it applied “equally to used car salesmen, animal rights 
activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, and missionaries.”57 Under the law, the Court held, 
no one was allowed to educate, protest, or counsel within eight feet of another person, 
without permission, on any subject with any viewpoint outside of a health clinic.58 Second, 
the Court held that the law was not motivated by an illegitimate purpose.  Justice Stevens 
said the law passed Ward’s test that demanded that government not adopt a regulation of 
speech “because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”59 The Court’s discussion of 
the government’s purpose, however, seemed rather brisk and deferential.  The majority did 
not conduct its own independent examination of the Colorado legislature’s intent but instead 
in two sentences found that the “Colorado courts’ interpretation of legislative history” and 
 
56 Id. at 708. 
 
57 Id. at 723. 
 
58 By comparison, the Court has generally treated restrictions on activities such as picketing and soliciting to be 
content neutral, reasoning that the restrictions do not turn on the viewpoint or subject matter of speech.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983); Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); United States v. 
Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); Heffron v. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).  
The majority appeared to take that approach in Hill. Although acknowledging that what it saw as a facially 
content-neutral law might sometimes require a court to “review the content of the statements made by a person” 
to determine if they constituted oral protest, education, or counseling, the majority concluded the “kind of 
cursory examination that might be required” did not render the law content based.  530 U.S. at 721-22.  
 
59 Id. at 719 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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the state Supreme Court’s holding that the law applied “equally to all demonstrators” 
sufficed to demonstrate a neutral purpose.60 Further, the Court said that Colorado’s interests 
in protecting privacy and access to health clinics, which the state said the law did, were 
“unrelated to the content of the demonstrators’ speech.”61 
The same trio dissented in Hill, although this time Justice Kennedy authored a 
separate dissent.  He disagreed with the majority that the law was content neutral on its face.  
Moreover, looking both to the law’s purpose and effect, Justice Kennedy argued the law was 
unconstitutionally viewpoint based.  Whereas the majority had deferentially evaluated the 
government’s purpose in finding the law content neutral, Justice Kennedy said the “true 
purpose” of the law was obvious.  “The legislature’s purpose to restrict unpopular speech 
should be beyond dispute,” he argued.62 The law’s preamble removed any doubt, he said.  
The preamble stated “that the exercise of a person’s right to protest or counsel against certain 
medical procedures must be balanced against another person’s right to obtain medical 
counseling and treatment in an unobstructed manner.”63 Justice Kennedy said the word 
“against” revealed the legislature’s desire “to restrict discourse on one side of the issue 
regarding ‘certain medical procedures.’”64 Further, he noted, the testimony to the Colorado 
legislature “consisted, almost in its entirety, of debates and controversies with respect to 
abortion.”65 As commentators Jamin Raskin and Clark LeBlanc pointed out, pro-choice 
 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 720. 
 
62 Id. at 768 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 
63 Id. (emphasis added). 
 
64 Id. at 768-69. 
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advocates do not protest against medical procedures.66 Justice Kennedy thus concluded there 
was no question that the law was intended to restrict the speech of abortion protesters. 
 Both Justice Kennedy’s and Justice Scalia’s dissents also faulted the majority for 
ignoring what they said were the law’s obvious effects.  Satisfied that the law on its face 
applied “equally to used car salesmen, animal rights activists, fundraisers, environmentalists, 
and missionaries,”67 the majority opinion paid little attention to the law’s practical operation.  
Justice Kennedy, however, said that under a reasonable interpretation of the law a speaker 
chanting in praise of the Court and its abortion decisions outside a health clinic would not be 
protesting, educating, or counseling and therefore would be free from the law’s demands.  “If 
the opposite message is communicated, however, a prosecution to punish protest is 
warranted,” he argued.68 Justice Scalia, in a dissent joined by Justice Thomas, similarly 
focused on the law’s disproportionate effects.  He repeated his line from Madsen that the vice 
of content-based legislation is that it “lends itself to use” for invidious, thought-control 
purposes, regardless of the law’s motivation.  He argued: “A restriction that operates only on 
speech that communicates a message of protest, education, or counseling presents exactly 
this risk.  When applied, as it is here, at the entrance to medical facilities, it is a means of 
impeding speech against abortion.”69 It thus “blinks reality,” Justice Scalia concluded, to 
interpret the law as content neutral.70 
65 Id.  
66 Raskin & LeBlanc, supra note 3, at 213. 
 
67 530 U.S. at 723. 
 
68 Id. at 769 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  As discussed in Chapter 3, the majority responded that the law would 
also apply to the Court-praising speaker. 
 
69 Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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 As they had in Madsen, the dissenters again accused the majority of letting their 
preference for abortion dictate the holding.  Justice Scalia said the “ad hoc nullification 
machine” was again at work.71 “Having deprived abortion opponents of the political right to 
persuade the electorate that abortion should be restricted by law,” he argued, “the Court 
today continues and expands its assault upon their individual right to persuade women 
contemplating abortion that what they are doing is wrong.”72 For his part, Justice Kennedy 
thought the majority’s opinion “strikes at the heart of the reasoned, careful balance I had 
believed was the basis for the joint opinion in Casey.”73 That opinion, he claimed, 
recognized that a woman’s decision whether to have an abortion was a “moral one.”74 But 
here in Hill, he argued, the majority “in effect tells us the moral debate is not so important 
after all and can be conducted just as well through a bullhorn from an 8-foot distance as it 
can through a peaceful, face-to-face exchange of a leaflet.”75 The Court was “so committed  
 
70 Id. at 748.  Justice Scalia also said the law was content based on its face even though facially it did not 
distinguish between subjects or viewpoints.  “Whether a speaker must obtain permission before approaching 
within eight feet –  and whether he will be sent to prison for failing to do so – depends entirely on what he 
intends to say when he gets there,” he argued.  Id. at 742.  By analogy, Justice Scalia hypothesized that a law 
restricting the writing or recitation of poetry would be content based even though such a law would not restrict 
any viewpoint or particular subject matter.  Though he did not cite it, the Court’s decision in Erznoznik v. City 
of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), would seem to support him on that point.  As discussed in Chapter 3, in 
Erznoznik, the Court held that an ordinance that prohibited a drive-in movie theater from showing films 
containing nudity when its screen was visible from a public street or place was unconstitutional because the law 
discriminated on the basis of content.  Because the application of the regulation hinged on the content of the 
movie (that is, whether the movie displayed nudity), the Court concluded the law was content based.     
 
71 Id. at 741. 
 
72 Id. at 741-42. 
 
73 Id. at 791 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 
74 Id.  
75 Id.  
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. . . to its course,” he concluded, that it was willing to “tear away from the protesters the 
guarantees of the First Amendment when they most need it.”76 
The majority again did not respond to those accusations.  As they saw it, the law was 
neutral and applied equally to any and all protesters on any subject.  What is perhaps most 
interesting about these cases is that the justices so often appeared to be talking past one 
another.  In Hill, the majority deferred to state court opinions in finding that the law’s 
purpose was neutral.  Justice Kennedy, however, independently scrutinized the legislative 
history closely and drew attention to the law’s preamble – which the majority ignored – that 
he said indicated the law’s “true purpose.”  Similarly, the majority paid little attention to the 
effect of the law in Hill. The dissenters, on the other hand, argued that the law’s effect was 
revealing and should have been dispositive.  In his Madsen dissent, Justice Scalia focused his 
analysis on transcripts from an in-court hearing that he claimed were evidence of the 
injunction’s viewpoint-based operation.  The majority ignored the transcripts and instead 
agreed with the state that the injunction had a legitimate purpose: It was a proper response to 
prior unlawful conduct.  Because, as Chapters 3 and 4 demonstrated, the Court has no clearly 
prescribed or agreed-upon way to determine content and viewpoint neutrality, the Court 
leaves itself vulnerable to charges in cases like these that justices are able to pick, choose, 
and ignore evidence to justify decisions that fit their ideological preferences.  
 Regulations of Adult Theaters and Businesses  
 As discussed in Chapter 3, in a line of cases involving sexual expression the Court 
has employed what one commentator has called “the puzzling doctrine of secondary effects” 
 
76 Id. at 792. 
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to uphold laws that are facially content based.77 In these cases, the Court has relied on the 
definition of content-neutral regulations as being “justified without reference to the content 
of the regulated speech”78 to look beyond the content-based face of a regulation.  Because 
these laws are aimed at the “secondary effects” of adult theaters and business and not at the 
content of speech itself, the Court has said, the laws are properly reviewed under 
intermediate scrutiny.  Since its birth in the Court’s jurisprudence, the secondary effects 
doctrine has badly divided justices on the Court.  If ideology is driving justices’ 
determinations of neutrality in these cases, an expectation would be that more conservative 
justices would be sympathetic to government’s attempts to curb sexual expression and, 
therefore, would be supportive of the doctrine, while more liberal justices would be less 
deferential to government and wary of labeling these regulations content neutral.  Table 5.2 
shows the lineup of justices and the frequency with which they have supported the liberal 
position in two relevant issue areas.  The majority and plurality opinions in each case upheld 
the regulations.  
 
77 Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Speech, Death and Double Effect, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1135, 1148 (2003). 
 
78 City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)).  
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TABLE 5.2 
Votes of Justices in Cases Involving Regulations of Adult Theaters and Businesses  
and the Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Those Justices in Relevant Issue Areas 
 
Case: Young v. American Mini Theatres (1976) 
Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Justices 
in Relevant Issue Areas (in percentages) 
First Amendment Civil Liberties 
Stevens (author) 68 64.5 Plurality  
(Against 1st Am Claim) Burger 31.9 29.6 
Rehnquist 21.3 21.8 
White 38.3 42.4 
Powell 47.8 37.4Concurring 
(Against 1st Am Claim) 
Stewart (author) 63.9 51.4 Dissent 
(For 1st Am Claim) Blackmun (author) 56.9 52.8 
Brennan 83.3 79.5 
Marshall 82.9 81.4 
Case: City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc. (1986) 
Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Justices 
in Relevant Issue Areas (in percentages) 
First Amendment Civil Liberties 
Rehnquist (author) 21.3 21.8 Majority  
(Against 1st Am Claim) Burger 31.9 29.6 
O’Connor 42.9 35.7 
Powell 47.8 37.4 
Stevens 68 64.5 
White 38.3 42.4 
Blackmun 56.9 52.8Concurring 
(Against 1st Am Claim) 
Brennan (author) 83.3 79.5 Dissent 
(For 1st Am Claim) Marshall 82.9 81.4 
Case: City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M. (2000) 
Aggregate Liberal Voting Records  of Justices 
in Relevant Issue Areas (in percentages) 
First Amendment Civil Liberties 
O’Connor (author) 42.9 35.7 Plurality  
(Against 1st Am Claim) Breyer 60.4 61.2 
Kennedy 52.8 36.6 
Rehnquist 21.3 21.8 
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 First Amendment Civil Liberties 
Scalia (author) 33.1 28.4 Concurring 
(Against 1st Am Claim) Thomas 34.8 25.1 
Souter 76.7 60.8Concurring & 
Dissenting 
(Against & For 1st Am 
Claim) 
Stevens (author) 68 64.5 Dissent 
(For 1st Am Claim) Ginsburg 75 64.6 
Case: City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc. (2002) 
Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Justices 
in Relevant Issue Areas (in percentages) 
First Amendment Civil Liberties 
O’Connor (author) 42.9 35.7 Plurality  
(Against 1st Am Claim) Rehnquist  21.3 21.8 
Scalia  33.1 28.4 
Thomas  34.8 25.1 
Kennedy 52.8 36.6Concurring 
(Against 1st Am Claim) 
Souter (author) 76.7 60.8 Dissent 
(For 1st Am Claim) Breyer  60.4 61.2 
Ginsburg 75 64.6 
Stevens 68 64.5 
Note: The liberal voting record percentages are taken from The Supreme Court Compendium. The figures listed 
indicate the percentage of cases in which the justice took the liberal position in the area during his or her 
duration on the Court.  The authors of the Compendium defined the First Amendment area as “guarantees 
contained therein.”  A vote was counted as liberal if a justice voted “pro-individual against the government” in a 
First Amendment case.  The Civil Liberties area combined the votes from criminal procedure, civil rights, First 
Amendment, due process, attorneys, and privacy cases.  A vote was counted as liberal if a justice voted “pro-
individual against the government” in a privacy case.  Pro-defendant votes in criminal procedure cases and pro-
women or pro–minorities votes in civil rights cases were considered liberal.  
 
The table can be interpreted in the following way: In Young v. American Mini Theatres, a four-justice plurality, 
Justices Stevens, Rehnquist, White, and Chief Justice Burger, voted against the adult theater owner’s First 
Amendment claim.  Justice Stevens authored the plurality opinion.  Justice Powell authored a separate 
concurring opinion in which he also voted against the theater owner’s First Amendment claim.  Four justices, 
Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall, dissented in the case and voted to support the First 
Amendment claim of the adult theater owner.  Justices Stewart and Blackmun authored dissenting opinions.  
The figures indicate the percentage of cases in which the justice took the liberal position in the respective issue 
area.  Justice Stevens, for instance, has voted liberally – that is, he has supported the individual against the 
government in First Amendment cases – 68 percent of the time during his duration on the Court.  In civil 
liberties cases, he has taken the liberal position 64.5 percent of the time.      
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 As Table 5.2 demonstrates, almost without exception the lineup of justices in the four 
secondary effects cases the Court has decided have supported the expectation.  Justices who 
voted the most conservatively in First Amendment and civil liberties cases supported labeling 
the regulations content neutral.  The Court’s more liberal justices in the two issue areas, on 
the other hand, have consistently dissented and cast doubt on the secondary effects doctrine.  
Almost, however, is a crucial qualifier in this paragraph’s opening sentence.  Notice that 
Justice Stevens, one of the more liberal voters in First Amendment and civil liberties cases, 
authored the plurality opinion in Young v. American Mini Theatres79 and joined the majority 
opinion in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.80 Justice Stevens’ votes in these four 
cases illustrates how a justice’s position can evolve.81 As will be discussed, in American 
Mini Theatres a plurality of the Court ruled that sexual expression was less deserving of First 
Amendment protection than political or other social speech, and the plurality was thus 
deferential to the city’s efforts to zone adult theaters.  In the two most recent cases in this 
area, however, City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.82 and City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.,83 
Justice Stevens joined the dissenters and wished to more closely scrutinize a government’s 
purpose.  Notice also that Justice Breyer, who has voted in the liberal direction in First 
Amendment and civil liberties cases more than sixty percent of the time, joined the plurality 
 
79 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
 
80 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 
81 Justice Stevens’ evolution in the secondary effects cases has a parallel in Justice Brennan’s changing 
approach to obscenity cases during his time on the Court.  Justice Brennan, regarded as one of the great 
champions of the First Amendment, authored the majority opinion in the 1957 case Roth v. United States, 354 
U.S. 476 (1957), in which the Court ruled that obscene material did not receive First Amendment protection.  
Sixteen years later in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973), however, Justice Brennan changed 
course and argued that all definitions of obscenity were too vague to be considered constitutional. 
 
82 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
 
83 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
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opinion in Pap’s A.M. By the 2002 Alameda Books, Inc. case, however, the split on the 
Court perfectly mirrored the ideological voting behavior of the justices: The five justices who 
have voted the most conservatively upheld the regulation, with the moderate conservative 
Justice Kennedy providing the crucial swing vote, while the Court’s four most liberal 
members dissented. 
 The secondary effects language and rationale first appeared in Young v. American 
Mini Theatres,84 though it received only plurality support.  A Detroit ordinance prevented 
adult theaters85 from being located within 1,000 feet of any two other “regulated uses”86 or 
within 500 feet of a residential area.  Five members of the Court voted to uphold the law but 
they could not agree on a single rationale.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Powell argued the 
case involved innovative land-use regulation and only slightly and incidentally impinged on 
the First Amendment.  A plurality of the Court, however, recognized that the ordinance 
singled out theaters because of the content of the films they showed.  Justice Stevens’ 
plurality opinion argued, as he so frequently has, that Mosley’s broad condemnation of 
content discrimination was overstated and that the Court does in fact allow a great deal of 
content regulation.87 The case here, he said, presented an instance in which content 
regulation was permissible because sexually explicit films were less worthy of First 
Amendment protection.  He wrote: 
 
84 427 U.S. 50 (1976). 
 
85 “If the theater is used to present ‘material distinguished or characterized by an emphasis on matter depicting, 
describing or relating to ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ or ‘Specified Anatomical Areas,’ it is an adult 
establishment.”  Id. at 53. 
 
86 Other regulated uses included adult bookstores, cabarets, hotels or motels, pawnshops, pool or billiard halls, 
public lodging houses, and shoeshine parlors.  See id. at 52 n.3. 
 
87 “The question whether speech is, or is not, protected by the First Amendment often depends on the content of 
the speech.”  Id. at 66. 
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 [I]t is manifest that society’s interest in protecting this type of 
 expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than [an] interest in 
 untrammeled political debate . . . . [F]ew of us would march our sons and 
 daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to see “Specified Sexual 
 Activities” exhibited in the theaters of our choice.88 
The plurality recognized that the “total suppression of erotic materials” would violate the 
First Amendment but ruled this law regulated only the “places where sexually explicit films” 
would be exhibited.89 Justice Stevens noted that the Detroit Common Council had 
determined that a concentration of adult theaters would cause an area to deteriorate and 
become a focus of crime.  In a footnote, the plurality said those “secondary effects” justified 
the content distinction the city had made.90 
The Court’s four most liberal voters in the First Amendment area dissented.  Justice 
Stewart’s opinion said the plurality had ridden “roughshod over cardinal principles of First 
Amendment law.”91 The guarantees of the First Amendment were not reserved only for 
speech for which “more than a few of us would take up arms to defend,” he argued.92 The 
law was content based, the dissent concluded, and should have been declared 
unconstitutional.  The speech involved here might be offensive to some, Justice Stewart 
admitted, but “[m]uch speech that seems to be of little or no value will enter the marketplace 
of ideas, threatening the quality of our social discourse and, more generally, the serenity of 
our lives.  But that is the price to be paid for constitutional freedom.”93 
88 Id. at 70. 
 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 71 n.34. 
 
91 Id. at 86 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 
92 Id.  
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 A majority of the Court has never embraced the candor of the plurality opinion in 
American Mini Theatres. When the secondary effects rationale received majority approval 
ten years later in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc.,94 the Court did so on the basis that 
the regulation was content neutral, not on the grounds that it was a permissible content 
regulation of less-deserving speech.  Yet, as Professor Daniel Farber has argued, the Court’s 
willingness to uphold the regulations in Renton and subsequent cases based on fairly thin 
evidentiary records suggests that the Court does – or, perhaps, more conservative justices on 
the Court do – in fact regard non-obscene sexual materials as enjoying a lower constitutional 
status than other protected speech.95 
Indeed, the disagreements among justices in the three remaining cases in this area 
have primarily been over their differing evaluations of those evidentiary records.  Because 
the secondary effects approach labels regulations content neutral because they are “justified 
without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” the government’s purpose has 
become the controlling consideration and, thus, often the locus of debate for justices.  In 
these three cases, as will be seen, the Court’s more conservative justices in the First 
Amendment area have shown a willingness to defer to government.  The Court’s more liberal 
voters, on the other hand, have scrutinized the government’s asserted purpose more closely 
and suggested that government was really interested in suppressing expression itself, not 
secondary effects.  Dissenters also have continued to argue in these cases that the content-
neutral label is inappropriately applied to regulations that discriminate on their face based on 
content. 
 
93 Id. at 88. 
 
94 475 U.S. 41 (1986). 
 
95 DANIEL FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 140 (2003). 
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 In Renton, the Court upheld a zoning ordinance that prohibited adult motion picture 
theaters from locating within 1,000 feet of any residential zone, single- or multiple-family 
dwelling, church, park, or school.96 Justice Rehnquist’s majority opinion candidly 
acknowledged that the law “treats theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other 
kinds of theaters.”97 Nevertheless, he said, the Renton ordinance was “aimed not at the 
content of the films shown at adult motion picture theaters, but rather at the secondary effects 
of such theaters on the surrounding community.”98 For support, Justice Rehnquist noted that 
at trial the district court found that the Renton City Council’s “predominate concerns” were 
with the secondary effects of adult theaters.99 The court of appeals, however, had ruled that 
if “a motivating factor” of the City Council in enacting the law was to restrict the exercise of 
First Amendment rights, the law would be unconstitutional.100 Relying on language from 
United States v. O’Brien,101 discussed in Chapter 2, in which the Court ruled it would not 
“strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative 
motive,”102 the Court rejected the court of appeals’ assessment.103 The district court’s 
finding of “predominate intent,” the Court said, was “more than adequate to establish that the 
 
96 475 U.S. at 46. 
 
97 Id. at 47. 
 
98 Id. (emphasis in original).  The Court said the law was designed to prevent crime, protect the city’s retail 
trade, maintain property values, and generally “protect and preserve” the quality of life.  Id. at 48. 
 
99 Id. at 47. 
 
100 Id.  
101 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 
102 Id. at 383. 
 
103 Note, however, that in Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985), 
a nonpublic forum case decided just one year before Renton, a plurality of the Court remanded a case to 
determine “whether the exclusion of respondents was impermissibly motivated by a desire to suppress a 
particular point of view.”  Id. at 812-13. 
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city’s pursuit of its zoning interests here was unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression.”104 Renton’s City Council had not actually studied the secondary effects of adult 
theaters on its particular community before passing the law but instead had relied on the 
experience of, and studies produced by, the city of Seattle, an approach the Court 
condoned.105 The Court thus held the law was content neutral and subject to intermediate 
scrutiny, which it passed. 
 Justices Brennan and Marshall, the Court’s two most liberal members in the First 
Amendment area at the time, dissented.106 Justice Brennan’s spirited dissenting opinion 
argued that the ordinance on its face “discriminates . . . against certain forms of speech based 
on content” and thus was wrongly labeled content neutral.107 Further, Justice Brennan said 
he was unwilling to “simply accept,” as he argued the majority did, Renton’s claim that the 
law was not designed to suppress the content of adult movies.108 A closer look at the City 
Council’s purpose, he argued, revealed its intentions were in fact to suppress expression.  He 
pointed out that the City Council added the provision to the law explaining its aim to control 
secondary effects only after owners of adult theaters brought a lawsuit.109 Prior to that 
 
104 Renton, 475 U.S. at 48. 
 
105 Id. at 50.  “The First Amendment does not require a city . . . to conduct new studies or produce evidence 
independent of that already generated by other cities, so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is 
reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem that the city addresses,” Justice Rehnquist wrote.  Id. at 51-52. 
 
106 Justice Blackmun, who had dissented in American Mini Theatres, concurred in the result in Renton but 
without authoring an opinion.  It, therefore, is unclear why he changed his position.  Justice Stewart, who had 
written a dissenting opinion in American Mini Theatres, had been replaced on the Court by Justice O’Connor in 
1981.  Justice O’Connor proved to be more conservative than Justice Stewart in the First Amendment area, and 
she joined the majority opinion here in Renton.
107 Id. at 57 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 58. 
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amendment, he said, there was no indication that the ordinance was designed to address any 
secondary effects.  In fact, “[both] the magistrate and the district court recognized that many 
of the stated reasons for the ordinance were no more than expressions of dislike for the 
subject matter,” he wrote.110 Justice Brennan added that the “findings” that were said to 
justify the law post hoc were no more than “purely speculative conclusions,” based on no 
expert testimony or independent study of Renton’s particular circumstances.111 And, though 
the Court said Renton could rely on the experiences and studies conducted by other cities, 
Justice Brennan said evidence suggested the City Council “never actually reviewed” any 
other study.112 He thus accused the majority of permitting Renton “to conceal its illicit 
motives.”113 “[T]he circumstances here strongly suggest that the ordinance was designed to 
suppress expression,” he concluded.114 
Throughout his dissent, Justice Brennan faulted the ordinance for impermissibly 
restricting speech based on its content or subject matter.  In a footnote, however, he 
suggested that the ordinance could also be construed to constitute viewpoint discrimination.  
Justice Brennan approvingly quoted a 1978 law review article by Professor Geoffrey Stone, 
who wrote that the “‘speech suppressed by restrictions such as those involved [here] will 
almost invariably carry an implicit, if not explicit, message in favor of more relaxed sexual 
mores.  Such restrictions, in other words, have a potent viewpoint-differential impact.’”115 
110 Id. at 59 (internal quotation and citation omitted). 
 
111 Id. at 60. 
 
112 Id. at 61. 
 
113 Id. at 62. 
 
114 Id.  
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Justice Brennan did not elaborate on the point, and the majority did not respond to it.  As will 
be discussed below, however, in a later case Justice Souter in dissent similarly argued that a 
zoning restriction that singles out adult businesses can be interpreted as a viewpoint-based 
regulation. 
 In the 2000 case City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,116 the Court extended the secondary 
effects rationale beyond zoning restrictions to include a ban on nude dancing.  The City of 
Erie enacted a public indecency ordinance that prohibited knowingly or intentionally 
appearing in public in a “state of nudity.”117 Pap’s A.M., a Pennsylvania corporation, 
operated “Kandyland,” an establishment in Erie that featured totally nude erotic dancing 
performed by women.118 To comply with the law, the dancers at Kandyland were forced to 
wear, at a minimum, “pasties” and a “G-string.”119 Pap’s A.M. sued, arguing the law 
violated the First Amendment. 
 In a divided opinion, the Court disagreed.  A plurality of the Court ruled the law was 
a content-neutral restriction on symbolic speech that passed the framework set forth in 
United States v. O’Brien.120 On its face, Justice O’Connor wrote for the plurality, the law 
was a general prohibition on public nudity.  “It does not target nudity that contains an erotic 
message; rather, it bans all public nudity, regardless of whether that nudity is accompanied 
 
115 Id. at 56 n.1 (quoting Geoffrey Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content: The Peculiar Case of 
Subject-matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 111-12 (1978)). 
 
116 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
 
117 Id. at 283. 
 
118 Id. at 284. 
 
119 Id.  
120 391 U.S. 367 (1968).  “[N]ude dancing of the type at issue here is expressive conduct, although we think that 
it falls only within the outer ambit of the First Amendment’s protection.”  529 U.S. at 289. 
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by expressive activity,” she wrote.121 Pap’s A.M., however, argued that the law was related 
to the suppression of expression because language in the law’s preamble suggested that its 
actual purpose was to prohibit erotic dancing.122 Justice O’Connor relied on the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s interpretation of the law to reject the argument.  The state 
supreme court had ruled that the preamble’s language meant that “one purpose of the 
ordinance was to combat negative secondary effects” associated with “nude live 
entertainment.”123 “In light of the Pennsylvania court’s” holding that “one purpose” of the 
law was to combat secondary effects, Justice O’Connor concluded, the law was properly 
evaluated as a content-neutral restriction because its purpose was unrelated to suppressing 
expression.124 
Justices Scalia and Thomas, two of the Court’s most conservative voters in the First 
Amendment area, concurred in the judgment only.  Justice Scalia argued that a general ban 
on public nudity regulates conduct rather than speech and is, therefore, outside of First 
Amendment scrutiny.  Even if Erie had singled out nude dancing for regulation, he argued, 
he would have found the law constitutional unless evidence clearly demonstrated that the law 
targeted the “communicative character of nude dancing.”125 In his biting dissents in which 
he had championed the First Amendment rights of abortion protesters, Justice Scalia focused 
closely on the effects of the regulations to find them content and viewpoint based.  Here, 
 
121 529 U.S. at 290. 
 
122 In the preamble, the City Council stated that it was adopting the law “for the purpose of limiting a recent 
increase in nude live entertainment within the City, which activity adversely impacts and threatens to impact on 
the public health, safety and welfare by providing an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, 
public intoxication, prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases and other deleterious effects.”  Id.  
123 Id.  
124 Id. at 292. 
 
125 Id. at 309 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
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instead, he appeared to have little regard for nude dancing and was quite deferential to 
governmental attempts to curb it.  Unlike the plurality, he said that he felt no need to identify 
any “‘secondary effects’ associated with nude dancing that the city could properly seek to 
eliminate . . . . The traditional power of government to foster good morals, and the 
acceptability of the traditional judgment that nude public dancing itself is immoral, have not 
been repealed by the First Amendment.”126 
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Ginsburg, one of the most liberal voters in the First 
Amendment area presently on the Court, rejected the Court’s application of the secondary 
effects rationale outside the zoning context.  As Justice Stevens interpreted the law, it 
constituted a total ban on nude dancing.  The law, in other words, foreclosed the message 
nude dancing communicated, “a message protected by the First Amendment.”127 The 
secondary effects rationale, he argued, cannot “justify a total ban on protected First 
Amendment expression.”128 Moreover, he said, the Court was wrong to conclude that the 
city’s interest in enacting the law was unrelated to suppressing speech.  Looking closely at 
the City Council’s purpose – arguably, a close look that Justice Stevens did not support when 
he joined the majority opinion in Renton and wrote the Court’s opinion in Hill – he argued 
that it was “pellucidly clear that the city of Erie has prohibited nude dancing precisely 
because of its communicative attributes.”129 He said the law’s preamble made that clear, and, 
unlike the plurality, he was unwilling to explain the preamble’s language away.130 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 319 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
128 Id.  
129 Id. at 326 (internal quotations and citation omitted). 
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Furthermore, he examined the law’s legislative history in the form of comments from City 
Council members who voted for the law.131 Four of the six Council members who approved 
the law, Justice Stevens said, “stated [their] view that the ordinance was aimed specifically at 
nude adult entertainment.”132 It was “beyond a shadow of a doubt,” he therefore concluded, 
that the purpose of the law was to suppress the message communicated by nude dancing, not 
to combat secondary effects, and the law was thus unconstitutional.133 
In a separate dissent, Justice Souter agreed with the plurality that the city’s stated 
interest in combating secondary effects associated with nude dancing establishments was 
unrelated to the suppression of expression and that O’Brien, therefore, provided the 
appropriate framework for review.  As he saw it, however, the city had an inadequate factual 
basis to support the law.  Justice Souter, who has voted in the liberal direction in First 
Amendment cases more than seventy-six percent of the time, was unwilling to grant the 
government discretion, instead arguing that the First Amendment demanded of the 
government “demonstration of an evidentiary basis for the harm it claims to flow from the 
expressive activity.”134 A government needs to show “demonstrated fact, not speculative 
 
130 “As its preamble forthrightly admits, the ordinance’s ‘purpose’ is to ‘limit’ a protected form of speech.”  Id. 
at 327. 
 
131 As the Court had in Renton, the plurality dismissed the evidence from the Council members on the ground 
that it “will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis of an alleged illicit legislative 
motive.”  Id. at 330 n.16 (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968)).  Justice Stevens 
countered, however, that in O’Brien the Court warned against relying on the assumption that illicit motive was 
behind the regulation and the uncertainty of deciphering the intent of a body as large as Congress.  Neither 
consideration was present in Pap’s A.M., he said.  “We need not base our inquiry on an ‘assumption,’ nor must 
we infer the collective intent of a large body based on the statements of a few, for we have in the record the 
actual statements of all the city council members who voted in favor of the ordinance.”  Id.  
132 Id. at 329.  One Council member said, “We’re not talking about nudity.  We’re not talking about the theater 
or art . . . . We’re talking about what is indecent and immoral . . . . We’re not prohibiting nudity, we’re 
prohibiting nudity when it’s used in a lewd and immoral fashion.”  Id. 
133 Id. at 331. 
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supposition,” which is all the city had done here, he argued.135 The proposition that nude 
dancing establishments increase the incidence of prostitution and violence is amenable to 
empirical treatment, he said.  The city’s failure to do so here, he concluded, was all the more 
problematic in light of one of the amicus briefs that was “largely devoted to the argument 
that scientifically sound studies show no such correlation.”136 Justice Souter said he was not 
suggesting that the required evidentiary showing could never be made.  Rather, in this case 
Erie had simply not made it. 
 Justice Souter’s demand for evidence and unwillingness to defer to government in its 
regulation of sexual speech commanded three other justices in a dissenting opinion in the 
Court’s most recent secondary effects case, City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc.137 A
1977 study conducted by the city of Los Angeles concluded that concentrations of adult 
businesses were associated with higher rates of prostitution, assaults, robbery, and thefts in 
surrounding communities.  The city responded by enacting a zoning ordinance that dispersed 
the location of adult businesses throughout the city.138 Six years after the study, the city 
amended the law to prohibit the establishment or maintenance of more than one adult 
entertainment business in the same building, even though the original study had not 
specifically addressed the effects of so-called multiple-use adult establishments.139 After a 
 
134 Id. at 313 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  The plurality responded that O’Brien did not 
demand such an evidentiary showing. 
 
135 Id. at 314. 
 
136 Id. at 315 n.3. 
 
137 535 U.S. 425 (2002). 
 
138 The law prohibited the location of adult businesses within 1,000 feet of each other or within 500 feet of any 
religious institution, school, or public park. 
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city building inspector in 1995 discovered that Alameda Books, Inc. was operating both as an 
adult bookstore and an adult arcade, the company sued to try to prevent enforcement of the 
law.  Both the district court and the court of appeals granted the business summary judgment. 
 In a 5-4 decision, the Court reversed.  Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, joined by 
the three justices who have voted the most conservatively in the First Amendment area, held 
that it was reasonable for Los Angeles to rely on the findings of the 1977 study as the basis 
for the ban on multiple-use establishments.  Relying on Renton, she said the evidentiary 
requirement for municipalities was only that they “rely upon evidence that is reasonably 
believed to be relevant to the secondary effects that they seek to address.”140 That was the 
case here, she said, as the city rationally assumed that reducing the concentration of adult 
businesses in a neighborhood, whether within separate establishments or in one large 
establishment, will reduce crime.141 Justice Kennedy provided the crucial fifth vote but 
concurred in the judgment only.  He appeared to depart from the Renton ruling that the type 
of zoning ordinance at issue here should be labeled content neutral.  “These ordinances are 
content based and we should call them so,” he argued.142 Nevertheless, Justice Kennedy said 
he supported Renton’s “central holding” that a zoning restriction that is designed to decrease 
secondary effects should be subjected to intermediate scrutiny.143 As for the present case, he, 
like the plurality, was willing to defer to government.  “[C]ourts should not be in the business 
 
139 In such establishments, a single proprietor “combines an adult bookstore, selling books, magazines, and 
videos, with an adult arcade, consisting of open viewing booths, where potential purchasers of videos can view 
them for a fee.”  Id. at 454 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
140 Id. at 442. 
 
141 Id. at 436. 
 
142 Id. at 448 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 
143 Id.  “As a matter of common experience, these sorts of ordinances are more like a zoning restriction on 
slaughterhouses and less like a tax on unpopular newspapers.”  Id. at 449. 
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of second-guessing fact-bound empirical assessments of city planners,” he argued.144 He 
agreed that the city could reasonably infer that two adult businesses under the same roof were 
no better than two next door and that the law, therefore, was, at the least, not invalid on its 
face.145 
The Court’s four most liberal voters in the First Amendment area dissented in an 
opinion authored by Justice Souter, who suggested that this type of zoning restriction bear a 
First Amendment label of its own.  “If we called it content correlated,” he said, “we would 
not only describe it for what it is, but keep alert to a risk of content-based regulation that it 
poses.”146 He continued: 
 The risk lies in the fact that when a law applies selectively only to 
 speech of particular content, the more precisely the content is identified, the 
 greater is the opportunity for government censorship. Adult speech refers not 
 merely to sexually explicit content, but to speech reflecting a favorable view 
 of being explicit about sex and a favorable view of the practices it depicts; a 
 restriction on adult content is thus also a restriction turning on a particular 
 viewpoint, of which the government may disapprove.147 
This is a wide conceptualization of what constitutes a viewpoint, one to which Justice 
Brennan alluded in a footnote in his Renton dissent.148 Sexually explicit content transmits a 
favorable view of being explicit about sex, the argument goes.  By that reasoning, then, 
restricting sexually explicit content actually constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint 
discrimination.  Echoing his dissent in Pap’s A.M., Justice Souter, however, said the risk of 
 
144 Id. at 451. 
 
145 Id. at 453. 
 
146 Id. at 457 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
147 Id.  
148 Indeed, this wide conceptualization of viewpoint could arguably justify the position that regulations of 
obscenity are viewpoint based, although Justice Souter did not make that suggestion in his dissent.  
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viewpoint discrimination with these zoning ordinances was “subject to a relatively simple 
safeguard.”149 If combating secondary effects was truly the reason for the regulation, he said, 
then government should show by empirical evidence that the effects exist and that the zoning 
can be expected to combat them without eliminating the expression itself.150 “The weaker 
the demonstration of facts distinct from disapproval of the ‘adult’ viewpoint, the greater the 
likelihood that nothing more than condemnation of the viewpoint drives the regulation,” he 
argued.151 Justice Souter seemed to be saying that government could permissibly suppress 
the “adult viewpoint,” but only if the regulation could be proven to target secondary effects 
and was not motivated merely by disagreement or disapproval.152 Here, he said, Los Angeles 
had not demonstrated that adult bookstores that also contained viewing booths, isolated from 
other adult establishments, increase crime or produce other secondary effects.  The 1977 
survey, he determined, provided “no support” for the city’s policy to break up multiple-use 
establishments.153 Because it did not, Justice Souter said, “we are a very far cry from any 
assurance against” viewpoint-based regulation, and the law was thus unconstitutional.154 
To summarize, on balance it has been the more liberal justices in these secondary 
effects cases who have articulated a wide conceptualization of “viewpoint” and shown an 
unwillingness to defer to government.  These justices have sought to impose a strong 
evidentiary burden on government to justify regulations and have closely scrutinized a 
 
149 Id.  
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 458.   
 
152 Implicit in Justice Souter’s argument, then, is the position that viewpoint discrimination is determined by a 
close evaluation of government’s purpose. 
 
153 Id. at 454. 
 
154 Id. at 466. 
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government’s asserted neutral purpose.  More conservative justices, on the other hand, have 
arguably relegated non-obscene sexual expression to a lower rung on the constitutional 
ladder.  In ruling that facially content-based laws can be labeled content neutral if the 
government’s purpose is to combat secondary effects, these justices have been deferential in 
their evaluation of government’s purpose and in their demand for evidence to justify a law’s 
rationale.  
 Restrictions on Religious Expression 
 As discussed in Chapter 4, in a line of limited public forum cases the Court has had to 
decide how to classify exclusions of religious expression from limited forums.  
Governmental actors, claiming that they are seeking to avoid an Establishment Clause 
violation, have argued that barring religious expression is permissible content discrimination, 
that the subject or topic of religion has legitimately been eliminated from the forum.  The 
Court, however, in sometimes badly divided decisions, has found otherwise, ruling that the 
exclusion actually constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. 
 These cases have thus involved a collision of two First Amendment clauses, the 
Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause.155 Scholars uniformly regard the Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence as complex and confusing.156 Any attempt to capture it 
or to provide coherence is well outside the present discussion.  At the risk of oversimplifying 
the tangle, however, it seems fair to posit that the divide on the Court in two of the three 
 
155 The First Amendment to the Constitution reads: “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of 
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or of the 
right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.”  U.S. 
CONST. amend. I. 
 
156 As one scholar put it, “From a lawyer’s point of view, the Establishment Clause may be the most frustrating 
part of First Amendment law.  The cases are a tangle of divergent doctrines and seemingly conflicting results.  
The Court seems unable to settle on a governing test, and what efforts it has made in that direction often turn 
out to be maddeningly vague and unhelpful.”  FARBER, supra note 95, at 275. 
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cases to be discussed below arguably at its roots reflected a disagreement among the 
Rehnquist Court’s conservative and liberal members over government’s proper relationship 
with religion.  A strong bloc of justices on the Rehnquist Court – Justices Thomas, Scalia, 
Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist, occasionally joined by Justice O’Connor – argued for 
a narrow, or minimalist, view of the Establishment Clause.  Under that view, the government 
has a fairly free hand in making voluntary accommodations for religious groups.157 
Neutrality becomes the cardinal principle: Private religious groups are permitted to receive 
governmental aid as long as that aid is equally available to nonreligious groups.158 The 
Rehnquist Court’s more liberal members, however, rejected that view, instead arguing that 
the Establishment Clause demands a firmer wall of separation between church and state.159 
The division of justices in the limited public forum cases discussed here arguably supports 
the proposition that the justices’ ideological preferences for how government should treat 
religion have colored their determination of what constitutes viewpoint discrimination in 
these cases.  Table 5.3 shows the lineup of justices in the cases and the frequency with which 
they have supported the liberal position in the First Amendment and civil liberties areas.  
Note that the First Amendment category includes justices’ votes in both speech and religion 
cases.  In each case below, the majority ruled that excluding religious expression from a 
forum amounted to viewpoint discrimination. 
 
157 Id. at 295. 
 
158 See Jason Manning, Comment, Good News Club v. Milford Central School: Viewpoint Discrimination or 
Endorsement of Religion? 78 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 833, 877 (2003). 
 
159 This divide on the Court was evident in Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997), in which the five justices 
mentioned above ruled that it was permissible to send public teachers into parochial schools to offer special 
educational programs for low-income students.  Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens dissented, the 
same lineup of justices who dissented in Rosenberger v.  Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia, 515 
U.S. 819 (1995), as will be seen below. 
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TABLE 5.3 
Votes of Justices in Cases Involving Restrictions on Religious Expression  
and the Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Those Justices in Relevant Issue Areas 
 
Case: Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District (1993) 
Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Justices 
in Relevant Issue Areas (in percentages) 
First Amendment Civil Liberties 
White (author) 38.3 42.4 Majority  
(For Free Speech Claim) Blackmun 56.9 52.8 
O’Connor 42.9 35.7 
Rehnquist  21.3 21.8 
Souter  76.7 60.8 
Stevens  68 64.5 
Kennedy (author) 52.8 36.6 Concurring 
(For Free Speech Claim) Scalia (author) 33.1 28.4 
Thomas  34.8 25.1 
Case: Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (1995) 
Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Justices 
in Relevant Issue Areas (in percentages) 
First Amendment Civil Liberties 
Kennedy (author) 52.8 36.6 Majority  
(For Free Speech Claim) O’Connor  42.9 35.7 
Rehnquist  21.3 21.8 
Scalia  33.1 28.4 
Thomas 34.8 25.1 
Souter (author) 76.7 60.8 
Breyer 60.4 61.2 
Dissent 
(Against Free Speech 
Claim) Ginsburg  75 64.6 
Stevens 68 64.5 
Case: Good News Club v. Milford Central School (2001) 
Aggregate Liberal Voting Records of Justices 
in Relevant Issue Areas (in percentages) 
First Amendment Civil Liberties 
Thomas (author) 34.8 25.1 Majority  
(For Free Speech Claim) Kennedy 52.8 36.6 
O’Connor 42.9 35.7 
Rehnquist 21.3 21.8 
Scalia 33.1 28.4 
Breyer 60.4 61.2 Concurring 
(For Free Speech Claim) 
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 First Amendment Civil Liberties 
Stevens (author) 68 64.5 
Souter (author) 76.7 60.8 
Dissent 
(Against Free Speech 
Claim) Ginsburg 75 64.6 
Note: The liberal voting record percentages are taken from The Supreme Court Compendium. The figures listed 
indicate the percentage of cases in which the justice took the liberal position in the area during his or her 
duration on the Court.  The authors of the Compendium defined the First Amendment area as “guarantees 
contained therein.”  The First Amendment area thus includes justices’ votes in both speech and religion cases.  
A vote was counted as liberal if a justice voted “pro-individual against the government” in a First Amendment 
case.  The Civil Liberties area combined the votes from criminal procedure, civil rights, First Amendment, due 
process, attorneys, and privacy cases.  A vote was counted as liberal if a justice voted “pro-individual against 
the government” in a privacy case.  Pro-defendant votes in criminal procedure cases and pro-women or pro–
minorities votes in civil rights cases were considered liberal.  
 
The table can be interpreted in the following way: In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of 
Virginia, a five-justice majority, Justices Kennedy, O’Connor, Scalia, Thomas, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, 
voted to uphold the free speech claim of a Christian student publication.  Justice Kennedy authored the majority 
opinion.  Four justices, Justices Souter, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens, dissented in the case and voted against 
the publication’s free speech claim.  Justice Souter authored the dissenting opinion.  The figures indicate the 
percentage of cases in which the justice took the liberal position in the respective issue area.  Justice Kennedy, 
for instance, has voted liberally – that is, he has supported the individual against the government in First 
Amendment cases – 52.8 percent of the time during his duration on the Court.  In civil liberties cases, he has 
taken the liberal position 36.6 percent of the time.          
As the discussion below will demonstrate, the Court has embraced a wide definition 
of both “viewpoint” and “discrimination” in these cases, resulting in decisions that have 
broadly accommodated religious expression.  However, two of the cases, Rosenberger v. 
Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia160 and Good News Club v. Milford Central 
School,161 have produced biting dissents, with the Court’s otherwise more liberal voters 
arguing that the majority was defining those terms too loosely.  As discussed, the lineup of 
justices in those two cases generally reflects the divide on the Rehnquist Court over 
government’s relationship with religion.  Notice how, as with the abortion protesters cases, 
the justices’ votes in Rosenberger and Good News Club run counter to their typical voting 
direction: The otherwise more liberal voters in the First Amendment area sided with the 
 
160 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 
161 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
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government while the more conservative voters sided with the religious group claiming a 
First Amendment violation.   
 In the first of the three cases to be discussed here, though, Lamb’s Chapel v. Center 
Moriches Union Free School District,162 the Court unanimously agreed that a restriction on 
religious expression was viewpoint discriminatory.163 Under state law, local school districts 
in New York were authorized to permit various uses of school property when the property 
was not being used by the school itself.  Pursuant to the law, a school district permitted the 
use of its facilities for “social, civic, and recreational uses” but determined that “school 
premises shall not be used by any group for religious purposes.”164 Lamb’s Chapel, an 
evangelical church, sought permission to use school property to show a six-part film series 
about child-rearing and family values.  When the district denied its request, the church sued. 
 
162 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 
163 In Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), decided twelve years before Lamb’s Chapel, the Court ruled that 
a university policy that barred religious groups from conducting meetings in school facilities constituted 
unconstitutional content discrimination.  The Court said that by allowing other student groups to meet on 
campus the university had created a “forum generally open to student groups” and thus was obligated to justify 
any exclusions.  Id. at 267.  Writing for the Court, Justice Powell said the ban on religious discussion and 
worship was a content-based restriction that would have to pass strict scrutiny.  He concluded that the 
university’s interest in avoiding an establishment of religion was not sufficiently compelling to justify the 
exclusion because an “equal access” policy to the university’s facilities would be compatible with the 
Establishment Clause.  Id. at 271.  In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens worried that the Court’s reliance on 
content discrimination could “undermine the academic freedom of public universities.”  Id. at 278 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in judgment).  Because a university’s resources are limited, he said, it was often “necessary and 
appropriate” for university officials to evaluate the content of a proposed student activity.  Id.  But although he 
argued a university could legitimately regard some subjects or activities as more relevant to its educational 
mission, a university could not, he said, discriminate based on viewpoint in granting access to a forum.  And in 
operation, he concluded, the policy barring religious groups here amounted to viewpoint discrimination.  “It 
seems apparent,” he said, that under the policy the university would have allowed atheists to meet on campus.  
Id. at 281.  “If school facilities may be used to discuss anticlerical doctrine, it seems to me that comparable use 
by a group desiring to express a belief in God must also be permitted,” he reasoned.  Id.  In the three cases 
discussed in detail in this section, the Court adopted Justice Stevens’ position that an exclusion of religious 
expression can constitute not just content but viewpoint discrimination.  It has been that determination of 
viewpoint discrimination that has divided the justices. 
164 508 U.S. at 387. 
265
 The church argued that the district had created a limited public forum by opening 
school property to such a wide variety of communicative purposes.165 Justice White, writing 
for the Court, said that argument had “considerable force” but nevertheless ruled that the 
Court did not need to reach the issue.166 Even assuming that the district had not created a 
forum, as the lower courts had ruled, Justice White said any restriction needed to be 
viewpoint neutral – and the exclusion of the film series was not.  The Court conceded that the 
policy applied equally to all uses of school property for religious purposes: All religious 
groups were barred.  The court of appeals ruled that evenhandedness, therefore, made the 
policy viewpoint neutral.  Justice White responded that the fact that all religions and all uses 
for religious purposes were treated alike did “not answer the critical question whether it 
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint to permit school property to be used for the 
presentation of all views about family issues and child rearing except those dealing with the 
subject matter from a religious standpoint.”167 The Court noted that the subject matter of 
child rearing and family values was “otherwise permissible.”168 The film series was denied, 
in other words, not because it could not be classified as a legitimate use of property for social 
or civic purposes but “solely because the series dealt with the subject from a religious 
 
165 Id. at 391. 
 
166 Id.  Although the Court did not explicitly rule that a limited public forum was created in Lamb’s Chapel, the 
Rosenberger Court referred to Lamb’s Chapel as a limited public forum case, as have commentators.  See 
Nicole Casarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 64 
ALB. L. REV. 501, 581 n.170 (2000).  For that reason, this dissertation treats Lamb’s Chapel as involving a 
limited public forum.  
 
167 Id. at 393. 
 
168 Id. at 394. 
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standpoint.”169 Defining viewpoint, then, as a standpoint or perspective on a subject, the 
Court ruled barring the film amounted to viewpoint discrimination.170 
A majority of the Court arguably took an even wider view of viewpoint 
discrimination two years later in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of 
Virginia,171 which was discussed in Chapter 4.  A University of Virginia policy authorized 
payment from the Student Activities Fund for the printing costs of student publications of 
qualified student organizations but prohibited payment for any publication that “primarily 
promotes or manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality.”172 Wide 
Awake Productions, a student organization that qualified as a Contracted Independent 
Organization under the University’s policy, published a student newspaper titled “Wide 
Awake: A Christian Perspective at the University of Virginia.”173 The editors declared that 
the paper’s mission was “to challenge Christians to live, in word and deed, according to the 
faith they proclaim and to encourage students to consider what a personal relationship with 
Jesus Christ means.”174 The student editors said that, as a qualified student organization, its 
 
169 Id.  
170 The district argued that permitting its property to be used for religious purposes would violate the 
Establishment Clause.  Noting that the film series would have been after school hours, open to the public, and 
not sponsored by the school, Justice White said the “fears of an Establishment Clause violation are unfounded.”  
Id. at 395.  All nine justices agreed the district’s policy was viewpoint discriminatory.  Justices Kennedy, Scalia, 
and Thomas, who concurred in the judgment, were bothered by the Court’s reference in its Establishment 
Clause discussion to the three-part test from Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), which those three 
justices wished to abandon.  Justice Scalia, whose acerbic wit is, if nothing else, entertaining to readers of Court 
opinions, wrote, “Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles 
abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once 
again, frightening the little children and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District.”  Id. at 
398 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).  
 
171 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 
172 Id. at 822.   
 
173 Id. at 826. 
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printing fees were eligible to be paid by the Student Activities Fund.  The University, 
however, denied their request for funding on the grounds that the paper was a “religious 
activity” within the meaning of the policy.175 
The students sued, and, in a 5-4 decision, the Court ruled that the denial of funding 
was viewpoint discriminatory.  The University acknowledged that any ideologically driven 
attempt to suppress a particular point of view would be “presumptively unconstitutional.”176 
But that was not the case here, the University insisted, because the policy permissibly drew 
lines based on content and not viewpoint.  Writing for the Court, Justice Kennedy admitted 
that the distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination was “not a precise one” 
and that it was “something of an understatement to speak of religious thought and discussion 
as just a viewpoint.”177 Nevertheless, the Court ruled, the University’s objection to “Wide 
Awake” was properly interpreted as viewpoint discrimination.  Religion may be a subject, “a 
vast area of inquiry,” Justice Kennedy wrote, “but it also provides, as it did here, a specific 
premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a variety of subjects may be discussed and 
considered.”178 And that perspective, not the general subject matter, resulted in the denial of 
funding to “Wide Awake,” the Court ruled, “for the subjects discussed were otherwise within 
the approved category of publications.”179 Justice Kennedy’s reference to “subjects 
discussed” was somewhat cryptic, and he offered no elaboration.  Presumably he was 
 
174 Id.  
175 Id. at 827. 
 
176 Id. at 830. 
 
177 Id. at 831. 
 
178 Id.  
179 Id.  
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referring to an observation he made earlier in the opinion that “Wide Awake” contained 
articles about racism, crisis pregnancy, stress, and eating disorders, among other topics.180 
Justice Kennedy responded that the dissent’s argument that the policy was viewpoint 
neutral because it applied evenhandedly to “agnostics and atheists as well as . . . deists and 
theists”181 wrongly conceptualized public debate.  The majority instead offered an expansive 
interpretation of viewpoint discrimination.  All debate is not “bipolar,” Justice Kennedy said, 
and anti-religious speech is not the only response to religious speech.182 If racism is a topic 
of debate, he hypothesized, it is “as objectionable to exclude both a theistic and an atheistic 
perspective on the debate as it is to exclude one, the other, or yet another political, economic, 
or social viewpoint.”183 The argument, it seems, is that religious and anti-religious 
viewpoints are not the only ones that can be had on a given issue (in this case racism).184 
Because other viewpoints would be left unfettered, the exclusion of religious and anti-
religious viewpoints thus amounts to viewpoint discrimination. 
 Reading the majority and dissenting opinions in the case suggests that one justice’s 
“perspective” is another justice’s religious exhortation.185 Justice Souter dissented in 
Rosenberger, joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and Stevens, those justices on the 
Rehnquist Court who argued for a stricter separation between church and state.  Justice 
Souter chided the majority for downplaying the evangelical character of the student 
 
180 Id. at 826. 
 
181 Id. at 895 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
182 Id. at 831. 
 
183 Id.  
184 See Wojciech Sadurski, Does the Subject Matter? Viewpoint Neutrality and Freedom of Speech, 15 
CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 315, 322 (1997). 
 
185 Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) (remarking that “one man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric”). 
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newspaper.  A “closer look” at the publication, he said, revealed that it did not offer a mere 
“religious perspective” or “Christian viewpoint,” as the majority maintained.186 Rather, it 
consisted of “straightforward exhortation to enter into a relationship with God as revealed in 
Jesus Christ, and to satisfy a series of moral obligations derived from the teachings of Jesus 
Christ.”187 As Justice Souter saw it, the subject of the publication was “nothing other than 
the preaching of the word.”188 And using public funds to directly subsidize that preaching, 
he argued, would categorically violate the Establishment Clause.  Indeed, he spent much of 
his long dissent justifying his position that “direct funding of core religious activities by an 
arm of the State,” which he said the majority was permitting, was unconstitutional.189 He 
maintained the University was, therefore, correct in denying funding to the publication; in 
fact, he thought the Establishment Clause compelled the denial.190 
Justice Souter’s characterization of “Wide Awake” as an evangelical religious activity 
was dispositive of his free speech analysis as well.  He said it was undebatable that the 
University could base its funding decisions on the subject matter of student speech.  The 
relevant inquiry, then, was whether the University was “impermissibly distinguishing among 
competing viewpoints.”191 In answering that question, Justice Souter employed a different 
 
186 515 U.S. at 876 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
187 Id. at 868.  “Even featured essays on facially secular topics become platforms from which to call readers to 
fulfill the tenets of Christianity in their lives,” he argued.  Id. at 866.  
 
188 Id. at 868. 
 
189 Id. at 863. 
 
190 The majority relied on the principle of neutrality, discussed in this section’s introduction, to resolve the 
Establishment Clause issue.  Because the forum was open to various student groups, the groups had equal 
access to funding, and the University disassociated itself from endorsement of the views of any of the groups, 
the Court ruled there was no Establishment Clause violation. 
 
191 Id. at 893. 
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method of analysis than the majority and conceptualized a narrower debate.  The majority 
seemed unconcerned that the University lacked an illicit purpose in its denial of funding; the 
Court instead focused on the operation or function of the policy and determined that its effect 
was to bar a perspective from debate only because it was religious.192 Justice Souter, 
however, implied that disproportionate impact on a viewpoint would not render a regulation 
viewpoint discriminatory unless the motive for the regulation was related to viewpoint.193 
Determining whether a regulation is viewpoint based, he said, “turns on whether the burden 
on speech is explained by reference to viewpoint . . . . [T]he government’s purpose is the 
controlling consideration.”194 The prohibition on viewpoint discrimination, he argued, thus 
bars “the government from skewing debate,” from taking sides by allowing “one message 
while prohibiting the messages of those who can reasonably be expected to respond.”195 
Under that reasoning, Justice Souter said there was clearly no viewpoint 
discrimination here.  The University had a neutral purpose in denying funding: It barred the 
subject of religion in its aim to comply with the Establishment Clause.  Furthermore, he 
argued the University’s policy applied evenhandedly.  “If the Guidelines were written or 
applied so as to limit only . . . Christian advocacy and no other evangelical efforts that might 
compete with it, the discrimination would be based on viewpoint,” he wrote.196 But that is 
 
192 Note that three of the justices in the majority here, Justices Kennedy, Scalia, and Thomas, were the 
dissenters in Hill v. Colorado who focused their dissent in that case on what they argued was the regulation’s 
discriminatory effect.  Justice O’Connor and Chief Justice Rehnquist joined the majority opinion in Hill, which 
largely ignored the regulation’s effect. 
 
193 See Sadurski, supra note 184, at 328. 
 
194 515 U.S. at 893-94 (internal quotations and citation omitted).  Justice Souter’s focus on purpose here mirrors 
his position in his dissents in the secondary effects cases. 
 
195 Id. at 894-95. 
 
196 Id. at 895. 
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not what the regulation authorized, he concluded.  The policy denies “funding for hortatory 
speech that ‘primarily promotes or manifests’ any view on the merits of religion,” even those 
put forth by atheists or agnostics, he said.197 
Justice Souter relied on that latter point to distinguish the Court’s holding in Lamb’s 
Chapel. In that case, he said, “religious” was understood to refer only to the viewpoint of a 
believer, and the regulation would have allowed access “to any speaker wishing to express a 
nonreligious or expressly anti-religious point of view on any subject.”198 In a footnote, 
Justice Souter cited excerpts from the transcript of the oral argument in Lamb’s Chapel as 
evidence that atheists would have been permitted to use school property in that case.199 The 
majority in Rosenberger challenged that characterization of the Lamb’s Chapel holding,200 
and at least one commentator has questioned the wisdom of putting so much importance on 
the distinction between access for religious and anti-religious views.201 But for Justice 
Souter that was not the only, or arguably even the most important, distinction between the 
two cases.  The regulation here, he said, was not being applied to deny funding “for those 
who discuss issues in general from a religious viewpoint,” as was the case with the denial of 
access in Lamb’s Chapel, “but to those engaged in promoting or opposing religious 
 
197 Id. at 896. 
 
198 Id. at 897. 
 
199 Id. at 897 n.13.   
 
200 The majority in Rosenberger responded, “There is no indication in the opinion of the Court (which, unlike an 
advocate’s statements at oral argument, is the law) that exclusion or inclusion of other religious or antireligious 
voices from that forum had any bearing on its decision.”  Id. at 832. 
 
201 See Sadurski, supra note 184, at 334 (arguing, “Imagine a particular religious group wanting to address an 
issue from a religious perspective.  Should the validity of its exclusion depend upon whether an atheistic group 
would be permitted or excluded?  What if no such other group ever applies?  The use of a hypothetical test to 
judge an actual request is notoriously unreliable.”). 
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conversion and religious observances.”202 Again, what seemed dispositive for Justice Souter 
was his depiction of “Wide Awake” as nothing more than evangelicalism.  As he saw it, the 
church in Lamb’s Chapel wished to address child-rearing and family values, secular topics, 
from a religious perspective.  Here, however, the paper’s subject matter was religion itself, he 
maintained.  “[A] university’s decision to fund a magazine about racism, and not to fund 
publications aimed at urging repentance before God does not skew the debate either about 
racism or the desirability of religious conversion,” he argued.203 “Wide Awake” was 
religious exhortation, the “preaching of the word,”204 Justice Souter concluded.  And because 
all such exhortation was barred from funding, the dissent argued the University’s policy was 
viewpoint neutral. 
 Justice Souter’s approach, then, would seem to hinge on making a distinction between 
discussion of a secular topic from a religious “perspective” and religious exhortation or 
“preaching.”  That distinction arguably divided the Court again in Good News Club v. 
Milford Central School,205 which involved the same state law at issue in Lamb’s Chapel. As 
in that case, a school district permitted its property be used for social, civic, and recreational 
uses but prohibited its use for religious purposes.  Two adult sponsors of the Good News 
Club, a private Christian organization for children ages 6 to 12, sought permission to hold the 
club’s weekly after-school meetings in a school’s cafeteria.206 The club described its 
meetings as “a fun time of singing songs, hearing a Bible lesson and memorizing 
 
202 515 U.S. at 898 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
203 Id. at 899. 
 
204 Id. at 868. 
 
205 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
 
206 Id. at 103. 
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scripture.”207 The school denied the request, arguing that the sort of activities the club 
engaged in “were not a discussion of secular subjects such as child rearing, development of 
character and development of morals from a religious perspective, but were in fact the 
equivalent of religious instruction itself.”208 The club challenged the denial.  In a 6-3 
decision, the Court ruled the club’s exclusion amounted to viewpoint discrimination. 
 Justice Thomas’ majority opinion pivoted on the school’s admission that it would 
permit discussion of the development of character and moral development from a religious 
perspective.  “[I]t is clear,” Justice Thomas wrote, “that the Club teaches morals and 
character development to children.”209 For instance, he said, the club instructs children to 
overcome feelings of jealousy and treat others well, “even if it does so in a nonsecular 
way.”210 The Court said Lamb’s Chapel was controlling and indistinguishable.  The only 
“inconsequential” difference, Justice Thomas suggested, is that Lamb’s Chapel taught 
lessons through films while Good News Club teaches “moral lessons from a Christian 
perspective through live storytelling and prayer.”211 In both instances, the excluded groups 
sought to address a subject otherwise permissible in the forum and “religion [wa]s the 
viewpoint from which ideas [we]re conveyed,” the Court concluded.212 
The court of appeals argued that because the club focused “on teaching children how 
to cultivate their relationship with God through Jesus Christ,” its activities were 
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208 Id. at 104. 
 
209 Id. at 108. 
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211 Id. at 110. 
 
212 Id. at 112 n.4. 
274
“quintessentially religious,” not simply a perspective on a subject.213 The Court rejected that 
view and instead said that there was no reason why something cannot be “quintessentially 
religious” and characterized as the teaching of morals and character development from a 
particular viewpoint.  Justice Thomas wrote, “What matters for purposes of the Free Speech 
Clause is that we can see no logical difference in kind between the invocation of Christianity 
by the Club and the invocation of teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism by other associations to 
provide a foundation for their lessons.”214 Because the club’s Christian viewpoint or 
perspective was barred on an otherwise permissible subject, the Court concluded the denial 
was viewpoint discriminatory. 
 The Court’s three most liberal voters in the First Amendment area dissented.215 As in 
Rosenberger, the dissenting justices disagreed with the majority’s characterization of the 
nature of the group’s activities.  In his dissent, Justice Stevens delineated three categories of 
speech for “religious purposes”: (1) religious speech about a particular topic from a religious 
point of view; (2) religious worship; and (3) an “intermediate category” that consisted 
“principally at proselytizing or inculcating belief in a particular religious faith.”216 In a 
limited public forum, he said, it would be impermissible to bar the first category of speech, 
and he used Lamb’s Chapel as his example.  But the club’s activities, he reasoned, amounted 
 
213 Id. at 111. 
 
214 Id.   
215 Justice Breyer, who had joined Justice Souter’s Rosenberger dissent, concurred in part in Good News Club.
His brief concurring opinion addressed quibbles he had with the majority’s Establishment Clause discussion but 
did not comment on the majority and dissent’s differing positions on the free speech issue.  It, therefore, is 
unclear why he elected to join the majority. 
 
216 Id. at 130 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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to “proselytizing religious speech” and thus did not fall into the first category.217 He said it 
was clear that the school did not intend to exclude all speech from a religious point of view.  
“Instead, it sought only to exclude religious speech whose principal goal is to ‘promote the 
gospel,’” he argued.218 The club’s speech did that, and he concluded it was therefore 
perfectly permissible for the club to be excluded.  In a separate dissent, Justice Souter, joined 
by Justice Ginsburg, similarly agreed that the majority had mischaracterized the nature of the 
club.  Justice Souter detailed a sample lesson plan that the club had submitted at trial.  “It is 
beyond question,” he said after reviewing the plan, “that Good News intends to use the 
public school premises not for the mere discussion of a subject from a particular, Christian 
point of view, but for an evangelical service of worship calling children to commit 
themselves in an act of Christian conversion.”219 He said the majority opinion “ignored 
reality.”  If taken literally, he said, “any public school opened for civic meetings must be 
opened for use as a church, synagogue, or mosque.”220 
Justice Souter is indeed correct that that would be a “remarkable proposition,”221 and, 
presumably, the majority would not have gone that far.  Then again, as one commentator has 
observed, an Evangelical Christian church service on a Sunday morning certainly would 
provide moral and character teaching.222 Under the majority’s wide conceptualization of 
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219 Id. at 138 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter said children are instructed that “the Bible tells us how we 
can have our sins forgiven by receiving the Lord Jesus Christ.  It tells us how to live to please Him . . . . If you 
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viewpoint discrimination in Rosenberger and Good News Club, perhaps an argument could 
be made that the church service, too, offers a “perspective” on a subject otherwise 
permissible in the forum.  As argued in Chapter 4, the Court has arguably blurred any 
distinction between content and viewpoint in these cases.  The dissenters have argued that a 
line exists, or at least should, that distinguishes religious perspectives from religious 
exhortation or evangelicalism.  That could be a difficult line to draw and administer, and a 
majority of the Court has made no attempt to try it.  As Professor Wojciech Sadurski noted, 
proselytizing talk about religion could almost always be characterized as being about 
something else (be it child rearing or moral development, to name just two).223 Religion, 
therefore, can be cast as either a subject matter or as a viewpoint, depending on what one 
wishes to achieve.224 The lineup of justices in Rosenberger and Good News Club suggests 
that those justices who believe government should be more accommodating to religion 
successfully cast the religious expression as a viewpoint or perspective.  Those justices who 
argue for a stricter separation between religion and government, on the other hand, fruitlessly 
cast the regulations as permissible restrictions on the subject of religion.  The justices’ 
ideological preferences toward government’s treatment of religion, it would seem, colored 
their conclusions. 
 Conclusion 
 Political scientists would not be surprised that the division of justices in the socially 
divisive cases discussed in this chapter largely mirrored the justices’ ideological voting 
behaviors.  Ideology has a profound influence on a justice’s vote, these scholars have said.  
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As has been discussed, individual justices did not always perfectly meet that expectation.  
Chief Justice Rehnquist, for instance, though an avid opponent of Roe v. Wade, authored two 
opinions and joined a third that found regulations of abortion protesters to be content neutral.  
Three other justices, normally more conservative voters in First Amendment cases who had 
typically voted with the Chief Justice in upholding abortion restrictions, scrutinized the 
operation or effect of the regulations to find them content and viewpoint based.  The Chief 
Justice, on the other hand, stayed true to his conservative voting record in the First 
Amendment area and voted to uphold the regulations.  Those otherwise liberal First 
Amendment voters who joined Chief Justice Rehnquist largely ignored the effect of the 
regulations and instead deferred to government’s asserted purpose.  
 Ostensibly, the cases involving regulations of abortion protesters were free speech 
and not abortion cases.  Yet the justices’ votes in three cases strongly suggest that much of 
the Court, in fact, saw the cases presenting a collision of two constitutional rights, and those 
rights at issue demanded contrary liberal and conservative voting positions.  Framed as a 
conflict between two rights, those who voted to uphold the regulations as content neutral 
took a liberal position on abortion rights (the votes can be seen as championing the rights of 
women seeking abortions) and a conservative position on the free speech rights of the 
protesters.  The opposite is true for those who argued the regulations were content and 
viewpoint based: a liberal position on speech rights and arguably a conservative position on 
abortion rights.  The cases were, at their core, about free speech; it seems plausible to argue, 
then, that Chief Justice Rehnquist was perhaps the only justice who did not allow his or her 
ideological position on the abortion issue to drive the resolution of the cases.  
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 The cases involving restrictions on religious expression similarly presented 
contrasting liberal and conservative positions.  Those who struck down the restrictions took a 
liberal position on free speech rights but arguably what would be considered a conservative 
approach to the Establishment Clause, supporting a broad accommodation of government 
support for religion.  Those justices who voted to uphold the restrictions in Rosenberger and 
Good News Club, on the other hand, took the conservative position on the free speech issue 
but a generally liberal approach to the Establishment Clause, demanding a firmer wall of 
separation between church and state.  Again, arguably justices allowed ideological 
preferences for the non-speech issue to drive their resolution of the cases.  And, as in the 
abortion protesters cases, the typical liberal First Amendment voters took the anti-free 
speech, pro-government position.  Although the next chapter will argue that the dissenters 
had the more persuasive argument in Rosenberger and Good News Club, the two categories 
of cases at least raises the question whether normally liberal First Amendment voters place 
other liberal values (abortion rights and separation of church and state) ahead of free speech. 
 The third category of cases discussed in this chapter – the secondary effects cases – in 
no way involved competing constitutional rights, and the lineup of justices generally matched 
the expected voting pattern.  Aside from Justice Stevens’ evolution, it has generally been the 
Court’s more conservative voters in the First Amendment area who have supported the 
secondary effects rationale and deferred to government’s asserted neutral purpose.  More 
liberal First Amendment voters, however, have cast suspicion on the rationale in their 
dissents and shown an unwillingness to defer to government. 
 Significantly, the chapter showed that in reaching differing decisions ideologically 
divided justices have used different methods of analysis, offered different conceptualizations 
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of key terms, and, in the secondary effects cases, demanded different evidentiary burdens.  
On balance, then, the cases discussed here perhaps lend credence to an argument that content 
and viewpoint neutrality are not tools of analysis but often conclusions that justify decisions 
reached on other, ideological grounds.  At the least, the lineups of justices in these cases, 
with some notable exceptions, allow observers to ascribe ideological preference as the 
primary explanation for decisions.  When that can be done, it permits critics to challenge the 
legitimacy of the Court’s rulings and, if nothing else, calls into question the utility of the 
Court’s current approach to determining content and viewpoint neutrality. 
Chapter 6 
Summary and Conclusions 
 
The overarching purpose of this dissertation was to explore how the Court has 
distinguished between content and viewpoint discrimination.  The distinction is crucial in 
First Amendment jurisprudence.  Content-based restrictions can be upheld, the Court has 
said, and the Court is even more tolerant of content-neutral restrictions of speech.  But even 
in limited public forums, nonpublic forums, and subsidy cases, contexts in which the 
government has significant control over speech, the Court has said that viewpoint 
discrimination is impermissible.  The Court’s categorical approach, it would seem, thus 
depends on a clear demarcation between the closely related concepts of content and 
viewpoint.  Yet as this dissertation has shown, the Court’s jurisprudence has precluded any 
such demarcation.  It is unsurprising that the distinction is so unclear: The Court has never 
adequately defined the terms and the criteria to be used to determine whether content or 
viewpoint discrimination is present.  The lack of definitions and inconsistent applications 
permit ideological manipulation of the concepts or, at least, allegations of manipulation. 
 This dissertation set out to answer two research questions, the first of which included 
several sub-questions.  To explore the line between content and viewpoint required studying 
the Court’s application of its content-neutrality rule, first announced with majority approval 
in Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley.1 In spite of suggestions in parts of the Mosley 
 
1 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
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opinion that the government has “no power” to restrict expression because of its content,2 the 
Court has instead embraced a content-based/content-neutral dichotomy when reviewing 
restrictions on private speech and speech in public forums that varies the scrutiny with which 
the Court reviews speech regulations in those contexts.  Content-based regulations must pass 
strict scrutiny to be constitutional, a rigorous standard that demands government have a 
compelling interest and limit speech using the least restrictive means.  Content-neutral 
regulations, on the other hand, must pass a more lenient review, which the Court has termed 
intermediate scrutiny.  Whether a regulation is content based or content neutral is thus crucial 
in determining its constitutionality.  In spite of the importance of that content-based/content-
neutral determination, however, the definition of content discrimination and the basis for 
determining whether a regulation discriminates based on content are murky.3
Chapter 3 showed that in identifying content discrimination involving private speech 
and speech in public forums the Court has waffled among three approaches, variably relying 
on the face of the regulation, the purpose or intent of the regulation, and the effect or impact 
of the regulation.  When the Court relies on the on-the-face approach, it focuses on whether 
the terms of the law or regulation on their face draw distinctions based on content.  If they 
do, the regulation is content based and strict scrutiny is the standard of review, regardless of 
the regulation’s intended purpose.  Commentators have championed this approach,4 and the 
Court has used it in numerous cases.  In Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York 
 
2 Id. at 95. 
 
3 See Edward Carter & Brad Clark, Death of Procedural Safeguards: Prior Restraint, Due Process and the 
Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 225, 234 (2006). 
 
4 See, e.g., Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and Content/Viewpoint 
Determinations, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 595, 620 (2003). 
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State Crime Victims Board,5 for instance, the Court held that the face of the regulation there 
determined that it was content discriminatory, not the presence or absence of an illegitimate 
purpose.6
Yet in other instances in which the Court has found regulations to be content neutral 
it has said that the government’s purpose is dispositive.  A regulation is content neutral, the 
Court has often said, if it is “justified without reference to the content of the regulated 
speech.”7 A regulation’s justification, or purpose, is the focus of analysis, the statement 
suggests.  Justice Kennedy wrote for a majority of the Court in Ward v. Rock Against Racism 
that “the government’s purpose is the controlling consideration”8 in determining whether a 
regulation is content neutral.  The regulation in Ward, however, also appeared to be neutral 
on its face, and the Court’s statement in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, decided five 
years after Ward, that “a content-neutral purpose [would not] be enough to save a law which, 
on its face, discriminates based on content”9 suggests that the Court does not, in fact, 
consider purpose alone to be controlling.  Yet that assertion cannot explain the Court’s 
secondary effects doctrine, in which the Court has upheld laws regulating adult theaters and 
businesses that are facially content based.  Relying on the definition of content-neutral 
regulations as being “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” the 
Court, over the objection of biting dissents, has looked beyond the content-based face of 
 
5 502 U.S. 105 (1991). 
 
6 “Simon & Schuster need adduce no evidence of an improper censorial motive. . . . [I]llicit legislative intent is 
not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment.”  Id. at 117. 
 
7 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976). 
 
8 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989). 
 
9 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994). 
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regulations and instead emphasized their asserted neutral purpose in combating secondary 
effects associated with the speech.  The government’s purpose in those cases, then, not the 
face of the regulation, has been dispositive. 
 Justices have also disagreed over the role the effects of a regulation should play when 
making the content-based/content-neutral determination.  In Ward, the Court said that when a 
regulation serves “purposes unrelated to the content of expression [it] is deemed neutral, even 
if it has an incidental effect on some speakers or messages but not others.”10 Justices, 
however, have argued that the Court should consider more carefully the effect or impact of 
regulations.  The dissenters in Hill v. Colorado, for instance, argued that the inevitable effect 
of a law restricting speech outside of health care facilities rendered the law content based.11 
And in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,12 four justices in dissent said that a general ban on public 
nudity effectively stamped out the constitutionally protected message communicated by nude 
dancing.  Court majorities have occasionally been sensitive to effects as well.  In United 
States v. Eichman,13 one of the flag burning cases, the Court ruled that, in spite of Congress’ 
claim that the law was facially content neutral, the law in effect criminalized flag desecration 
while it condoned the respectful burning of worn or soiled flags, thus making the law content 
based. 
 The Eichman decision indicates another reason why the Court’s jurisprudence has 
made a definitive understanding of content discrimination difficult: The Court has conflated 
the content and viewpoint concepts when reviewing restrictions on private speech and speech 
 
10 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
 
11 530 U.S. 703, 763 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
12 501 U.S. 560 (1991). 
 
13 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
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in public forums.  The Court struck down the law in Eichman because it said it was content 
based, but the real flaw of the law appeared to be that it was viewpoint based – the law 
prohibited only unpopular and unacceptable viewpoints toward the flag.  Couching viewpoint 
discrimination in content-based language is one way the Court has conflated the terms.14 
Moreover, the Court has at times appeared to describe the content-based/content-neutral 
determination as pivoting on the presence or absence of viewpoint discrimination.  “The 
principal inquiry in determining content neutrality,” the Court has said, “is whether the 
government has adopted a regulation of speech because of disagreement with the message it 
conveys.”15 The Court has also confused the matter by occasionally using the term “content 
based” as an umbrella term that includes both viewpoint discrimination and any other type of 
discrimination based on content.16 
Content and viewpoint are no doubt closely related concepts.  A restriction on 
viewpoint is by definition also a restriction on content.  The government, of course, concerns 
itself with the content of expression when it suppresses a particular view.  Although similar, 
however, as this chapter’s introduction indicated, the Court has not treated the concepts as if 
they are the same.  In limited public forums and nonpublic forums the Court has held that 
content discrimination is permissible.  Viewpoint discrimination, however, is 
unconstitutional.  The distinction between the two is crucial in those contexts.  As argued in 
Chapter 3, the Court’s conflation of the concepts when reviewing regulations of private 
speech and speech in public forums has at least two consequences.  First, the conflation 
 
14 See also First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 
(1992).  
 
15 Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. 
16 See, e.g., Consol. Edison v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980) (“The First Amendment’s hostility 
to content-based regulation extends not only to restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of 
public discussion of an entire topic.”). 
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seems to imply that viewpoint discrimination in public forums and of private speech can be 
upheld.  Content discrimination can be constitutional, the Court has said, if it passes strict 
scrutiny under review.  Although the Court has never upheld a regulation on private speech 
or speech in public forums under strict scrutiny that appeared to be viewpoint based, the 
Court’s conflation of the content and viewpoint terms in those contexts nevertheless at least 
implies that an instance of viewpoint discrimination could be upheld if it were able to pass 
strict scrutiny.  By contrast, in limited public forums and nonpublic forums, where the 
government has more control over speech, the Court has suggested that viewpoint 
discrimination is unconstitutional on its face.  
 Second, because the Court has conflated the concepts when reviewing regulations of 
private speech and speech in public forums, it has left itself no principled room to make the 
distinction between content and viewpoint discrimination when it has to.17 In Consolidated 
Edison v. Public Service Commission18 and R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,19 cases involving 
restrictions of private speech, the Court divided over whether the regulations constituted 
content or viewpoint discrimination.  In those cases, however, the distinction ultimately did 
not prove to be crucial.  Though the justices disagreed on the viewpoint neutrality of the 
regulations, the Court nevertheless struck them down as content based.  In limited public 
forums and nonpublic forums, on the other hand, the distinction is vital; the constitutionality 
of a regulation can hinge on the content/viewpoint distinction.  Conflating the concepts in the 
contexts of private speech and speech in public forums has only frustrated the Court’s 
attempts to untangle the concepts when it needs to in other contexts. 
 
17 See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 597. 
 
18 447 U.S. 530 (1980). 
 
19 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
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 Because government can permissibly restrict speech based on its content in limited 
public forums and nonpublic forums, the definition of viewpoint discrimination is critical in 
those contexts.  This dissertation has shown, however, that although the Court has long 
articulated its disfavor of viewpoint discrimination, the Court has never provided a clear-cut 
definition it consistently announces when resolving cases in which viewpoint discrimination 
is claimed.  In its libel jurisprudence, for instance, the Court has clearly defined the requisite 
fault standard that public officials and public figures must prove to prevail in a libel suit.  To 
win, those plaintiffs must prove actual malice, defined as knowledge of falsity or a reckless 
disregard for the truth.20 The Court has provided no such ready-made definition to identify 
all instances of viewpoint discrimination.  Nevertheless, a close reading of the Court’s many 
opinions discussed here suggests that two understandings of viewpoint discrimination have 
emerged.  Viewpoint discrimination exists (1) when the government discriminates against 
offensive, unpopular, or disfavored views and (2) when a competing perspective has been 
removed from a forum or debate.  As Chapter 2 discussed, the first principle was germinated 
in pre-Burger Court cases, long before the Court articulated its content-neutrality rule, and 
has persisted throughout the Court’s jurisprudence.21 The second definition has emerged 
primarily from the Court’s limited public forum and nonpublic forum cases.  For instance, a 
regulation was viewpoint discriminatory in Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free 
 
20 N.Y. Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964). 
 
21 See, e.g., Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of the Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Texas v. 
Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989); Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (holding that 
government cannot aim at “the suppression of ideas thought inimical to the government’s own interest”). 
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School District,22 a 1993 limited public forum case, because a perspective on “a subject 
otherwise permissible” in the forum was eliminated, the Court held.23 
The Court’s frequent disagreements about the viewpoint neutrality of regulations 
have generally not been over how to define viewpoint discrimination, however, but rather 
how to apply the concept.  In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,24 a majority of the Court ruled that a 
hate speech law that it said was content based on its face was also viewpoint discriminatory 
“in its practical operation”25 because proponents of racial tolerance could use fighting words 
that racial bigots could not.  Justice Stevens responded in dissent that the law was 
evenhanded and that the hypothetical Justice Scalia used in the majority opinion failed to 
prove his point.  In its subsidy cases, the Court has said that government cannot “aim at the 
suppression of dangerous ideas.”26 Justices have often disagreed over how to apply that 
statement to the facts at hand, however.  In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley,27 for 
instance, Justice O’Connor was persuaded in her majority opinion that the law there only said 
the NEA should “take into consideration” decency and respect when awarding grants.28 In 
dissent, Justice Souter, on the other hand, said the law was unquestionably viewpoint 
discriminatory on its face.   
 
22 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
 
23 Id. at 394. 
 
24 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 
25 Id. at 391. 
 
26 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 513 (1959).  Rather than consider the statement a separate 
definition of viewpoint discrimination, it is best considered a component of the prohibition against 
discriminating against offensive, unpopular, or disfavored views. 
 
27 524 U.S. 569 (1998). 
 
28 Id. at 576. 
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 Moreover, as discussed in Chapter 4, the Court has arguably employed a broader 
application of viewpoint discrimination in the limited public forum context than it has in the 
nonpublic forum cases it has decided.  In a line of limited public forum cases involving 
restrictions on religious expression, the Court has said that religion can be considered a 
viewpoint and not a subject.  In Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of 
Virginia,29 for instance, the Court held that a University of Virginia policy prohibiting the 
payment of printing costs for any student publication that “primarily promotes or manifests a 
particular belief in or about a deity or an ultimate reality”30 was viewpoint discriminatory.  
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court that although religion is “a vast area of inquiry . . . it 
also provides, as it did here, a specific premise, a perspective, a standpoint from which a 
variety of subjects may be discussed and considered.”31 The dissent countered that the 
university had a neutral purpose in denying funding and that the policy applied evenhandedly 
to all religious publications and to “agnostics and atheists as well as . . . deists and theists.”32 
The majority, however, took a broader view of what counts as an opposing viewpoint.  The 
opposite of religious is not just anti-religious, the Court said, but also secular.33 Regardless 
of the University’s purpose for the policy, the Court ruled, the policy’s effect or function was 
to eliminate religious perspectives from the forum.   
 
29 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 
30 Id. at 822.   
 
31 Id. at 831. 
 
32 Id. at 895 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
33 See Nicole Casarez, Public Forums, Selective Subsidies, and Shifting Standards of Viewpoint Discrimination, 
64 ALB. L. REV. 501, 527 (2000). 
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 In the nonpublic forum context, by contrast, the Court has arguably been insensitive 
to claims of viewpoint discrimination.  Although it has repeated that viewpoint 
discrimination is impermissible, in its nonpublic forum cases the Court has yet to find that a 
regulation is viewpoint based.34 The most significant difference between the Court’s 
treatment of cases in the limited public forum and nonpublic forum contexts has been its 
method of analysis or, in other words, the criteria it uses to make the determination.  As 
discussed, in cases involving limited public forums, the Court has largely been unconcerned 
with the government’s intent or purpose and instead has emphasized the function or effect of 
regulations.  In nonpublic forum cases, however, the Court has largely ignored any viewpoint 
discriminatory impact or effect and instead has focused its analysis on evaluating – 
deferentially, it has seemed – government’s purpose.  Further, while the Court has ruled a 
restriction on religious expression is viewpoint discriminatory in limited public forum cases, 
it has not extended the same rationale to the nonpublic forum context, where it has upheld 
exclusions of political speech as viewpoint neutral even though apolitical viewpoints or 
perspectives are left unfettered.35 The viewpoint discrimination concept, in other words, has 
been applied differently depending on the speech context. 
 This dissertation’s second research question sought to explore whether evidence 
supported commentators’ concerns that the content and viewpoint concepts are vulnerable to 
ideological manipulation.36 Political science scholarship has concluded that ideological 
 
34 In Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 812 (1985), the Court did 
remand a case to determine if the government’s “facially neutral” purpose for a regulation in a nonpublic forum 
was actually a pretext for viewpoint discrimination. 
 
35 See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
36 See, e.g., Wilson Huhn, Assessing the Constitutionality of Laws that are Both Content-Based and Content-
Neutral: The Emerging Constitutional Calculus, 79 IND. L.J. 801, 853-54 (2004); Susan Ehrmann, Note, 
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values and policy preferences of justices have a considerable influence on their votes.37 To 
examine whether that insight might apply to Court determinations of content and viewpoint 
neutrality, Chapter 5 studied Court decisions in three socially divisive areas of law – speech 
regulations of abortion protesters, regulations of adult theaters and businesses, and 
restrictions on religious expression.  In each area, content and viewpoint discrimination have 
been the central issue of significant cases.  The chapter used data, taken from The Supreme 
Court Compendium,38 that categorized the voting behavior of justices on the Court to explore 
whether a justice’s interpretation of the neutrality of a speech regulation fell on expected 
ideological lines.  The chapter concluded that, with a few notable exceptions, the lineup of 
justices largely mirrored their ideological voting behaviors.  In the cases involving 
regulations of adult theaters and businesses, it has generally been the Court’s more 
conservative voters in the First Amendment area who have deferred to government’s asserted 
neutral purpose and upheld the regulations as content neutral.  The Court’s more liberal 
voters, on the other hand, have demanded a greater evidentiary burden and have consistently 
challenged the secondary effects rationale.   
 In the cases involving speech regulations of abortion protesters and restrictions on 
religious expression, the Court’s typical liberal and conservative voters in the First 
Amendment area have flip-flopped.  Those two categories of cases involved collisions of two 
constitutional rights; arguably, justices allowed their ideological preference for the non-
 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School District: Creating Greater Protection for Religious 
Speech Through the Illusion of Public Forum Analysis, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 965, 995 (1994).  
 
37 See, e.g., Donald Songer & Stefanie Lindquist, Not the Whole Story: The Impact of Justices’ Values on 
Supreme Court Decision Making, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1049 (1996); JEFFREY SEGAL & HAROLD SPAETH, THE 
SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED (2002).  
 
38 LEE EPSTEIN ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT COMPENDIUM: DATA, DECISIONS, AND DEVELOPMENTS (3rd ed. 
2003). 
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speech right to color their resolution of the free speech issue.  In two of the three cases 
involving restrictions on religious expression, the lineup of justices reflected the divide on 
the Rehnquist Court over government’s proper relationship with religion.  Those justices who 
generally believe government should be more accommodating to religion cast the religious 
expression as a viewpoint or perspective and thus held the regulations were viewpoint 
discriminatory.  Those justices who argue for a stricter separation between church and state, 
on the other hand, failed in their attempt to depict the regulations as permissible restrictions 
on the subject of religion.  In the abortion protesters cases, three of the justices who have 
voted the most conservatively in privacy and civil liberties cases voted to strike down the 
regulations on abortion protesters.  Of the six justices voting to uphold the regulations as 
content and viewpoint neutral, on the other hand, four of them had voted the most liberally in 
privacy and civil liberties cases and had been the most supportive of abortion rights.  Several 
of those justices in the majority had also typically voted more liberally than the dissenters in 
First Amendment cases.39 Yet in these cases it was instead the more conservative dissenters 
supporting the First Amendment rights of abortion protesters, voting to strike down the 
regulations as content and viewpoint based.   
 Importantly, Chapter 5 showed that in reaching different decisions over the neutrality 
of regulations, ideologically divided justices used different methods of analysis and offered 
different conceptualizations of key terms.  Because the Court does not have a uniform or 
agreed-upon way to determine content and viewpoint neutrality, it is arguably easier for 
justices to emphasize criteria and use methods to justify decisions that fit their ideological 
preferences.  
 
39 As was shown in Chapter 5, Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote the majority opinion in two of the abortion 
protester cases, stands out as an important exception. 
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 A Proposal for Reform 
 As this dissertation has shown, the Court’s speech discrimination principles are 
plagued by inconsistency and confusion.  The Court’s current malleable approach leaves the 
content and viewpoint concepts ripe for manipulation and fails to provide a sound foundation 
for the protection of free expression.  This dissertation concludes, therefore, by offering a 
suggested fix, a new method of analysis for the Court. 
 Under this method, courts reviewing regulations on private speech and speech in 
public forums should follow two steps to determine whether a speech regulation is neutral: A 
court should first decide whether a regulation is content neutral and then, in the next step, 
declare whether it is viewpoint neutral.  To determine whether a regulation is content neutral, 
a court would utilize the three inquires discussed in Chapter 3 – face, purpose, effect – that 
the Court has variably employed.  The difference here, however, is that a court would be 
required to use all three, not to focus singularly on one or another.  In determining content 
neutrality, then, a court would look to the face of a regulation, its purpose or justification, and 
its effect or operation.  Any of the three can reveal that a regulation is discriminatory and that 
intermediate scrutiny is thus not the appropriate standard of review.  Each will be discussed 
in turn. 
 As discussed above, when a court examines the face of a regulation, it focuses on 
whether the terms of the law or regulation on their face draw distinctions based on content.  
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley,40 for example, the law at issue exempted “the 
peaceful picketing of any school involved in a labor dispute.”41 As Justice Marshall 
 
40 408 U.S. 92 (1972). 
 
41 Id. at 93 (quoting CHICAGO, ILL., MUNICIPAL CODE, CH. 193-1 (i) (1968)). 
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observed, the law described “permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter:”42 All 
picketing was prohibited except that involving the subject of a labor dispute.  When, as in 
Mosley, the application of a regulation turns on the content of speech, the regulation should 
be considered content based, regardless of the government’s purpose.43 
Using this approach, then, the Court’s secondary effects doctrine should be 
overturned.  As the Court has had to acknowledge, the regulations of adult theaters and 
businesses it has labeled content neutral using the secondary effects rationale are content 
based on their face.44 The Court, however, has sanitized the regulations – and contradicted 
language in its case law45 – by looking past their face to emphasize the government’s 
asserted neutral interest in combating secondary effects.  Since its birth, the doctrine has 
generated stinging criticism from dissenting justices and commentators.  Professor Geoffrey 
Stone was correct when he argued that the doctrine “is . . . disturbing, incoherent, and 
unsettling.”46 The doctrine invites litigants and lower courts to extend its rationale beyond 
the realm of sexual speech,47 where it was created, and it produces confusion and uncertainty 
about what counts as a secondary effect and what type of secondary effect is required to 
 
42 Id. at 95. 
 
43 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 117 (1991) 
(“Simon & Schuster need adduce no evidence of an improper censorial motive. . . . [I]llicit legislative intent is 
not the sine qua non of a violation of the First Amendment.”); Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 
(1994) (“[A] content-neutral purpose [would not] be enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates 
based on content.”).   
 
44 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (“To be sure, the ordinance treats 
theaters that specialize in adult films differently from other kinds of theaters.”). 
 
45 See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642-43 (1994) (“[A] content-neutral purpose [would not] be 
enough to save a law which, on its face, discriminates based on content.”). 
46 Geoffrey Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 115 (1987). 
 
47 See, e.g., McGuire v. Reilly, 260 F.3d 36, 44 (1st Cir. 2001) (holding that the legislature was aiming at “the 
deleterious secondary effects of anti-abortion protests”). 
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excuse a facially content-based regulation.48 This is not to suggest that municipalities are 
helpless in the face of whatever effects might be associated with adult theaters and 
businesses.  As Justice Souter argued in his dissent in City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 
Inc.,49 secondary effects are amenable to empirical treatment.50 Documented empirical 
evidence of such effects might demonstrate a compelling interest, and, combined with a 
regulation that is narrowly tailored, the law could be justifiable under strict scrutiny.  These 
laws are content based on their face, however, and strict scrutiny should be the standard of 
review. 
 Because a shrewd governmental body might successfully dress up a regulation that is 
intended to discriminate in neutral language, a court determining the content neutrality of a 
regulation must also look at the regulation’s purpose or justification.  The Court has actually 
already used this method, though its overstated language has led to confusion in its 
jurisprudence.  In Ward v. Rock Against Racism,51 for instance, the Court reviewed a city 
guideline that required performers using a bandshell in Central Park to use sound 
amplification equipment and a sound technician provided by the city.  As the three dissenters 
in the case pointed out, the guideline was “indisputably” neutral on its face “as [it] 
appl[ied]to all bandshell users irrespective of the message of their music.”52 The majority, 
 
48 Jacobs, supra note 4, at 621-22. 
 
49 535 U.S. 425, 457 (2002) (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 
50 Justice Souter was arguably incorrect, however, to suggest that a restriction on adult businesses is a 
viewpoint-based restriction.  The municipalities are not concerned with the underlying view adult content 
transmits.  The regulation in Renton, for instance, applied to all theaters that broadcast adult content.  The 
viewpoint of a particular film did not matter.  Holding that a restriction on a subject is actually viewpoint based 
because the subject implicitly transmits a view represents a wide conceptualization of viewpoint, one that would 
be unwieldy in practice. 
 
51 491 U.S. 781 (1989). 
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however, made no mention of the guideline’s facial neutrality and instead focused closely on 
the government’s purpose for enacting the guideline.  The justification for the guideline, 
Justice Kennedy wrote for the Court, was the city’s desire to control noise levels at bandshell 
events in order to avoid “undue intrusion” into nearby homes,53 a justification that had 
“nothing to do with content.”54 Thus, the Court was satisfied the regulation was content 
neutral.  The Court was wise to scrutinize the city’s purpose, but the method proposed here 
suggests the Court was wrong when it said that the “government’s purpose is the controlling 
consideration”55 in determining content neutrality and that a regulation is “content neutral so 
long as it is ‘justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.’”56 As argued 
above, government’s purpose should be one consideration in determining content neutrality, 
not the controlling consideration.  A content-neutral justification should not save a law that 
discriminates on its face based on content. 
 It should be emphasized that a requirement that judges evaluate purpose is not 
suggesting they partake in subjective mind-reading or base holdings on mere allegations.  In 
United States v. O’Brien,57 Chief Justice Warren astutely warned against “hazardous” 
inquiries into alleged intent of legislative members.58 The suggestion here is that judges 
focus on manifest purpose, which could include use of legislative history when the evidence 
 
52 Id. at 804 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  Recall that the dissenters in the case argued the law failed intermediate 
scrutiny.   
 
53 Id. at 792. 
 
54 Id.  
55 Id. at 791. 
 
56 Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted). 
 
57 391 U.S. 367 (1968). 
 
58 Id. at 383. 
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of discriminatory purpose is overwhelming.  Justice Kennedy’s documentation of legislative 
history in Hill v. Colorado,59 for instance, combined with the law’s preamble and its obvious 
effect persuasively made the case that the law there was not neutral.  Similarly, Justice 
Stevens was convincing in arguing in his City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M.60 dissent that the Court is 
not unwisely relying on allegations or suspicions when the testimony of virtually every 
member of a small governing body reveals a discriminatory purpose.61 Such evidence should 
preclude a finding of neutrality, even if the face of the regulation is neutral. 
 Further, to answer a question perhaps raised by the Court’s holding in Turner 
Broadcasting System v. FCC,62 any manifest content-based purpose prevents classifying a 
regulation as content neutral.  In Turner, the Court was persuaded that Congress’ “overriding 
objective” in passing the must-carry law was to save free local broadcast television from 
economic doom, a content-neutral purpose, the Court concluded.63 As argued in Chapter 3, 
however, the law arguably included a content-based purpose as well: The law favored local 
broadcast content.  The proposed method suggested here posits that judges should avoid 
being required to untangle purposes and determine which one “overrides” another.  If a law 
contains a content-based purpose, it cannot be labeled content neutral, no matter if the 
government proffers other neutral purposes it claims are paramount. 
 Finally, a court should examine the reasonable effects of a regulation.  Despite 
facially neutral language and purported justifications, a regulation should not be considered 
 
59 530 U.S. 703, 768-69 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting). 
 
60 529 U.S. 277 (2000). 
 
61 Id. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
62 512 U.S. 622 (1994). 
 
63 Id. at 646. 
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content neutral if it has a clear discriminatory impact or effect.  Although early Court 
opinions advised a careful look at effects,64 the Court has not consistently followed that 
advice.  As other scholars have argued, discriminatory effects are as offensive to First 
Amendment values as are discriminatory governmental purposes.65 Justice Scalia’s 
perceptive observation that legislation can “lend[] itself to use” for “invidious, thought-
control purposes”66 should inform the Court’s speech discrimination principles.  The 
dissenters in Hill, for instance, were correct that a reasonable assessment of the law’s effects 
there indicated it would disproportionately restrict one type of speech, anti-abortion speech.  
Justice Scalia argued that a regulation, applied at the entrance to medical facilities, “that 
operates only on speech that communicates a message of protest, education, or counseling     
. . . is a means of impeding speech against abortion.”67 Laws with such discriminatory 
effects should be not be reviewed under the less demanding intermediate scrutiny simply 
because legislators were careful to avoid evidence of discrimination on the law’s face or in 
its manifest purpose.  If the inevitable effect of a regulation – described by one commentator 
suitably as not just any effect “but only one which seems to be a necessary and obvious 
consequence of the” regulation68 – is that it has a one-way effect of closing off one side of a 
 
64 See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939) (“In every case, therefore, where legislative 
abridgment of the [speech and press] rights is asserted, the courts should be astute to examine the effect of the 
challenged legislation.). 
 
65 See, e.g., Susan Williams, Content Discrimination and the First Amendment, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 615 (1991). 
 
66 Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 792 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part 
and dissenting in part). 
67 Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 744 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 
68 Williams, supra note 65, at 730 n.312. 
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debate69 or singling out a particular message, the regulation cannot be labeled content 
neutral.70 
If evaluation reveals the regulation’s face, purpose, and effect are neutral, the 
regulation is properly classified as content neutral and intermediate scrutiny is the standard of 
review.  If, on the other hand, one of the inquiries precludes a content-neutral label, a court 
must then proceed to the second step and decide whether the regulation is viewpoint neutral.  
The Court has clouded its jurisprudence by conflating the content and viewpoint terms, 
appearing to review all content-based restrictions of private speech and speech in public 
forums under strict scrutiny.  As mentioned above, the Court is correct when it suggests that 
viewpoint discrimination is a type of content discrimination.  A viewpoint restriction, by 
definition, is a restriction that makes the content of expression crucial.71 As the Court has 
recognized, however, not all content-based restrictions are viewpoint based.  In limited 
public forums, nonpublic forums, and subsidy cases, content discrimination is permissible; 
viewpoint discrimination is not.  The method proposed here suggests that courts make the 
distinction between content and viewpoint in all speech contexts.  The Court has clouded its 
jurisprudence by conflating the concepts in some contexts yet making the constitutionality of 
regulations contingent on their distinction in others. 
 As discussed above, arguably two understandings of viewpoint discrimination can be 
distilled from the Court’s numerous cases, and those two understandings should serve as the 
Court’s definitions of the concept.  To repeat, viewpoint discrimination exists (1) when the 
 
69 See Casarez, supra note 33, at 581 n.497. 
 
70 Indeed, it should be labeled viewpoint discrimination in the method’s next step, as will be discussed, and 
struck down as unconstitutional. 
 
71 See CASS SUNSTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEECH 12 (1993). 
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government discriminates against offensive, unpopular, or disfavored views or messages or 
(2) when a competing perspective has been removed from a forum or debate.72 Content-
based restrictions that are not viewpoint based would be those that do not meet one of those 
two definitions.  Restrictions on whole subject matters, topics, or categories of speech 
constitute content-based but viewpoint-neutral regulations.  The 1992 case Burson v. 
Freeman73 serves as an example.  In Burson, a Tennessee law prohibited the solicitation of 
votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of the entrance to 
a polling place.  The Court correctly labeled the law content based: The law’s application 
depended on the content of speech.74 As the Court noted, though content based, the law was 
viewpoint neutral.  The entire category of political campaign speech was barred.  The state 
had a neutral purpose; no view was being disfavored; all competing campaign perspectives 
were treated evenly. 
 The Court’s holding in Burson demonstrates that these type of content-based but 
viewpoint-neutral regulations can be upheld.  Justice Blackmun’s plurality opinion stressed 
that “an examination of the evolution of election reform . . . demonstrate[d] the necessity of 
restricted areas in or around polling places.”75 In other words, the law, the Court held, passed 
the rigorous strict scrutiny test and thus was constitutional.  The Court has admitted that only 
the “rare case” survives strict scrutiny.76 Yet that strict standard is appropriate, the Court has 
 
72 A regulation with a one-way effect that closed off one side of a debate or singled out a particular message 
would thus constitute viewpoint discrimination. 
 
73 504 U.S. 191 (1992). 
 
74 Id. at 197. 
 
75 Id. at 200. 
 
76 Id. at 211. 
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argued, because, although viewpoint neutral, a category restriction like the one at issue in 
Burson still distorts debate.  When the government bars an entire category of content from a 
public forum, the Court reasons, such a restriction should be treated with suspicion. 
 Importantly, Burson showed that, though rigorous, strict scrutiny is not fatal in fact.  
As argued above, the Court, therefore, is wrong to conflate the content and viewpoint 
concepts when reviewing restrictions on private speech and in public forums.  Even though 
the Court has not upheld a regulation that appeared to be viewpoint based in those contexts 
under strict scrutiny, the Court’s conflation of the terms at least implies that an instance of 
viewpoint discrimination could be upheld if it were capable of passing strict scrutiny.  The 
implication is false, as the Court has acknowledged in other speech contexts by suggesting 
that viewpoint discrimination is invalid on its face.77 Viewpoint discrimination, one scholar 
said, “is the primary free speech clause danger.”78 As Justice Brennan argued in Perry 
Education Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, “Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in 
its purest form and government regulation that discriminates among viewpoints threatens the 
continued vitality of free speech.”79 A viewpoint restriction negatively impacts all of the 
values that underlie and inform the First Amendment.80 A finding of viewpoint 
discrimination, therefore, should result in per se unconstitutionality.  
 
77 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106 (2001) (“When the State establishes a 
limited public forum, the State is not required to and does not allow persons to engage in every type of speech . 
. . . The State’s power to restrict speech, however, is not without limits.  The restriction must not discriminate 
against speech on the basis of viewpoint.”). 
 
78 Jacobs, supra note 4, at 600. 
 
79 460 U.S. 37, 62 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).   
 
80 See Jacobs, supra note 4, at 599-600. 
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 In limited public forums and nonpublic forum cases, of course, the analysis begins 
with the content/viewpoint distinction.  Content discrimination is permissible in those 
contexts, even expected, the Court has said.  Government can also permissibly exclude a 
class of speakers from forums it has created.  Viewpoint discrimination, however, is 
impermissible.  The distinction is critical.  As Chapter 4 showed, however, the Court has 
used inconsistent methods to identify viewpoint discrimination in the two contexts.  The 
method proposed here would, again, require courts to use all three inquiries (looking to face, 
purpose, and effect) to determine whether a regulation in a limited or nonpublic forum 
amounts to viewpoint discrimination.  Because government has the discretion to reasonably 
restrict the boundaries of forums, it may not be immediately apparent whether the face of a 
regulation is viewpoint based.  A court’s inquiry into discriminatory purpose and effect is 
thus especially important.  The Court has been wrong to ignore discriminatory effect in its 
nonpublic forum cases.81 It has proffered no good reason why it should apply different 
standards, and no such reason exists.  “Viewpoint discrimination is censorship in its purest 
form,”82 no matter the speech context.  The Court has thus also erred in applying a seemingly 
“lighter” test of viewpoint discrimination in subsidy cases.  When the government subsidizes 
private speech, the Constitution’s ban on viewpoint discrimination should apply, a point the 
Court seemed to embrace more forcefully in Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez,83 its recent 
subsidy case.84 
81 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Arkansas Educ. Television 
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).   
 
82 Perry, 460 U.S. at 62 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 
83 531 U.S. 533, 548-49 (2001) (“Where private speech is involved, even Congress’ antecedent funding decision 
cannot be aimed at the suppression of ideas thought inimical to the Government’s own interest.”). 
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 Drawing the line between content and viewpoint85 no doubt presents difficult cases.  
The dissenters in Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia86 were 
arguably correct, however, that the Court muddied the water in that case.  The University 
policy there, on its face, barred funding for student publications of all religious faiths as well 
as agnostic or atheist perspectives.  And, as the Court acknowledged, the University had a 
neutral purpose.  It denied funding not because it disagreed with the speech but because it 
sought to avoid an Establishment Clause violation.  If such a regulation is viewpoint based, 
as the Court concluded, then the Court has all but obliterated the distinction between content 
and viewpoint.  Although the Court’s wide interpretation in Rosenberger of what counts as 
an opposing viewpoint might have superficial appeal, the ramifications of the decision are 
dramatic.  As has been discussed, the Court has not extended Rosenberger’s rationale beyond 
religious speech.  Pre-Rosenberger Court precedents upheld exclusions of political speech 
from nonpublic forums as viewpoint neutral.87 Extending Rosenberger’s rationale would 
seem to imply that those cases were wrongly decided, that any restriction on political speech 
in a forum would be viewpoint discriminatory because apolitical viewpoints or perspectives 
would be left unfettered.  If those decisions are correct, on the other hand, the consequence 
would seem to be that religious speech has more protection than political speech, an odd 
understanding of the First Amendment in a democracy, to be sure.  Moreover, if regulation of 
 
84 Of course, that assertion is contingent on a distinction between government and private speech.  Discussion of 
that distinction is outside the scope of this dissertation.  Commentators and courts, however, have proposed 
factors that should be considered in any workable analysis.  See, e.g., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc. v. 
Comm’r of Va. Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 288 F.3d 610, 618 (4th Cir. 2002); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Who’s 
Talking? Disentangling Government and Private Speech, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 35 (2002). 
 
85 Recall that the approach proposed here requires courts to make the content/viewpoint distinction in all speech 
contexts, including public forums and private speech. 
 
86 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 
87 See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). 
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any broad subject – be it religion, politics, economics – constitutes a viewpoint regulation, 
the practical implication would thus seem to be that government has little control in defining 
the boundaries of the forums it voluntarily creates, a drastic reversal of Court precedent.88 
A more fruitful approach distinguishing content from viewpoint examines the case 
facts in context.  If an examination of the application of the regulation in Rosenberger, for 
instance, revealed that Christian publications – but no other faiths – would be barred from 
funding, the policy would have been viewpoint discriminatory.  One competing perspective, 
one viewpoint would have been silenced.  Evidence in front of the Court actually cast doubt 
on the policy’s neutral effect.  The Muslim Students Association (MSA) received funding 
because the University classified it as a cultural, as opposed to a religious, organization.89 
The MSA then used funds to publish “Al-Salam,” a publication intended to “promote a better 
understanding of Islam to the University Community.”90 As Professor Nicole Casarez 
argued, a finding of viewpoint discrimination would have rested on a more defensible 
foundation had the Court emphasized the policy’s arguably discriminatory application.91 
The key when making the distinction between content and viewpoint is thus to limit 
analysis of effect to actual application, if available, and, if not, reasonably predictable or 
inevitable effects, as described above.  Any good judge, unrestrained, could muster up a 
hypothetical to find support for a point.  Justice Scalia’s hypothetical debate in R.A.V. v. City 
 
88 See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983) (ruling government 
can create a limited public forum “for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups or for the discussion of 
certain subjects”).   
 
89 See Casarez, supra note 33, at 528. 
 
90 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 850 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 
91 Casarez, supra note 33, at 529. 
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of St. Paul92 that pitted supporters and opponents of racism shouting fighting words at one 
another, for example, arguably was not “a necessary and obvious consequence of the” law.93 
The Court was on much surer footing in United States v. Eichman,94 in which it ruled that, in 
spite of claims of facial neutrality, the law in effect singled out flag desecration for 
punishment. 
 
he new method proposed here can make no claim of infallibility.  Arguably no test 
or approach can anticipate and encompass all issues that will come before a court.  The best 
we can hope for, and what this proposal aimed to offer, is guidelines as clear as possible 
(which are presently sorely lacking in the Court’s jurisprudence), applied consistently and in 
good faith by judges not driven solely by ideological views.  Political science scholars might 
say this is wishful thinking, that ideological preferences will always influence judicial 
decision making.  Even so, every effort should be made to minimize the role of ideology.  
The First Amendment, generally, and its prohibition of viewpoint discrimination, 
specifically, are far too important not to try. 
 
92 505 U.S. 377 (1992).  
 
93 Williams, supra note 65, at 730 n.312. 
 
94 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
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